



## Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Participations with Pakistan's Army to Fight the Terrorism after 9/11

▪ DOI: 10.31703/gsssr.2022(VII-II).03

▪ URL: [http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2022\(VII-II\).03](http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2022(VII-II).03)

▪ Vol. VII, No. II (Spring 2022)

▪ Pages: 17 - 24

▪ p-ISSN: 2708-2121

▪ e-ISSN: 2708-3616

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**Abstract:** *A modern state keeps on attending to governmental matters without paying attention to the dangers and confrontations thereof. Otherwise, the State cannot attain a stable, peaceful environment. The inner threats such as terrorism and extremism faced by the country are not different from going into a war with another country as it also weakens and demolishes the State. Hence, the country going through a critical period due to inner threats needs to strengthen the base of the law enforcement agencies. When it comes to Pakistan, the ability of the security agencies has been greatly weakened and affected by the presence of internal and external security threats. Pakistan's security has been greatly compromised due to the massive number of terror attacks and various crimes orchestrated from the unchecked villages and tribal areas. The army, intelligence services institutions and all other security departments are responsible for assisting the police force when they are performing their main duty, which is to maintain the law and order situation. The study will focus on the role of KP Police in the battle against terrorism and analyze their weak points.*

**KEYWORDS:** KP Police, Pak Army, Terrorism

### Introduction

The intelligence agencies, the Intelligence Bureau, which are civilian institutions, are controlled by ex-army officials. As a result, the army chief is expected by the political heads to solve all security issues. They are expecting him to take charge of all actions taken against the terrorists and criminals. Hence, the police do not have a suitable counter-terrorism policy at their disposal, and they do not have the ability to create one. On October 22, 2008, endeavours were made to create a fourteen points plan to face the threat of terrorism, and thus, the NACTA was established in 2009 (Ghauri, 2008).

So, now the administrations and political governments are concerned about national security due to the growing threat of terrorism. They all are interested in creating means to counter terrorism in future and live peacefully. Hence, the State has agreed to improve the

police force. We have discussed these improvements before. This whole chapter will focus on the output of these efforts and improvements. It will also focus on the role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police in the battle against terrorism and analyze their weak points.

### Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Role in Neutralizing the Situation

A terrorist draws strength from his strong political and religious beliefs, making it hard to detach himself from this kind of mindset. Some countries have initiated operations to neutralize the extremist mindset of individuals, but their success has been questionable (Abbas, 2011). The countries that have designed these kinds of programs are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. The success rate of the program could be enhanced if police and jail

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administration perform vigorously as these kinds of programs are mostly conducted in jails or asylum cells. Police have been assigned the responsibility of conducting these programs and are expected to play a pivotal role in many major countries.

There are multiple benefits of conducting these programs in prisons. The environment of the prisons offers the confined person various mindsets. Even if a detainee is not interested in these kinds of programs, he can still have an opportunity for discussions with his peers and build a strong relationship with them. (Hassan, 2013). Police also keep an eye on the prisoners even after their release and help them to co-exist in society, thus reducing their chances of backsliding. In the maxim of "we command respect", the Police force can present a friendly face of its authority, and their behaviour with the public is important as only amicably they can inculcate the concept of abiding by the law in criminals for the overall peace of society.

Subsequently, after these programs, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government has decided to indulge the Police force in these rehabilitation initiatives, especially when terrorists' main targets are the police themselves. Even if the police had been imparted proper training and had the ability to deal with terrorism, still they were unable to face the challenges posed by terrorism and also had to deal with physical and structural damage. In the district Swat of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, these programs have been initiated from the point of view of post-insurrection rehabilitation. The role of police in all this is very little as the army is leading the program.

### The De-radicalization Model

Prior to the launching of the recovery program for the detainees in Pakistan, the idea of de-radicalization was totally unknown as the only option to counter terrorism was using armed force. After the completion of a victorious operation conducted in the Swat area against the terrorists in 2009, a recovery program was launched in the district. The terrorists who yielded during the operation were detained with others who were named by their relatives. In 2010, the army decided to screen detainees as a way of identifying serious militants. A de-radicalization program was then launched for

those detainees who were not considered serious militants. As of June 2012, the Swat initiative was still in its initial phase.

