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Pak-Turk Strategic Framework and Geo-Economic Relations in post 9/11 Era: A way Forward for Strong Partnership

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Abstract

Because of deep cultural, spiritual, & trade relationships, Pakistan & Turkey have had powerful connections since Pakistan's independence. The Two brother countries have already been collaborating to strengthen their trade cooperation in order to ensure an effective presence in the world market, as well as to establish different opportunities for each other to boost one's national economies. The two nations have a deep relationship for stronger economic and social development in sectors such as energy, trade, textile products, as well as a variety of other areas of the economy. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic & Political relationship between Turkey & Pakistan, particularly in terms of new opportunities. The study has employed hermeneutics methodology and tried to interpret data and information using discourse analysis. Mostly, the data has been obtained from the official sources of Pakistan and Turkey and focused on Pakistan's paradigm shift from Geopolitical to Geo-Economic strategies. The strong financial collaboration between both the Pakistani & Turkish governments has been discovered to be primarily embodied in the Pak-Turk strategic economic framework. According to the findings, Pakistan should take precautions to ensure that all concerns are fixed in the PTSEF after already being confined to many anti-dumping charges brought by Turkey.

Key Words: Pakistan, Turkey, Geo-Political, Geo-Economic Strategies, Economic Framework

Introduction

Pakistan and Turkey have a prominent place in Muslim World due to their geostrategic location. The two countries are situated in conflict-prone regions. The world is evolving with tremendous speed in the post-Cold War and post-September 11th era. Turkey is a geostrategic player in global affairs due to its distinctive location, thriving financial

market, a long-standing tradition of cooperation with the Western Countries, & substantial military forces, which are second largest in size only after the United States in NATO. The significant geostrategic area known as the heartland of Eurasia, positioned on Turkey's periphery, always has been a central focus of global politics. The unique

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geographical location of Turkey offers certain international influence levers. As Turkey is strategically located between Europe, and much of the world's economic and political power is centered, & Asia, has recently evolved as an essential central core of growth in the economy & political influence (Hussain 2008, 67). The regional and global influence of Turkey is now spreading all over continents. While Turkey has a significant influence on most of its adjoining countries, especially in the Caucasus, & this capability extends in and out of Central Asian countries at which a Turkic ethnic and linguistic territory extends eastward towards the Chinese border. It has large Kurd population areas that are adjacent to the Iraqi Kurd inhabited region. Due to this geographical proximity, the country has been restraining Kurdish separatist propensities (GINGERAS, R, 2020). Similarly, Pakistan is situated in an area with excellent economic, ideological, & strategic prospects. Pakistan is in Southern Asia & serves as a connection bridge between West Asia & South Asia. In trade relations as well as other strategic issues, Pakistan provides the connection among South Asia, West Asia, and also to Central Asia, moving resources from resource-rich to resource-poor countries. The world population is currently dealing with depletion of natural resources, a COVID-19 epidemics, & terrorist activities. Pakistan is a transportation pathway because of the Gwadar Port, which is vital to the CPEC (Khan, F. K, 2016).

Turkey's international and regional relations have high wire conduct, attempting to reconcile its independent foreign policy around West & East – while working together with Europe and USA on one side, & on the other side Russia and China. As demonstrated by the escalating Syrian crisis, it deserves a much more thorough examination. Russia's economic and military priorities, and also China's endeavors to relate nations through the Belt & Road Initiative as well as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, all ought to be evaluated. Turkey's endorsement for Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute helps to bring India into the regional Strategies – but rather, Turkey has also supported Pakistan with the financial issues and on Nuclear Suppliers Group (Hussain, 2020).

