GLOBAL
Political
REVIEW *empowering humanity*
www.gprjournal.com

GPR

GLOBAL POLITICAL REVIEW
HEC-RECOGNIZED CATEGORY-Y

VOL. X, ISSUE III, SUMMER (SEPTEMBER-2025

Humanity Publications
sharing research

Article Title

Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan

Abstract

With the end of the Cold War came the proclamation of the end of history which turned out to be a hasty verdict. The twilight of the 20th Century was no different than its beginning because the historical continuum along the lines of the 'us versus 'them' is still woven into the national narrative of states. Against this background this paper investigates the nature of ideological commitment which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have interwoven in their national narratives.

Authors:

Ghulam Mustafa: (Corresponding Author)
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.
(Email: ghulammustafa@gcuf.edu.pk)

Visit Us

Citing this Article

07	Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan		
Authors	Ghulam Mustafa	**DOI**	10.31703/gpr.2025(X-III).07
		Pages	70-82
		Year	2025
		Volume	X
		Issue	III
Referencing & Citing Styles			
APA	Mustafa, G. (2025). Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan. *Global Political Review, X*(III), 70-82. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2025(X-III).07		
CHICAGO	Mustafa, Ghulam. 2025. "Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan." *Global Political Review* X (III):70-82. doi: 10.31703/gpr.2025(X-III).07.		
HARVARD	MUSTAFA, G. 2025. Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan. *Global Political Review,* X, 70-82.		
MHRA	Mustafa, Ghulam. 2025. 'Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan', *Global Political Review*, X: 70-82.		
MLA	Mustafa, Ghulam. "Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by a Unique Ideology: The Case of Dprk and Pakistan." *Global Political Review* X.III (2025): 70-82. Print.		
OXFORD	Mustafa, Ghulam (2025), 'Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan', *Global Political Review,* X (III), 70-82.		
TURABIAN	Mustafa, Ghulam. "Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by a Unique Ideology: The Case of Dprk and Pakistan." *Global Political Review* X, no. III (2025): 70-82. https://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2025(X-III).07.		

Title

Militaristic Nationalism, Driven and Sustained by A Unique Ideology: The Case of DPRK and Pakistan

Authors:

Ghulam Mustafa: (Corresponding Author)
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.
(Email: ghulammustafa@gcuf.edu.pk)

Contents

Abstract

With the end of the Cold War came the proclamation of the end of history which turned out to be a hasty verdict. The twilight of the 20th Century was no different than its beginning because the historical continuum along the lines of the 'us versus 'them' is still woven into the national narrative of states. Against this background this paper investigates the nature of ideological commitment which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have interwoven in their national narratives.

Keywords:

Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Democratic Republic of Korea, Militaristic Nationalism, Ideology

Introduction

A euphoria gripped the imaginations of those who witnessed the lifting of the Iron Curtain and loudly proclaimed the triumph of liberal ideas and values. The Cold War was over, and the ideological divide of the world was proclaimed as part of history. This death knell of ideologies turned out to be too hasty, and the characteristic divide of 'us' versus 'them' did not disappear. The fault lines got blurred but did not vanish. Ironically, the twilight of the 20th Century has been no different than its dawn, and the theater of this bloody drama was once again the Balkan region. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia along religious lines was a grim reminder that the era of ideological fault lines has not come to an end. This local religious and ethnic conflict reinforced global division when different warring parties attracted fighters from various parts of the globe with respective loyalties (Huntington, 1996).

Bewildered and shocked, the Danes could not believe the outrage and worldwide protests and demonstrations by the Muslim World against the

publishing of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. The nature and scope of the protests confounded the diplomatic relations of Denmark, which was unprecedented in its history (Kimmelman, 2008). The emerging flashpoints in Ukraine and Syria confirm the fragmented nature of global politics. What we are witnessing is not the repeat of history but rather its continuation along the lines of the 'us' versus 'them'.

Against this background, this paper investigates the nature and role of nationalism, augmented by a peculiar brand of ideological mooring and interwoven into the state narrative of both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan was carved out of British India as the Muslims of the subcontinent demanded a state of their own, arguing to have a separate nationhood based on their Islamic ideology. The DPRK, on the other hand, has been the culmination of a great power struggle in the 20th century, rooted in a deep ideological divide. This nationalism with strong ideological commitment provides quite interesting parallels, which this paper is trying to highlight.

The main purpose here is to critically evaluate the defining role of this unique nationalism, which has been instrumental in the establishment of new norms and setting of directions for state policies. The goal is not to analyze nationalism or nation per se, but to critique the defining role of ideology as the source of nation-building and sustaining project. As an ideological state, Pakistan, with the active help of the USA, Europe, and Arab countries, actively promoted and supported the cause of the Islamists and the mission of Jihad during the Afghan War, and its proxy wars with India became an unofficial policy tool of the state. In a similar fashion, the state of the DPRK relentlessly and unabashedly promoted and defended the heaven of *Juche* ideology, where legions of indoctrinated adherents are produced to defend it. Kim Il-sung (1973), "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work," Speech to Party Propaganda and Agitation Workers, December 28, 1955, Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Juche, as a political ideology, owes its birth to North Korea's founder, Kim Il-Sung, in the early 1950s. Many commentators have long argued that Juche as a political ideology as an indigenized form of Marxist Communism; other scholars disagree with such widely held views based on a systematic analysis of its tenets. North Korea's Juche is said to be different from the traditional Marxist-Leninist position in view of its rejection of the primacy of the vanguard party as stipulated by Leninism, and also pays no heed to the emphasis of the working class as the power behind the revolution as argued by Marx. The Juche ideology has been the very heart and soul of the extraordinary longevity of the North Korean regime, notwithstanding all the predictions of its imminent collapse. Among its core tenets are building a state that would be absolutely self-reliant and to be isolated from the rest of the world as far as is practically possible (Kim 1973). The formation of Pakistan on the basis of the Two-Nation theory is not only its cornerstone but also provides it with a separate identity vis-à-vis India and thus complements the state narrative of 'us' versus 'them' (Shabbir, Ali, & Batool, 2024). This reinforces a perpetual struggle for survival, transforming the country into a security state with a siege mentality. Whereas for the DPRK, the *Juche* ideology is the necessary framework to not only justify its existence but to actively seek the unification of the fatherland through the force of arms.