So, according to the International model, there are four stages of the recovery programs that are initiated on a large scale. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police followed these 4 steps at different levels of security, society, beliefs and politics. The program was developed by the army of Pakistan and cost the government Rs 4.4 million. Money for the budget was allotted by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government (Farooq, 2010). Out of the 4 stages, the 1<sup>st</sup> stage was supposed to allow the youngsters to complete their education. The 2<sup>nd</sup> stage provides coaching and knowledge so that they are able to have a logical and separate mindset. The 3<sup>rd</sup> stage motivated them to discuss their issues and develop family engagement. The 4<sup>th</sup> stage included training the individuals in different crafts so that they could earn a living for themselves. So far, more or less 400 people have been able to return to a normal way of life thanks to these programs (PIPS, 2010).

There was not much contribution by the Swat police in the fight against terror, but still, they played a vital role. The army and the swat police were involved in the identifying process of the detainees who seemed fit for the recovery program. The police forces were also in charge of supervising the recovered individuals' wanting to have a comeback to society. In Rajanpur District, a training school was installed by the Punjab government for the individuals of the prohibited groups who were willing to return to normal life (pPIPS, 2012). On the other hand, TTP and some other religious groups continuously targeted the police officers. A total of 418 police personnel were murdered in terrorist attacks, and some 640 were badly harmed (Seifert, 2010). Thus, these harsh truths did not allow the police to participate in the recovery programs completely.

### Army Operations and the Participation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police

The policies were reconsidered by the Pakistani government, and the religious groups of Pakistan were banned. On the other hand, Pakistan got involved in the war on terror and slaughtered many Taliban. The war on terror in Pakistan spread countrywide and was just not

in the FATA and other tribal regions. In order to handle the terrorist groups' actions, large participation was made to stop the Taliban. In North Waziristan in the year 2004, the first action against the Taliban was taken. The mission turned out to be successful as some 300 terrorists were killed and some 600 were detained during the mission ([Hilali, 2014](#)). President Musharraf states, "We have broken the back of al Qaeda and destroyed its vertical and horizontal communication links. We have captured more than 700 terror operatives." He also mentioned that "I can challenge that no other country has done more than Pakistan in the counter-terror campaign" ([Malik, 2011](#)).

In 2006, Baitullah Mehsud succeeded Nek and became the head of TTP. In the name of Islam and implementing the Sharia Law, he asked other terrorist groups to target the Pak army and its security agencies. The situation took a new turn when eleven soldiers were accidentally killed in a US air strike which made the Pakistani government question the US policies. As a result, they wanted to shake hands with Baitullah Mehsud ([Rana, 2014](#)). The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009 was signed between both parties. The agreement did not last long enough as the Taliban did not respect the agreement and carried out violent operations in the Malakand region. As a result, the terrorists living in tribal areas were targeted by the Pak army ([Abbas, 2013](#)). The Pakistani government did not want to compromise with the terrorists again, and they targeted the Taliban without any remorse in FATA, Malakand and Swat regions since 2002. There were 3 levels of this operation;

1. The 1<sup>st</sup> was that they wanted to neutralize Taliban and Al Qaeda channels,
2. The 2<sup>nd</sup> was that they needed to obtain Intel on Taliban networks
3. The 3<sup>rd</sup> was that they wanted to initiate military strikes.