Historical Overview

The roots of Pak-Turkey relations can be traced back to the pre-partition era. There were close relations between Indian Muslims and the rulers of the Ottoman Empire. The reason for considerable influence on Indian Muslims is due to the spiritual attachment with the institution of the Caliphate (S. Khan 2020, 14). The Indian Muslims supported the Ottoman Empire in its wars with Russia and Greece, respectively in 1877 and 1897. They also supported it in the Balkan war of 1912 (Ali 1967, 357). The Muslims of the Subcontinent were the supporters of the Ottomans in the First World War. They initiated a movement to preserve the caliphate. Their support remained continue during the Turkey's struggle for independence as well as after the establishment of modern Turkey. Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah appreciated Mustafa Kamal Ataturk many times. Turkey cordially recognized Pakistan after its emergence. Thus, the people of Pakistan and Turkey had strong connections even before the beginning of their formal relationship. Their bilateral ties have been strengthening with the passage of time. The two countries adopted different ideologies. Turkey became a secular Republic, while Pakistan was established on the basis of Islamic ideology. These ideological differences did not hamper their bilateral relations (Philip Kowalsk, 2019).

Turkey and Pakistan have shared a warm relationship since the inception of Pakistan. The religious, cultural, and historical affinities are the essence of this relationship. Pak- Turkey relations are not limited to theory, but they practically support each other in their hard times. There were two natural disasters in Pakistan in 2005 (Earthquake) and in 2010 (Flood). Turkey provided assistance to its brother nation in these disasters. In both cases, Ankara provided rescue teams, medicines, and food supplies. Turkish public and private organizations also supported Pakistan on the instructions of their government. The two States have the same views on many regional and global matters. They have strong military capabilities and vast economic potential. Pakistan and Turkey have

been engaged in counter-terrorism and defense cooperation in the post 9/11 era. Pakistan-Afghanistan- Turkey Trilateral Summit (PTTS) is another aspect of their cooperation. The main purpose of PTTS is to improve the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Turkey is one of the most reliable allies of Pakistan. It always supports Pakistan on International forums. Turkish and Chinese support saved Pakistan from being blacklisted from Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (Kaura, 2020, p. 3). As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Turkish weapons transactions to Pakistan amounted to 112 \$ million between the years of 2016 & 2019. (SIPRI). According to SIPRI, throughout this time period, Turkey was Pakistan's fourth-largest source of arms, outdoing the USA, & Pakistan was Turkey's third-largest weapons export industry. These statistics will start rising as Turkey completes recent orders valued more than \$3 billion from Pakistan, along with the acquisition of four MILGEM Ada-class corvettes, a couple of which will be assembled in Pakistan, and 30 T-129 Atak choppers.

Geostrategic Relations

Turkey-Pakistan partnerships have withstood the volatility of global politics and also the downdrafts of their internal affairs over the decades. Ever since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has garnered unqualified support from Istanbul, regardless of whoever rules in Ankara—the Kemalist liberal army ruling elite or the prevailing Islamist administration (Kaura, 2020, p. 16). Thus, the security concerns of Ankara and Islamabad led them towards the Western security umbrella. Both were Muslim majority states. The manifold similarities became the cause of their further closeness. Therefore, Turkey has a special place in Pakistan's foreign policy. The two countries consolidated their relations by signing a permanent friendship agreement in 1951. Ankara also helped Islamabad in its currency printing. They also signed a Friendship Treaty to strengthen their relations in 1954 (Cheema 1990, 135). This agreement added the strategic dimensions in Pak-Turkey relations. The two brother countries joined Central Treaty Organization in 1955. In the early 1960s, they had

strained ties with their western partners (Selcuk Colakoglu, 2013).