This discourse raises the question of how militaristic nationalism is driving the internal and external security policies of these states. What kind of domestic, regional and to some degree global factors dictate this persistent adherence to such nationalism? In finding answers to these questions, I will explicate the pivotal role of this unique brand of nationalism in forming not only the national narrative but also being crucial in the pursuit of aggressive foreign policy. What sort of security challenges this represents for the state itself and how it affects regional stability will be touched upon when explaining this singular form of nationalism.

Militaristic Nationalism as Part of State Narrative

Irrefutably, identity is a defining element in the contestations of groups and a handy instrument for politicians to exploit for mobilizing people to advance their political objectives (Hippler, 2005). Apart from defining the groups and determining their collective interests and responsibilities, ideology shapes their sense of belonging to one particular group by alienating the others who do not

subscribe to the same ideational construct. Such identity is interwoven in the national discourse as an unassailable narrative.

This ideational construct is employed to deconstruct the 'other side', which is then used as a parameter to determine and measure the loyalties of those residing inside the state boundaries. Such a definition of one's identity in comparison with others provides the requisite template for understanding the underlying objectives and interests of the state and the driving force behind the actions of state actors (Tidy, 2012). Nationalist demagogues systemically design and present the identity of the state in such a way as to set the direction for the country's military strategies and economic policies by cultivating public opinion. Regional and global security environments also determine the identity politics of the state, taking into account its relative strength and capabilities as compared with other states (Mastný, 1981). This dispensation plays a crucial role in the alliance choice of the state.

Defensiveness and victimization are the hallmarks of the complex security narratives of both Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the case of Pakistan, this security narrative gets further impetus by a teleological injunction of the danger posed by the adversarial forces of its enemies, which is threatening its Islamic identity. These hostile forces always lurk in the shadows with ever-readiness to jump at any opportunity and strike at the very roots of the state. This narrative is further reinforced by historicism, where a tragic and painful struggle for the formation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India is part of the national consciousness. The image of a persecuted Muslim nation in a hostile environment is imprinted on the national psyche (Cohen, 2002). For North Korea, the fountainhead of its narrative is ethnic nationalism, while the image of victimhood is bolstered by the so-called occupation of the other half of its fatherland by the American forces. This necessitates a military preparedness to liberate the Peninsula from the Occupier.

The Narrative in the State of Pakistan

The collapsing and disintegrating British Empire had to resolve the most urgent issue facing them in India was the irreconcilable split between Hindus and Muslims, as the country was edging towards

civil war. The All India Muslim League leadership vehemently maintained that the Muslims of India had a separate identity, historically rooted in their religion and extending to cultural and social mores, and entitles them to be a distinct nation (Sayeed, 1968; Qureshi, 1965). This led to the adoption of the Two-Nation Theory espoused by the Pakistan Movement and which claimed that Hindus and Muslims are two nations with significant historical differences. To this, the Hindus responded with their own jingoism, which further inflamed the communal frenzy between the two communities. This led to the worst kind of communal violence in Kolkata between Muslims and Hindus (Collins & Lapierre, 1997). The country was rushing towards a major civil war as the demand for a separate homeland by the Pakistan Movement became more pronounced and uncompromising. The fear of being submerged and subjugated by a Hindu majority after the departure of the British gave further impetus to the Pakistan movement (Jawad & Shabbir, 2025). Realizing the inevitable, the departing British partitioned India in 1947 between the so-called Muslim Pakistan and Secular India.

Cognizant of the fact that the young nation has to be provided with a strong unifying bond, the founding father, Quai-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, fervently stressed the adoption of the state ideology. Along with the material health of the state, nationalism steeped in Islamic ideology was projected as the surest way for strengthening the psychological bonds of the fledgling state. The founding father vividly delineated the guiding lines for the new state in these words:

The state should create such conditions as are most conducive to translating the idea-system – that is, their cherished ideals – into social action. It should help in building a 'good society', like the Greeks – except that this society has to be based upon the Islamic value-system, the system which Pakistanis fervently believe in. Refer to President Jinnah's address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Karachi, delivered on August 11, 1947. Quoted in Ziadi, Z. H. (Ed.): Pakistan at last 26 July - 14 August 1947. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, Vol. 4, Islamabad: "Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project," National Archives of Pakistan, 1999, pp. 537/538.

This crowning of the state ideology finds its due reflection in the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic

Republic of Pakistan. Articles 2 and 227 of the Constitution affirm this dispensation as the legal foundation for the state ideology. Thus, reinforcing the Islamic credentials of the state, where its identity is firmly established in the Muslim creed. As a natural corollary, Pakistani nationalism is grounded in Islam, which credits it with the unique status of a state founded in the name of ideological nationalism. Scholars like Cohen (2004) in their fervent argumentation trace this separateness to historical events and figures (Cohen, 2004). One historical incident that more often finds repetition is the invasion of Sindh by the Arab Army under the command of Muhammad bin Qasim in 712 A.D. However, these assertions and claims are not without their critics and are being criticized as a myopic and distorted view of history.