Sirat-e-Mustaqeem, Darghalam, Bia-Darghalam and Kwakhbadesham were a few small-scale programs initiated in Khyber Agency. In Malakand Division, the operation named Rah-e-Rast proved to be the most fruitful one as it handed the control back to the government of the area, thus weakening the control of the terrorists in the area. In 2009, 596 strikes were initiated against terrorist in comparison to last year, when the numbers of

attacks were half (313) only. During the year, 12,866 militants were arrested, including 75 al Qaeda and 9,739 local Taliban and militants belonging to other banned groups and Baloch insurgents ([PIPS, 2010](#)). For the accomplishment of the Waziristan operation, 2 divisions of 100,000 army men were sent to FATA. The Air Force of Pakistan indulged in air strikes in 38 different instances. On the other hand, on the ground operation, 930 terrorists and 580 outsiders were slain. However, when FATA was left by the Pak army, TTP found some room again ([Sabir, 2013](#)). Naturally, due to all these operations, the Taliban became crueller and started decapitating army men in Mingora (Gokay, 2003). So a large-scale action was taken by the Pak army against Afghani terrorists. These operations are;

1. In 2001 and 2002, in the South Waziristan region, the AL-Mizan operation was launched.
2. In 2007 in the region of Bajaur, an operation name Sherdil was conducted.
3. In 2008 in the region of South Waziristan, the Zalzala operation was initiated.
4. In 2008, in the Malakand division and the Swat valley, the operation Rah-e-Haq was launched.
5. In 2009, the operation Rah-e-Rast was initiated in division of Malakand.

### **Operation Al-Mizan and Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police**

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The Taliban's authority was toppled in Afghanistan. This forced them and other international terrorists to find shelter in the northern regions (FATA and PATA). The Taliban who came finding shelters were aided by the local criminals and militants ([Malik, 2005](#)). Together, the terrorist orchestrated an attack on army men of Pakistan stationed in the Azam Warsak area of South Waziristan in June 2002 ([Jamal, 2015](#)). This attack led to the death of 12 army men in Pakistan ([Kelleher, 2011](#)). So, Pakistan decided to launch small and large security operations under the name Al-Mizan to target the terrorists in FATA with a major focus on South Waziristan in June 2002.

The sole purpose of the operation Al-Mizan was to exterminate the terrorists and other extremists, especially those who were hiding in that region. They were a threat to the national security of Pakistan, so they needed to

be exterminated as quickly as possible. President Musharraf's role in the war on terror was very important as he was assisting the NATO forces greatly, and this also got him appreciated in an international forum. Due to the support of NATO forces, Zawahiri called for Musharraf's head. Thus Musharraf commanded his forces to eliminate all the threats hiding in the key locations of South Waziristan (Kozal, 2014). The lack of better communication between the police and other security departments did not allow the police force to play any major role in the war on terror. This non-communication also caused many security concerns. Unluckily, the operation Al-Mizan did not come out as a big success as the terrorist did not withdraw from the area. In comparison, Ahmedzai Wazir and other terrorists put up strong resistance in the path of the Pakistan army. The operation also allowed the police force to take an active part in the army's actions (International Crisis Group, 2014).

### Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Kalosha March 2004 (Wana)

In January 2004, in Wana, trigonal-sided rocket attacks were launched by the police force and the army, which led them to become the main target of the terrorists. In South Waziristan, at the location of Bajaur, there were many camps of the Pak army on which the terrorists initiated rocket attacks. Shulma army walkthrough point had to face serious damages. The response to the terrorist attack on the army camp was given in the shape of an army operation. "Operation Kalosha" was a major operation launched due to the worsening security situation. The objective of the mission was "search-and-destroy" (International Crisis Group, 2014). The objective of "search-and-destroy" was to eliminate the entire terrorists who came from outside the country. Despite the claims being made by the Pakistan army, the 13-day operation could not dismantle the terrorists.

### Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Silence, July 2007

The Lal masjid devotees wanted to destabilize the country. As a response, the Musharraf government initiated a military operation against all of them in the name of national

security. The revolutionaries hiding in the complex were elated by the masjids administration. Due to the fact every side witnessed the massacre, the operation was called silence which was a failed operation (Dawn, 2015). In various sections of the countries, large numbers of suicide attacks were launched by the terrorist after the said operation. In Islamabad, the locals got terrified due to the deteriorating security situation in the city. The Taliban commander, Maulvi Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, stated on July 21, 2007, "Mujahideen of the north and south Waziristan agencies will avenge the martyred brothers, sisters, and sons. Praise be to Allah, Mujahideen have launched activities and conducted guerilla and suicide attacks against the army and paramilitary forces. They will take revenge on the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa operation" (Dawn, 2015). As a result, the KPK police started arresting hundreds of defendants with the help of other intelligence sectors. The KPK Police wanted to pinpoint all the offenders. The KPK police were assisted in this matter by the Pak army (Perito, 2014). They wanted to terminate the terrorist hideouts and criminal gangs in Peshawar and other areas.

### The Rah-e-Haq Operation and the Participation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in it

KPK Swat district had an operation conducted in its territory by the defence forces known as Rah-e-Haq. Most tourists love to visit the valley of Swat, and it houses many attractive mountains of Pakistan. Sufi Muhammad, who was the controller of TNSM, directed his organization to slowly introduce their armed and political strength in the Sway valley. The first task was coordinated in November 2007 by the Pakistan security personnel, and in the centre of 2008, the task was reinitiated, which went on to operate for another year (Dawn, 2015). In the 3<sup>rd</sup> round of the operation, Rah-e-Haq was crucial as in the Swat valley. The Pakistan security forces initiated the shoot-on-sight protocol. The killing of army men and wrecking of the schools were the justification required for the arresting of the rebel forces. The "Malakand agreement" is a peace accord signed between terrorist and security forces of Pakistan (Nacos, 2011). The police force did not make any contributions to operation Rah-e-

Haq, but still, they managed to train a lot of new recruits to face the threat of terrorism. The Pak army, with the help of Swat police, successfully pinpointed the individuals for recovery programs. The police force was also in charge of keeping an eye after the detainees were released into society and following whatever they were doing.

### **Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Zalzalā**

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The South Waziristan's Mehsud Tribe was the point of interest for the security forces of Pakistan after the Shakai accord revival. The leaders of the Mehsud clan, i.e. Abdullah Mehsud and Baitullah Mehsud, were the main targets as an operation was designed against them by the army. The name of the operation was "Operation Zalzalā". The goal of "Operation Zalzalā" was to liberate the areas acquired by the Mehsud clan (Jones & Fair, 2010). The liberation of the Sararogha fort was the motivating point of operation Zalzalā for the Pak army as it was in the hands of the terrorists. In the coming days, little army men lost their lives, and many wanted to have a direct battle with the forces of the Mehsud clan. The time period of operation Zalzalā was from January to May 2008, and the army was obligated to finish its task until May 2008. After the operation was successful, the army left the area and returned (IRIN News, 2011, May 30). The organizations of terrorists and criminal groups were also pinpointed by the police who were hiding in the area.

### **Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem**

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The name 'Sirat-e-Mustaqeem' (right path) was another operation initiated by the Pakistan army. The operation was launched on June 29 2008. The location of the operation was the Khyber Agency. The 2 groups, i.e. Bareilvi Ansar-ul-Islam and Deobandi Lashkar-e-Islami, were drowned in factional-based disputes, and the area, as a result, became a point of interest for terrorists. Thus, the area started to witness a centre of terrorist activities. The operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem was a failure as the terrorists could not be pulled apart by it (Rana, 2014). Nevertheless, while the religious conferences and fairs were in motion, the

police force took part in them with the motive of introducing improvements (Hilali, 2005). The hatred shown during press conferences towards the opposite party was prohibited. Police officers also closely monitored rallies and kept law and order situations in check.

### **Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Sher Dil**

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Some subordinates of Al-Qaeda, mainly Zia Ur Rehman and Faqir Muhammad, were leading a terrorist group. The Sher Dil Operation was to terminate them. Bajaur and Swat terrorists had aid and assistance from Baitullah Mehsud. He did so to boost the rebellion, and so the attacks on military men of Pakistan, officers of the government and security forces could be increased. TTP terrorist-related group called TNSM was also the target of operation Sher Dil. The police were forced to initiate the operation and to free the area of Swat from terrorists (Rana, 2014). The recovery program was brought into the area, and the army soldiers stayed in order to help youngsters train and recover.