The organization of Regional Cooperation Development (RCD) supplemented their relationship in 1964. It was established to strengthen the economic, cultural, and technical cooperation between Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran. In the 1960s, there was a strategic consensus between Turkey and Pakistan over Cyprus and Kashmir issues. Turkey also supported Pakistan during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. It endorsed the Pakistani stance and criticized India over its aggression. The two countries continued bilateral political and strategic cooperation in the 1970s. Ankara provided full diplomatic and military support to Pakistan during the separation of East Pakistan. Islamabad also extended its diplomatic and military support to Ankara on the Cyprus issue. In 1975, the United States imposed arms restrictions on Turkey. This US move was condemned by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Aziz Ahmad (S. Khan 2020, 18). In 1979, it also cast a negative vote on a resolution regarding Cyprus in United Nations. They have common stance on the Iranian revolution. They were also against the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Their common security perceptions again led them towards the United States-backed alliance. The Pak-Turkey strategic relations were consolidated during the 1980s. They carried out joint military exercises in 1987. The two countries also established Military Consultative Group (MCG) in 1988. It intended to enhance cooperation in defense production and joint military training (Hussain 2008, 73). However, the two countries have diverse perspectives on the Afghan government in the post-cold war era. Pakistan supported the Taliban while Turkey was in favor of the Northern Alliance. Moreover, the two brothers focused on their respective strategic concerns in the 1990s. Islamabad was engaged in Afghanistan while Ankara was focusing on the newly independent states of Balkan and Eurasia (Ishtiaq Ahmad, 2000).

Post 9/11 Era

The 9/11 incident brought a drastic change in global political and strategic dynamics. Pakistan was the

focus of attention of the world due to its frontline status in War against terrorism. It was suffering from internal instability and external pressure. Turkey again came forward and provided all kind of support to its historical friend. The pak-Turkey relationship has strengthened during Recep Tayyip Erdogan regime ([Desk, N, 2013](#)). In 2003, Al-Qaida attacked in Istanbul, in which 60 people were killed, and 650 were injured. It was a grave security threat for Turkey. Al- Qaida was enhancing its influence in the country. It was using Turkish Kurds and Pakistanis for terrorist activities. In 2004, there was an attack on NATO Summit in Istanbul, and the Turk police detained the 16 Al- Qaida backed militants of Ansar al Islam [_\(Shah and Li 2020, 562\)](#). Al- Qaida gave a threat to the US and its allies, and being a US ally Turkey was also under threat. Ankara kept its security agencies on high alert to counter such threats. In December 2003, Ayman al Zawahiri, Al- Qaida's leading member, criticized Turkish secularism as well as its relations with US and Israel. He called this system against Islamic principles and cause of mortification and downfall of Muslims [_\(Bulent and Toktas 2007, 1034\)](#). An urgent strategy was required to counter such intimidations. International cooperation was also inevitable in this regard. In January 2004, Ankara and Islamabad concluded a treaty of Fight Against International Terrorism and Organized Crime (FACTOR) [_\(Shah and Li 2020, 563\)](#). Counter terrorism was an important aspect of this treaty. They were committed to eradicating organized crimes. This agreement was very important for Turkey because it included intelligence-sharing aspects. It is essential in countering terrorism and criminal activities. No country can counter all the security threats alone. Pakistan's strategic importance for Turkey has been increased due to its security concerns in post/11 era. Ankara was insecure from Al- Qaida, which has strong footholds in Afghanistan. Due to geographical proximity with Afghanistan, the cooperation of Pakistan was inevitable. Furthermore, its Inter-Service intelligence agency had the experience of countering terrorism. The two countries established High-Level Military Dialogue (HLMD) in

2003. Its aim was to promote the defense cooperation between them [\(Qadri, 2016\)](#).

The transition of Turkey's Military-Industrial complex: Rationale for the Wonderful Upsurge