A counter-narrative of these events and historical figures is presented by the Indian literature. While Muhammad bin Qasim is a heroic person who crusaded for the true religion of Islam in the Pakistani literature, for Indian scholars he was a foreign invader and a colonialist. This incident, according to Indian scholar Goel (1996), is an Arab cultural onslaught in the name of religion (Goel, 1996). Not only frontiers but history also has become a contested field between India and Pakistan. The Delhi Sultanate under various Muslim rulers is a proud reminder of the glory of Muslim power in the Sub-continent. Competing and contrary versions and perspectives of history are a continuous point of departure between the two nations. This contestation is extended to historical figures, where the heroes of one party are the villains for the other. For instance, Ghauri, Ghazni, and Abdali, originating from modern-day Afghanistan, represent the glorious era of Islamic expansion where these warriors defeated and subdued the rulers of India and, as such, are portrayed as the heroes of Islam in Pakistan. For India, these personalities evoke the image of nothing more than marauders and looters.

The Narrative in the State of the Democratic Republic of Korea

After the vanquished Japanese Empire, the ensuing great power struggle led to the most unfortunate division of the Korean nation. Most Koreans were optimistic about the future of their country and were hoping for the eventual realization of their long awaited independence. But the fate had it otherwise, and the unfolding events led to what the Koreans and their nationalist leaders had not even imagined. The vivisection of their fatherland was beyond their wildest dreams. This arbitrary decision, imposed by outside powers and reinforced and perpetuated by its so-called nationalist leaders, has shaped the rest of its historical narrative for the last more than half a century. A perfect example of a power struggle between major powers played out on Korean soil to the detriment of its national aspirations. Glancing through this fateful event will provide the occasion to grasp the nature of the enduring hostilities between the two Koreas.

After taking the reins of power across the 38th parallel in the North, Kim Il-sung donned the mantle of the father of the nation. Every self-imposed leader seeks legitimacy, and various tactics and strategies are adopted for this purpose. Nationalism has to be deeply rooted in an ideological anchorage that firmly establishes the credentials of a nationalistic leader. Kim Il-sung resorted to the *Juche* ideology of self-reliance to provide direction for the newly established state. The recurrent theme of the *Juche* ideology was that it would usher in "a new era in the development of human history." The Korean Workers' Party became the vanguard of this ideology with the dedicated responsibility to propagate it (Cummings, 1997; Dimitrov, 2013; Kwak, Patterson, & Olsen, 1983).

As Marxism became Leninism in the Soviet Union and Maoism in China, in North Korea, it was localized as *Juche*. Kim Il-sung declared himself *Suryong*, thus establishing a genealogical link with the celebrated Koguryo dynasty (Lee, 1984). It served two fundamental objectives. It deliberately downplayed the paramount role of the Workers Party, thereby systemically downgrading its revolutionary stature. This is contrary to the customary communist practices where the party is the fountainhead of all revolutionary forces. Proclaiming himself as the *Suryong* Kim Il-sung became the natural leader with the mission not only to unify the divided nation but to lead it as well. Thus, he arrogated to himself some sort of divine right to be the father of the nation. Quite systemically interweaving the political ideology of *Juche* with mythical beliefs and establishing it as the right kind of creed for the salvation of the nation.

Following in the footsteps of his father, Kim Jong-il continued with the idolization of the state ideology. In fact he further improved upon it when he launched a nationwide campaign to promote the cult of Kim Il-sung. *Juche* and *Kimilsungism* were blended together and developed into cultic ideas and teachings with the objective of indoctrinating the nation. Kim Jong-il put Kimilsungism on a higher pedestal than Marxism-Leninism, which he believed was far better suited to present the revolutionary spirit and thinking. Expounding Kimilsungism, he opined (Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, 2006) that it "is an original idea that cannot be explained within the frameworks of Marxism-Leninism. The ideas of *Juche,* which constitute the quintessence of Kimilsungism, are an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind." (Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, 2006)

This transformation helped Kim Jong-Il to espouse a peculiar brand of nationalism with more emphasis on "particularism over supposedly more universalistic Marxism-Leninism (Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, 2006). A singular nationalism with a dominant narrative to preach and inculcate unconditional love of the fatherland. *Juche* ideology, in tandem with Kimilsungism, elevated the nation and state to the highest pedestal. The unravelling of the Cold War world order acted as a catalyst to justify the continued existence of the North Korean regime. The survival of the state in the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration could be attributed to this unique ideological foundation of the state.

After the demise of his father Kim Jong-Il shifted his policy to the military-first doctrine. Prioritizing the revolutionary aspect of the ideology, he expanded the functional and organizational role of the military to reflect the shift in the policy direction. Thus, the Korean People's Army (KPA) overtook the Korean Workers' Party on the hierarchical ladder to become representative of the proletariat itself. This transformation, however, could be traced back to the previous "four-fold military" structure propounded by Kim Il-sung, with the objective of turning the entire nation into a fighting force.

Under Kim Jong-Il, however, the military-first policy reached new levels, which in 1997 the Workers' Party Newspaper (*Nodongsinmun*)

editorial captured very well when it equated the army with the party, the people, and the state (Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, 2006). Along with the elevated role of the army as an institution the stature of Kim Jong-Il also touched new heights. His leadership for the KPA was eulogized. This idolization of the army became part of the official literature of the Workers' Party. Its revolutionary credentials were proclaimed as the embodiment of the martial spirit, constancy, and integrity which portray the essential "mission of preserving with rifle and lives the security of our party, revolution, fatherland, and people" (*Nodongsinmun* [Labor News] 2003). Kim Jong-il's glorified vision for a great and flourishing nation required the unconditional and unqualified support and loyalty of the people to defend not only his person but the grand vision that he sought for the country.