### **Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Rah-e-Rast**

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In 2009, strategies to counter the increasing rebellion movements were being worked upon. The operation called Rah-e-Rast became part of the campaign and showed an excellent success ratio. It was foreseen by the Pakistani army that in order to have a better aim at the Pak army soldiers, the Taliban would abandon their fortress and will come out in the wide areas where collateral damage would be minimal. But a mishap occurred in which the roads and mountain routes were not blocked due to insufficient resources. Lastly, a pickup vehicle proved to be an extraction for much of the Taliban. More helicopter monitoring was required to tail the vehicle. The valley of Swat was split into northern and southern regions in the name of the Rah-e-Rast operation. Pakistan army grounded ¼ soldier in each of the regions. In addition to 2 wings of FC and special service commandos, 52,000 more troops were available. The army was evacuated before any operation could begin, and 3,000,000 people were moved to somewhere else. 2 million were placed in camps installed by the army, and

after airstrikes aided the ground operation, the army was able to disperse the terrorists, although TNSM leadership could not be detained (Hassan, 2013). It was believed that Dir had been used as an escape route by TNSM to enter Afghanistan.

### **Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Rah-e-Nijat**

From 2008-09, Baitullah Mehsud belonging to South Waziristan Agency, kept giving orders to his militants. In those years, everyone was afraid due to Baitullah Mehsud's activities and the failure of operation Zalzal (Ghauri, 2008). Baitullah Mehsud was raised in South Waziristan, where his fortress was located. Baitullah Mehsud, in 2008 and 2009, caused brutality diagonally in Pakistan. At this point, Operation Rah-e-Nejat was initiated by Pakistan, being the 4<sup>th</sup> operation in South Waziristan on October 17, 2009 (Hassan, 2013). Securing the leading exits was the main goal of this operation and to annihilate terrorist corners and their South Waziristan base. In mid-year 2009, with some help from the US military and the CIA, Pakistan was finally able to successfully launch initial strikes orchestrated by the Pak army and air force. The 11<sup>th</sup> corps was in general order with three divisions: the 7<sup>th</sup>, situated in Miranshah; the 9<sup>th</sup> in Wana and the 4<sup>th</sup> corps forward sent to Jandola (Hassan, 2013). On August 5, South Waziristan was hit by a drone strike from the CIA in which Baitullah was slain. In January 2010, his successor Hakeemullah Mehsud was also slain in a Drone strike.

### **Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2013)**

In 2012, major parts of tribal agencies and the Malakand Division got liberated by the armed forces of Pakistan. North Waziristan was the only marshland left. The army chief Gen Kayani did not approve the operation despite having the consent of the CGS and Corps Commanders. When Gen Kayani left, Gen Raheel Sharif was the one to take his place as the chief of army staff. After having his approval, the operation took flight without delay in June 2014. The groups against which the operation was intended were TTP, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkestan

Islamic Movement, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al-Qaeda, Jundallah and the Haqqani Network. The work plan of the army for this operation was SEEK-DESTROYED-CLEAR-HOLD. The strategy of Seek and destroy was adopted from the time of the Vietnam War. On the other hand, the Clear and hold strategy was the part of Iraq War. The 2 ideologies were merged by the Pak army, which resulted in the operation being a success. The protocol for this operation would be that army would pursue the prey. If one is found, then it would be detained but while the operation is in process and after its fulfilment to make certain that the enemy does not come back after the army leaves the area and start the rehabilitation process there. Only after 1 and ½ years of Zarb-e-Azb, tremendous favourable results were attained. The terrorists were a lost cause now, and their formation was pulled into the piece. The operation conducted by the intelligence authorities diffused all the remaining sleeper cell channels. The rest of the sleeper cells were arrested. The numbers of terrorist slain were 3400, numbers of hideouts demolished were 387, from where orders were being taken and given. The number of committed terrorists slain is 183, while 21193 were arrested. However, this success came with a high price, 488 valiant officers, men of the Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, and Rangers Sindh sacrificed their lives, and 1914 were injured. The sum of all these operations was that in Pakistan, attacks by terrorists declined to a 6-year low since 2008 (Rana, 2011).