In essence, the Turkish military industry does have a rich historical context. Within this perspective, positions & regulations to develop and sustain a comprehensive military-industrial complex always had proceeded from ancient to modern times & maintained their emergence, sometimes when they were interrupted at occasions, visibly pushed back, and when they managed to stay an aspiration. Correspondingly, the Turkish national defense history has seen a plethora of advancements efforts, but never perseverance on the interpersonal basis, although these endeavors foundered inconsistency at times. Turkish mission of defense autarky was started in 1974. There was an arms embargo on it which disturbed the defense capabilities of its forces. Its air force was particularly affected by the embargo due to its dependence on US defense equipment [\(Mevlutoglu 2017, 284\)](#). Turkey is determined to enhance its arms export. It has decided to develop a strategic partnership with Islamabad. Ankara's 2023 vision includes the plan to increase defense production and export to USD 25 billion until the year 2023 [_\(Kurç 2017, 261\)](#). It will enable the country to maintain its status of regional power. Ankara is looking for flexible alliances with several countries in order to achieve its certain foreign policy objectives [_\(Haugom 2019, 212\)](#). Prime Minister Erdogan also showed his commitment to getting rid of reliance on foreign defense industries. He believes the suppliers influence the military capability of a country due to this dependency. This vision of defense autarky has brought a considerable change in the Turkish approach towards Pakistan. It considers Pakistan as a potential market for its arms export and it has established a strategic partnership with the country in 2016 on the basis of this vision. The two countries signed three agreements in 2017. Under the first agreement, Ankara gave a contract of 52 Mushashak trainer aircrafts to the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex [\(Shayista Farooq, 2020\)](#).

Turkey has provided its services for upgrading F-16 aircraft and submarines of Pakistan. The country has also signed an agreement of USD 1.5 billion in July 2018. Under this agreement, Pakistan was agreed to purchase 30 T129 helicopters and four corvettes from Turkey [\(Kachair 2021, 18\)](#). The US sanctions on Turkey has delayed the delivery of helicopters. There is an issue of export licenses of engines used in T129. The US Congress is going to block licenses because T129 engines are American made. Turkey cannot sell T129 or any other weapon having these engines without the approval of the US government. It is perceived that the US wants to discourage Ankara from operationalizing the Russian S400 missiles. Ankara is unable to get the export licenses from the American government which is essential for delivering T129 to Islamabad. Being a time-tested friend, Pakistan has increased the time limit of the delivery [\(Kachair 2021, 19\)](#). The successful implementation of this deal would be a great addition to their strategic relations. The exchange program of military training was launched in 2000. It has strengthened the strategic relations between the two countries. Under this program, Turkey has trained 1500 Pakistani army officers [\(Aysu Bicer, 2020\)](#).

Cultural Cooperation

Turkey "seeks to eliminate differences among the Islamic community, to seek solutions to disagreements, as well as to assert our honorable causative factors, particularly Palestine, Cyprus, & Kashmir." And apart from diplomatic and political support, the increasing popularity of Turkish artistic works, including such TV shows, has increased Turkey's wide acceptance in Pakistan [\(Fatima Bhutto, 2020\)](#). Prime Minister Imran Khan has asked Pakistan Television to telecast the famous Turkish television series 'Ertugrul,' dubbed in Urdu & awarded to Pakistan by Turkish TV and Radio Corporation (TRT) at no expense during Ramzan in 2020. According to one analyst, "Pakistan accounts for 25% of Ertugrul's global YouTube viewers, & in the last week of May 2020, TRT Ertugrul by PTV was YouTube's third most-watched channel in the globe" [\(Frud Bezhana and Daud Khattak, 2020\)](#).