Miliberal Nationalism and Pakistan's Unconventional Warfare

Operation Neptune Spear by the US Navy SEAL team, which resulted in the death of the most wanted man on the globe, was conducted in the town of Abbottabad, the Pakistani equivalent of the U.S. West Point. Once again, it brings to the fore the central question of who is with whom and how the global war on terror is perceived and responded to by different segments of the planet. Pakistan's role in the fight against terrorism came under tremendous criticism. The then British Prime Minister, David Cameron, unequivocally asked Pakistan to clarify its role in the export of the global Jihadi enterprise and bluntly demanded that the country should not be permitted to "look both ways (Watt & Dodd, 2010). Declaring Pakistan as a rogue or failed state because of its policy toward terrorism or militancy is misleading. This approach undercuts the real issue which is the security and geostrategic context in which this policy is unfolding. The unorthodox connection between the state and its militaristic nationalism, and at other times its interaction with global politics, leads to contradictory policies and thus shapes the geopolitical directions of the country.

Geography, coupled with ideology-driven nationalism, turned out to be the defining parameters for the country's role in the regional and global affairs. Pakistan became the frontline state in

the Western campaign against the Soviet forces when it invaded Afghanistan. The country became the center for the global Jihad enterprise which found not only a cause but a fertile ground for it. The ideological persuasions of the state and the Mujahedin, driven by the spirit and ideology of the holy war, were a perfect combination for this alliance. An elaborate network of recruitment, training, and financing was put in place with the active support of the Western powers and some Gulf states. But the driving force behind this enterprise was the ideological commitment and zeal of these combatants as well as their backers.

With the eventual withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the country began downward descend into chaos. The full repercussions for Pakistan and the region started to unfold as the West made its way and left both Pakistan and Afghanistan to mend for themselves. Heavily armed, trained, and zealously wedded to the ideology of the holy war, these Mujahedin became a security challenge for the Pakistani state. These forces and their ideology have permeated both the state and society. The security establishment of the state found itself in the midst of a geostrategic nightmare (Paul 2014) when these forces pose a threat to the very integrity of the state, which has turned into a "geostrategic curse" (Paul, 2014). In its jubilation over the spectacular success of these armed forces against the Soviet army, the security agencies of Pakistan lost touch with reality. In their hubris, they failed to realize the transformation of these forces when they started to operate independently.

In the process, the Jihadists began to dominate the ideological narrative, exploiting the weakness of the state and its institutions. Plagued by corruption, struggling with secessionist elements, and battling the unresolved dispute of Kashmir with India, the Pakistani state was challenged by these fundamentalists on both the political and security fronts. There had been a mushroom growth in the movements of these extremist organizations in the wake of anti-Soviet campaign. These groups are inspired by the teachings of Al-Qaeda and are following in its footsteps with the ultimate mission of driving the US forces out of Afghanistan (Gall, 2014). Interestingly the resistance to the American and NATO forces is not portrayed as a struggle for national liberation. On the contrary, the Pashtun-

dominated Taliban projects its movement as one driven by Islamic ideology and its Jihadist principles and thus extending its opposition to the state of Pakistan. This effectively eroded the writ of the state from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), forcing the army to undertake a number of military operations to dislodge these people from their bases. These operations have drawn an unconventional response from these groups. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) resorted to indiscriminate suicide bombings, widespread attacks on both military and civilian targets, the use of improvised explosive devices, and mass casualty bombings. TTP seeks to delegitimize the Pakistani state and replace it with the Islamic Emirate.

Islamabad's collusion with these Islamist militant groups was designed to bleed India white. In Afghanistan the objective was to ensure the formation of a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. The security apparatus of Pakistan had been confident that the Mujahedin's success against the Red Army could be replicated against India (Tomsen, 2013). The struggle in Kashmir started as a political dispute between the Muslim League and Congress, which soon transformed from a secular movement for self-determination into an ideological battle for liberating fellow Muslims. A legacy of the partition plan, Kashmir has a geostrategic vitality. Kashmir, as part of India, presents a direct challenge to the very idea of Pakistan, a nation-state, founded on the cornerstone of Muslim nationalism. This shift to an ideological-territorial tussle fitted Islamabad's goal of the ideological imperative of the Two-Nation Theory to claim Kashmir as an integral part of the Pakistani state. But in a similar vein, it augments the secular moorings of India. Thus, lines were drawn on the basis of ideological demarcation. Hence, the battle for Kashmir presents as much an ideological ground as a territorial one, locking both countries in an unending security competition, both in the conventional and unconventional realms.

Pakistan's nuclear explosion in May 1998, following Indian nuclear tests, saw a marked shift in the activities of these militant groups. They expanded their area of operation from Kashmir to all over India. In 2000 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) claimed responsibility for spectacular attack on the Red Fort. A joint attack by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) on the Indian Parliament in 2001 brought things to stand standstill between

India and Pakistan. New Delhi accused Islamabad of complacency in these attacks and demanded that it should take action against these groups. The Pakistani state's inability to take on these organizations really complicated the matter. While the world at large and India in particular accuse Pakistan of adding to and abetting these attacks, the fact is that the country itself is facing the unrelenting raids and sabotage activities of these networks. In fact, these attacks inside India, especially on the Indian parliament, were orchestrated to divert the Pakistan army's ongoing operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and to relieve pressure on Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Shahzad, 2011).

Ruthless and indiscriminate attacks in Mumbai were designed by the LeT to inflict not only physical but psychological damage on the Indian state. Mumbai, the commercial and cultural hub of the country, made an excellent target for the group to show its strength and audacity. By paralyzing a city of more than 20 million people for almost 48 hours, LeT signaled and extended its campaign in India. As the group subscribes to the ideology of militant Islam, which reinforces the long-held perception that strong links exist between the Pakistani state security agencies and the Islamist organizations (Lieven, 2012). The then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was quoted as saying, "There is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack, it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan (Sengupta, 2009). Singh's comments are indicative of the prevalent security situation in the region and the geostrategic competition between the two neighbors, which is spearheaded by both states against each other. The use of proxy by the Pakistani security agencies is undertaken with the belief that India could be bled white like the Red Army (Tomsen, 2013). These ideologically oriented soldiers brought the two nations to the brink of a nuclear war in 1999 when they occupied some mountain tops in the Indian held Kashmir.