The outcome of the counter-terrorism operation conducted could be more positive if people have a sense of responsibility and cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Much cannot be done alone by the law enforcement agencies if they are not supported by society. So people must help law enforcement agencies in any way they can. The realization for people of their own role in society and how can they improve their society is very important. The success rate of the police force carrying out an operation in an isolated area only depends upon the people living there, whose help can change the outcome of the operation and can make the operation successful. In Pakistan, people are afraid of police approaching them for any kind of assistance, so they already distance

themselves from the police. The absence of a strong bond between people and police is what makes the terrorists strong.

Not to mention that only a small part of the police force has been able to take advantage of the attention given by the provincial and federal governments in the wake of terrorism in terms of improving police effectiveness and empowering them with the latest equipment and technology. Most of the department of police is still not that much efficient and is still using outdated and old stuff. The terrorists have better weapons and technology at their disposal as compared to our police, so there is no match between them. The communication channels of terrorists are also better than the police. However, the sad aspect of all this is that even after all the threats to national security, police and law enforcement agencies have never taken anything serious and have failed to create an effective strategy against terrorism.

### **Role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police in Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad**

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On February 22 2017, an operation was launched by the Pak army called Radd-ul-Fasaad targeting the hidden sleeper cells. The aim of the operation was that local security forces would be assisted by the army in order to eliminate sleep cells and their hideouts. In 2014, the operation, which was called Zarb-e-Azb, was supposed to be strengthened by initiating this operation. An additional goal of this operation is to ensure Pak borders security. The Interior Minister is the controller of this operation. Under this operation, all active security forces departments, whether local or army-related, are working together towards the collective goal. The wide goal of this operation also covered the demobilization of the weapons that could facilitate terrorists.

### **Miscellaneous Efforts by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police**

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In 2017, it was confirmed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa authorities that terrorist activities in the region are reduced to a great extent, which resulted in improved law and order situation in the province. "The number of terrorist attacks in the province in 2016 was

lower than in the last six years, which is proof that the efforts of army and police have improved the law-and-order situation to a great extent" (KP Inspector General of Police (IGP) Nasir Khan Durrani). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police, especially the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD), played a pivotal role in improving law and order through increased intelligence-based search-and-strike operations and restricting militants' safe havens through a number of new policy reforms, he said. "If we compare the number of terror incidents in 2017, it is far better than those in 2015 and 2014," said Durrani, adding that the province suffered 238 terrorist incidents in 2016, compared to 297 in 2015 and 610 in 2014. "Incidents of extortion also went down to 100 in 2017 as compared to 344 in 2014 and 178 in 2015,". "Apart from blasts and extortion cases, the number of kidnapping-for-ransom cases reached 22 in 2017, [compared to] 110 in 2014 and 53 in 2015," was claimed by Mehsud, the CTD head from the past 2 years. The actions taken by the army of Pakistan in FATA have had "remarkable effects on the law-and-order situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa," Forward of Pakistan was informed by him "For police, there were two major challenges: one, nabbing fleeing militants who had escaped to settled areas as a result of the operation, and two, to stop their further infiltration," he stated. Since June 2014, almost 1,195 extreme terrorists have been detained by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police thanks to the Zarb-e-Azb operation as specified by Mehsud (Hassan, 2013).

### **Concluding Comments**

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Police and other security agencies always kept their eyes wide open even when the terror attacks decreased considerably, only to tackle any disrupting activity. Additionally, all the landlords who rented their properties to tenants without proper identification were on the police radar and were being pursued by the police force, and serious actions were taken against them because terrorists hid in their homes and hotels. Hence, it is a very positive fact that in all of Pakistan and especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the number of terrorist incidents has decreased majorly.

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