Like other organizations, LeT subscribes to a philosophy that views the world in specific coloring. India represents this nexus of "Hindu-Zionist-Crusade" conspiracy which is posing mortal threat to Islam (Sahni, 2008). The unfinished agenda of Kashmir is the continuation of the everlasting struggle between the world of Islam and the world of non-believers. The liberation of Kashmiri Muslims from Indian subjugation is not the only objective but rather the total destruction of the state of India itself.

Two factors, the lack of strategic depth and the burden of history, are driving the foreign policy of Pakistan. This security imperative necessitates embracing the Islamists with the objective of cementing the ideological roots of the state and advancing its security interests. The origin of the insecurity can be traced back to the very inception of the state. After the mutiny of 1857 by the Indian soldiers, the British government changed its policy of segregating the army on religious lines, which presented quite a challenge at the time of partition. Consequently, Pakistan did not get a commensurate strength of armed forces (Cheema, 2002). The partition itself accompanied the worst kind of communal violence on both sides which created an enduring bad blood between the two countries. Soon after independence, hostilities broke out in Kashmir, and the newly independent states found themselves in armed conflict without any resolution. From the very beginning, India developed strategic relations with the Soviet Union, which forced Pakistan to seek allies in the Western camp to provide for its own security and establish a balance of forces in the region (Rizvi, 2000).

While in the East it was engaged in hot military competition with New Delhi, in the West, the Kabul government was pushing for its irredentist claims in the Pashtun belt against Islamabad. To counter Afghanistan's claims, Pakistan devised the strategy of supporting the Islamist elements in Afghanistan to undermine the government in Kabul. The Afghan leader, Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, an avowed nationalist, openly promoted and supported the idea of uniting all the Pashtuns across the Duran Line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Tomsen, 2013). This had quite serious security implications for the newly established state of Pakistan. The country's physical as well as ideological frontiers came under serious threat, challenging its very existence as a state based on the Two-Nation Theory. The response of leaders and policymakers in Islamabad was unconventional in supporting disgruntled and disillusioned leaders of Afghanistan. Needless to say that this policy was initiated before the Communist Revolution but got a shot in the arm following the subsequent Soviet invasion. Leaders like Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and his

Hezb-e-Islami party became the frontmen for this project (Tomsen, 2013). Things took a new and dramatic turn after the Red Army arrived in Kabul. Pakistan's response was blatant and audacious as it received generous financial and military aid from the West and Saudi Arabia for Jihad in Afghanistan (Rubin, 2002; Hussain, 2005).

Convinced of the exceptional power of religious appeal, the Pakistani leaders, with the active support and collaboration of the West as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, resorted to a massive indoctrination of the nation with the objective of preparing the foot soldiers of Islam. Religious institutions mushroomed all over the country, and Islamist groups like *Jamaat-e-Islami* and *Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam* became the vanguard of this campaign against the infidel communists. Interestingly, Sunnis and ethnic Pashtuns were favored, which forced the Tajik leader, Ahmad Shah Masood, to leave Pakistan and make a deal with the Soviet forces (Rashid, 2003) (Rashid, 2001). This choice fit well with the strategic interests of Pakistan and its backers, both the West, especially the United States, and Saudi Arabia, after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. For Islamabad, supporting the ethnic Pashtun served two objectives. Firstly, it delegitimized the communist regime in Kabul and weakened its stance on the Pashtun issue. Secondly, it supported and reinforced the ideological foundation of the Pakistani state.

For a number of reasons, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the seminal geostrategic context for the policy makers in Islamabad to promote and advance their national security interests. An elaborate network of training facilities, financial flows, and national and worldwide recruitment was put in place. Pinning down the Soviet forces for ten years and then their withdrawal from Afghanistan emboldened the security circles of Pakistan to employ the same strategy of asymmetric warfare in Kashmir. The strategic calculation was that these battle-hardened and well-trained mujahedin could be deployed in the critical theater of Kashmir (Lieven, 2012).

Where the Geneva Accord ensured the withdrawal of the Red Army, it left the government of Dr. Najeeb intact in Kabul. The Western backers and financiers of the Afghan campaign washed their hands clean of it, leaving Islamabad to deal with the post-Soviet Afghanistan and the brigades of the mujahedin. A power struggle broke out among the various mujahedin factions for control of Kabul. Pakistan hedged its bets on Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami as Afghanistan descended into civil war. Throwing its full weight behind Hekmatyar with the strategic calculation that it would lead to the establishment of a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul. The concept of strategic depth began to unfold in earnest. However, after the spectacular emergence of the seminary students in and around Kandahar, Pakistan switched sides to support the Taliban.

Within no time, the Taliban overran Kabul, allegedly with the covert support and backing of the Pakistani security establishment. The Taliban is a phenomenon that represents extreme religious orthodoxy and intolerance. A curious and little-known figure, Mullah Omar emerged as the Amir-ul-Momineen in Kabul, which, understandably enough, received recognition only from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and UEA. The twin strategic objectives of securing strategic depth in Afghanistan and forcing India to settle the settlement of Kashmir issue appeared to be within grasp. These were blended into one narrative. Things started to take a different turn when the Taliban provided a safe haven to Osama bin Laden after his expulsion from Sudan and allowed him to establish Al-Qaida, a jihadist organization with a global mission. Islamabad's inability to restrain the Taliban from aligning with Al-Qaeda did not bode well for its strategic objectives.

Another interesting aspect of the Taliban phenomenon is its ethnic Pashtun makeup. It was a smart move on the part of the strategic thinkers and policy pundits in Islamabad to channel Pashtun nationalism into a religious movement. By systemically diffusing Pashtun nationalism, which strengthened its own ideology-based nationalism. This was possible as the region of the Northwest, now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, has a long history of Jihad, which predates even the arrival of the British and was vigorously pursued against the latter as well. It has a folklore-like appeal for the people of the region. For instance, the legendary tales of Shah Ismail (1779-1831) and Ahmad Rai Bareilly (1786-1831) in the Balakot area of Masehra, who valiantly embraced martyrdom in the defense of Islam against Sikhs. Retelling this story reinvigorates the spirit and consciousness of Jihad

and also reinforces the symbolism of resistance against the enemies of Islam. In the case of Pakistan, this enemy is India, which is a persistent threat to its ideological foundation.

Juche and North Korea's Unconventional Warfare

Locked in an enduring struggle for survival and security competition with South Korea, the DPRK does not shy away from pursuing a militant course to achieve its objective of national unification. Sustaining the state through a continuous reinterpretation and adaptation of Juche is at the heart of its ideological narrative.

A nation divided against its own self, where one nullifies the existence of the other. After the disastrous Korean War, which failed to unify the Peninsula, the regime in Pyongyang resorted to unconventional armed tactics. Short of total war, the North Korean government conducted various raids and violent attacks to undermine the government of the South. Since the signing of the armistice in 1953, it has conducted over 2000 such acts overtly and covertly. Its assassination plots to eliminate former South Korean Presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan did not succeed (Szalontai, 2012; Bluth, 2008). So much so that the regime engineered the midair explosion of a civil Korean airliner 747, killing all the passengers on board. Demonstrating its unrelenting antipathy for the South Korean government, the Special Operations Forces of the North carried out a blatant raid on the Blue House, Presidential Palace, in 1968 (Szalontai, 2012; Bluth, 2008). As an asymmetric warfare, the operation inflicted deep psychological scars on the people of South Korea.

In the post-Cold War geostrategic environment, North Korea was beset with unprecedented strategic and economic problems. The discontinuation of subsidies after the collapse of the Soviet Union adversely affected its military potential. It failed to modernize and update its military hardware in the wake of its collapsed economy, and its defense capabilities declined vis-à-vis those of South Korea (Kang, 2004). Pyongyang reorganized its military posture on unconventional lines to meet the capabilities of Seoul. The high-tech defense capabilities of the South were responded to by a shift to unconventional warfare strategies to make up for its conventional deficiencies (Reece, 1997).

The DPRK shifted its strategy from total war to unconventional warfare during the reign of Kim Il-sung at the start of the 1960s. His determination to unify the Peninsula was further buoyed by the victory of the Viet Cong forces against the military of the United States. The guerrilla warfare in Vietnam heavily dented the American armada and left its advanced military defenses vulnerable. This emboldened Kim Il-sung to replicate the tactics of asymmetric warfare on the Peninsula. A reorganization of the Korean People's Army was launched in earnest to upgrade its conventional capabilities while at the same time boosting its unconventional skills. There was a marked difference between the military doctrines of the North and South. The defense policy of Seoul was based on the concept of proactive defense and deterrence as planned by the ROK-US force posture. On the contrary, Kim Il-sung pursued the military strategy of offense and preemption (Reece, 1997).

As part of the ideological divide, Pyongyang was an ardent supporter and an enthusiastic campaigner of worldwide revolutionary movements and their propagator. Notwithstanding the covert nature of such activities, it is not hard to find the footprints of the North Korean regime in advancing the cause of international communism. Along with propagating leftist ideas and military hardware and know-how, its activities extended to recruitment and training of those groups who were involved in armed struggles across Latin America, especially Mexico and Uruguay (Lee, 1984; Keller, 2015). In 1971, it came under international spotlight when the Sri Lankan government expelled 18 North Korean diplomats. They were accused of supporting the People's Liberation Front financially with the objective to kick kick-starting armed resistance against the government.

Fighting and resisting imperialism and colonialism had been the enduring feature of the communist world during the Cold War. This struggle for power and influence was fought with ideological zeal and commitment. North Korea shouldered its own responsibilities and actively supported the liberation struggles of the African movements (Young, 1986; Clough, 1987). Pyongyang's media campaign was relentless in castigating the "South African racist clique" as the protégé of Western Imperialism and accused it of systemically denying the majority to achieve their

independence. Military advisors from North Korea were training the guerrilla arm of the African National Congress in Angola (Vantage Point 1986). Pyongyang's help to a number of African countries was driven by the underlined objective to gain acceptance and recognition as the only true representative government of the Korean people. Of course, it also strengthened its ideological bonds with its comrades.

At the height of the Cold War, around 4,000 North Korean military personnel were involved in the Angolan Civil War either directly or as military advisors (Vantage Point 1986). They provided logistics to the liberation fighters who were waging guerrilla warfare against the forces of the Apartheid. Pyongyang's role was also pivotal in the Rhodesian Bush War, providing training to Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army, which was waging an asymmetric warfare against the Rhodesian forces (Choi & Jeong, 2017). The latter were supported by the Apartheid forces of South Africa. Pyongyang's involvement in the wars and struggles of Africa, some would argue, was dictated by its ties with Moscow. But this just partly explains its engagement in African affairs. However, the fact is that the leadership of North Korea, during the early years of the 1960s to 1970s, sincerely believed in the uniqueness of their ideological allure for the Third World, especially its emphasis on the notion of 'self-reliance' and its worthiness for emulation by the countries of the developing world (Halliday, 1981). As such, North Korea's involvement in the struggle of these countries was motivated by its genuine belief in the *Juche* heaven to be replicated in such regions.

As part of international communist comradeship, North Korea extended the scope of its activities to worldwide organizations that were engaged in armed struggles. Movements like the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were supported by the North Korean regime in different ways (Keck, 2014). Its footprints were also found on the continent of Europe. Guerilla fighters from the Red Brigades, a paramilitary group of Italy, received training in the DPRK during the peak of the Cold War competition (Bartali, 2007). Along with the material help, Pyongyang was actively engaged in propagating the cause of worldwide armed struggles. This support has not ceased but has

shifted to a new paradigm where material help could be purchased. Pyongyang's longstanding objective of opposing the United States and Western allies remains steadfast.

North Korea and Pakistan, Points of Convergence

A major point of departure exists between the two ideological nations. In the case of Pakistan, the strength of the Two-Nation Theory is rooted in the historical narrative and religious symbolism. Superimposing religious symbolism on historical narrative with the objective of resurrecting the Utopian state of the past finds popular support among the masses. Unlike North Korea, in Pakistan, only the founder of the state, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, remains the father of the nation. In North Korea, the Kim dynasty has been elevated to the status of divinity, where the elder Kim has been put on the highest pedestal of somewhat of a somewhat mythical figure. Attributing the features of omnipresence to the personality of Kim Il-Sung has allowed the ruling elites to create the Kim cult. This perpetuates a unique consciousness among the people while at the same time conferring legitimacy on the ruling Kim family. No doubt mythical and historical figures sustain ideological nationalism. Curiously enough, both Pyongyang and Islamabad found nourishing geostrategic contexts for their peculiar brand of nationalisms, albeit landing in opposing camps of the global ideological divide.

Emerging in the backdrop of the Second World War, both North Korea and Pakistan became the camp followers of the opposing Superpowers. The geopolitical context of the Cold War provided a budding environment for their ideological nationalism to take root. Regional and global security dispensation dictated the prioritization of national security policies. Pakistan joined the Western, particularly the U.S.-sponsored alliances of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CEATO). It became the frontline state in the containment strategy of communism in Southeast Asia. Its Islamic credentials, reflected in its ideological nationalism, were exploited as a bulwark against godless communism. Much like Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was backed and supported by the rival camp led by the Soviet Union. Islamabad's cooperation with the West was dictated by its security situation, while the latter was seeking the support of Pakistan to contain the spread of communism in the region. On the other

hand, Pyongyang's *Juche* ideology was the natural corollary of Marxism-Leninism. Such nationalisms, deriving strength from ideologies and molded by surrounding security situations, transformed into militant creeds.

Locked in a persistent struggle for survival, where not only physical but also their ideological frontiers were tested by the hostile forces. Security became the dominant theme, and the whole society was indoctrinated with a military spirit and readiness. Prioritization of security has transformed the roles of the armies in these states. In North Korea, the Korean People's Army has become identical with the state and society, deriving its strength from the revolutionary underpinnings of the *Juche*. This ideology is not only the promise of the golden age, but its revolutionary force is directed at the imperialism of the West, especially the US. Consequently, liberation of the Korean Peninsula is the prime objective of the KPA.

In a similar fashion, the Pakistani Army has become the custodian of the ideological frontier of the state and savior of the nation. Liberation of the Indian occupied Kashmir is so pivotal to the strategic objectives of the Pakistan Army that it somehow justifies its very existence. Kashmir, as the unfinished agenda of the Partition, is a challenge to the very ideological foundation of the state. Since the eruption of hostilities in 1948, both India and Pakistan have fought two major wars, with the enduring security competition between the two neighbors. Following their nuclear tests in May 1998, both states were engaged in a military standoff on the Kargil heights, bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear nightmare.

Competing nationalisms, fueled by ideological differences and sustained by contending national narratives, reinforce the security competition among the rival states. For North Korea, the very existence of South Korea is a persistent negation of its nationalist credentials. This situation is further exacerbated by the presence of American forces on the soil of the fatherland. Like the Korean War of 1950-53, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 shattered the very foundation of its Two-Nation Theory. The dismemberment of the United Pakistan rendered a devastating blow to its ideological nationalism.

Enduring security competition with their respective rivals has prompted both states to seek security through unconventional weapons acquisition. In 2002, according to the Carnegie Endowment dossier, quoting US intelligence officials, both Islamabad and Pyongyang shared know-how in sensitive nuclear technology. North Korea received technical support from Pakistan for its uranium enrichment program. In return, Pyongyang provided Islamabad with its *No-dong* Ballistic missile technology (Kim & Singh, 2004). No ideological affinity exists between the two states, but undoubtedly, their unremitting pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile technology is driven by their ideological zeal. Interestingly, both states are the closest allies of China.

Conclusion

This paper probed the nature and role of militaristic nationalism in the state narrative by unearthing the underlying internal and external security imperatives. The enduring commitment to this nationalism is shaped by domestic, regional, and, at some level, global factors. The central premise of this paper is borne out by the foregoing, which affirms the defining role of ideology-driven nationalism in dictating the national narratives of both Pakistan and North Korea. Glorification of history and historical figures becomes part of this narrative, which is regularly invoked to justify the policies of the state. Nationalism interwoven with ideology acquires new dimensions and becomes synonymous with the very identity of the state itself. Its criticism is equated with anti-state activities, while state activities and policies are pursued with the double objectives to safeguard and protect both the physical and ideological frontiers of the state. Providing internal unity by inculcating the feelings of belonging to the same narrative while reinforcing the idea of external adversarial forces. Thus, the conflicting dichotomy of 'us' versus 'them' derives its strength from this ideological framework.

Like any other state in the Westphalian system, for both Pakistan and North Korea, survival dominates every aspect of the state discourse. Ensuring survival through security by augmenting it with its peculiar brand of nationalism. Claiming exclusivism for their nationalism, both Pyongyang and Islamabad derive their legitimacy from it, which has been the source of persistent sustenance for both states. Every security challenge is interpreted through the prism of this unique ideological nationalism. This approach has been the bedrock of their security architectures.

References

Bartali, R. (2007). Red Brigades (1969–1974): An Italian phenomenon and a product of the Cold War. *Modern Italy, 12*(3), 349–369. https://doi.org/10.1080/13532940701633817 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Bluth, C. (2008). *Korea*. Polity Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=aC572uWCAkAC Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Cheema, P. I. (2002). *The armed forces of Pakistan*. Oxford University Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=cw_gduyRv50C Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Choi, L., & Jeong, I.-y. (2017). North Korea and Zimbabwe, 1978–1982: From the strategic alliance to the symbolic comradeship between Kim Il Sung and Robert Mugabe. *Cold War History, 17*(4), 329–349. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2017.1328406 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Clough, R. N. (1987). *Embattled Korea: The rivalry for international support*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429043543 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Cohen, S. P. (2002). The nation and the state of Pakistan. *The Washington Quarterly, 25*(3), 109–122. https://doi.org/10.1162/01636600260046271 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Cohen, S. P. (2004). *The idea of Pakistan* (2nd ed.). Brookings Institution Press. https://doi.org/10.7864/j.ctt1gpcc2 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Collins, L., & Lapierre, D. (1997). *Freedom at midnight*. HarperCollins. Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Dimitrov, M. K. (2013). *Why communism did not collapse: Understanding authoritarian regime resilience in Asia and Europe*. Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=wWc0AAAAQBAJ Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Gall, C. (2014). *The wrong enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. https://books.google.com/books?id=Rd9JAQAAQBAJ Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Goel, S. R. (1996). *The story of Islamic imperialism in India*. Voice of India. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130282270434664320 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Halliday, J. (1981). The North Korean model: Gaps and questions. *World Development, 9*(10–11), 889–905. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(81)90053-2 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Hippler, J. (2005). *Nation-building: A key concept for peaceful conflict transformation?* Pluto Press. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000796789746944 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. Simon & Schuster. https://books.google.com/books?id=noPAdn9YgWkC Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Hussain, R. (2005). *Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan*. Ashgate Publishing. https://researchportalplus.anu.edu.au/en/publications/pakistan-and-the-emergence-of-islamic-militancy-in-afghanistan Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Jawad, D. K., & Shabbir, D. G. (2025). The two-nation theory: Historical roots, political implications, and contemporary relevance. *Pakistan Social Sciences Review, 9*(1), 61–69. https://www.ojs.pssr.org.pk/journal/article/view/885 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Kang, C. S. (2004). North Korea's international relations: The successful failure? In S. S. Kim (Ed.), *The international relations of Northeast Asia* (pp. 159–187). Rowman & Littlefield. Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Keck, Z. (2014, July 29). North Korea's Middle East pivot. *The Diplomat*. https://thediplomat.com Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Keller, R. (2015). *Mexico's Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the legacy of the Mexican Revolution*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139683490 Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Kim, Y., & Singh, L. (2004). Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous counter-trades. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 16*(1), 73–98. Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Kimmelman, M. (2008, March 20). Outrage at cartoons still tests the Danes. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/books/20cartoon.html Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Kwak, T.-H., Patterson, W., & Olsen, E. A. (1983). *The two Koreas in world politics*. Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Lee, K.-b. (1984). *A new history of Korea* (E. W. Schultz, Trans.). Harvard University Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=sZHksU-oL7gC
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Lieven, A. (2011). *Pakistan: A hard country*. Penguin Books. https://books.google.com/books?id=ny1V4Q0sP20C
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Mastný, V. (1981). Ideology and foreign policy: A global perspective. In G. Schwab (Ed.), *Ideology and foreign policy: A global perspective* (pp. 1–20). Cyrco Press.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Paul, T. V. (2014). *The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199322237.001.0001
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Qureshi, I. H. (1965). *The struggle for Pakistan*. University of Karachi. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000796183145984
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Rashid, A. (2001). *Taliban: The story of the Afghan warlords*. Pan Books.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Rashid, A. (2003). *Jihad: The rise of militant Islam in Central Asia*. Penguin Books.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Reece, A. D. (1997). *A historical analysis of tunnel warfare and the contemporary perspective*. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA339626.pdf
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Rizvi, H. A. (2000). *The military and politics in Pakistan: 1947–1997*. Sang-e-Meel.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Rubin, B. R. (2002). *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system*. Yale University Press.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Sahni, A. (2008). Mumbai: The uneducable Indian. *South Asia Intelligence Review, 7*(21), 32–39.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Sayeed, K. B. (1968). *Pakistan: The formative phase, 1857–1948*. Oxford University Press.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Sengupta, S. (2009, January 7). Dossier gives details of Mumbai attacks. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/asia/07iht-attacks.4.19178953.html
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Shabbir, G., Ali, S., & Batool, S. S. (2024). Contours of identity: A comprehensive exploration of ideological narratives in Pakistan's formation. *Journal of Development and Social Sciences, 5*(1), 250–260. https://www.ojs.jdss.org.pk/journal/article/view/891
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Shahzad, S. S. (2011). *Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*. London: Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183pdzs
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Shin, G.-W. (2006). *Ethnic nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, politics, and legacy*. Stanford University Press
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Szalontai, B. (2012). In the shadow of Vietnam: A new look at North Korea's militant strategy, 1962–1970. *Journal of Cold War Studies, 14*(4), 122–166.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Tidy, J. (2012). The social construction of identity: Israeli foreign policy and the 2006 war in Lebanon. *Global Society, 26*(4), 535–556. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2012.710597
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Tomsen, P. (2013). *The wars of Afghanistan: Messianic terrorism, tribal conflicts, and the failure of the great powers*. New York: PublicAffairs.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Watt, N., & Dodd, V. (2010, July 28). Cameron sparks diplomatic row with Pakistan after 'export of terror' remarks. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jul/28/david-cameron-pakistan-export-terror
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext

Young, K. (1986). North Korea and the Third World. In S. R. Hongkoo (Ed.), *North Korea in a regional and global context*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Google Scholar   Worldcat   Fulltext