The Schism within the Islamic Ummah

Early in 2011, the "Arab Spring" posed a challenge to, and in certain cases overthrew, long standing totalitarian governments in West Asia. The obstacles and reactions across West Asia remained till 2011. Notwithstanding, political vulnerability & civil conflict have spread throughout the region as the intention of protecting by former authoritarian governments has undermined [\(Jung, Dietrich, 2011\)](#). The power vacuum & chaos that accompanied the "Arab Spring" not only exacerbated pre-existing schisms, including such Saudi-Iran or Sunni-Shia competition, but also created new ones. It also renewed the competition for the leadership of the Muslim world. Turks and Arabs were the players of the competition. Turkey is ambitious to restore its previous glory and leadership of Muslim Ummah [\(Dede, Alper Y, 2011\)](#). On the other side, Saudi Arabia is the contemporary leader of Ummah. The open antagonism between the two states is restructuring the geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics of the region. They are trying to enhance their influence by adopting the hard and soft power strategies. It has complicated the security landscape of West Asia [\(Eralp, Atila, 2011\)](#). Their hostility was intensified after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. He was a Saudi dissident and was found dead in Saudi Consulate General Istanbul [\(Mohammed Alrmizan, 2021\)](#). The Muslim world has been divided into two adverse Sunni blocs. On the one side, there are Turkey and Qatar, while, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE are on the other side [\(Tanir, Ilhan, 2011\)](#). These camps are confronting with one another for regional supremacy. They are also influencing the states outside the region. The Shiite Iran is the third power in Muslim World. It often tilts towards the Turkish bloc. Saudi allies, particularly UAE, have been spending billions of dollars in order to enhance their influence. The economic, military, and cultural investments along with humanitarian aid have strengthened their position across the region. Ankara has extended the diplomatic ties with West Asia as well as African states [\(Christopher Phillips, 2017\)](#).

Saudi Arabia and Iran are the traditional rivals of the Middle East. They have used religion to


achieve their foreign policy goals. The two powers have been promoting their specific version of Islam throughout the world, while Ankara is promoting the Hanafi sect ([Evangelos Venetis, 2014](#)). It is using soft power as an instrument to achieve its goals. Furthermore, it has the support of Al Jazeera, which is the largest news network of Middle East. It is projecting the country as an ideal Muslim state. Ankara has raised the numbers of its embassies in Africa from 12 to 42 ([Pinar Tremblay, 2020](#)). There is intense competition between UAE and Turkey for supremacy in Africa. The latter established its biggest overseas military base in Mogadishu in 2017. When Saudi Arabia and UAE imposed an embargo against Qatar in the same year, Turkey supported the country by deploying its troops to its base. Turkey and Kuwait concluded a defense treaty in 2018 ([Yeni Şafak, 2019](#)). The former has tried to increase its access towards Saudi backyard. The conflicts between the two opponent Sunni camps have been intensified due to the support for their proxy groups in Libya and Syria. Turkey provided financial and diplomatic support to Muhammad Morsi's government, while UAE funded the Egyptian media against his government. The split within the Muslim World was clearly noticed when there was an inauguration of the Kuala Lumpur Summit in 2019 ([Reuters Staff, 2020](#)). Its idea was presented by the former President of Malaysia, Mahathir Muhammad to promote cooperation among Malaysia, Indonesia, Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey. It was perceived as a challenge to the Saudi backed Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Islamabad was enthusiastic to participate initially, but it did not participate due to the Saudi pressure. Indonesia also withdrew its participation due to the concerns of the Gulf Kingdom. The Summit highlighted the rift among the Muslim blocs. Turkey, Iran, Malaysia and Qatar are clearly challenging the Saudi backed Muslim bloc ([Kachair 2021, 9](#)).

In August 2020, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Shah Mehmood Qureshi requested Saudi Kingdom to convene a meeting of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers on Kashmir issue. He informed the Kingdom that in case of refusal he will request the Prime Minister of Pakistan to call a meeting of

Muslim states that are ready to support the country on its core issue. In response, Riyadh asked Islamabad to repay a debt of USD 1 billion that was given to it in November 2018. It also rejected Pakistan's request for deferred oil facility. Pakistan's effort to repair the fractured links by sending the Army Chief General Qamar Bajwa was failed because the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman refused to meet him. It indicates that the complete revival of ties would take some time. On the other hand, the growing Indian market has attracted the Saudi Kingdom. The two countries have developed strong economic relations. Riyadh's annual trade with Delhi is USD 27 billion while, with Islamabad is USD 3.6 billion. It may be the reason behind the Kingdom's low attention towards Kashmir issue. In this scenario, the Turkish unconditional support on Kashmir issue has supplemented the Pak- Turkey historical bonding ([Kachair 2021, 10](#)).

Economic Complexities and Strategic Economic Framework

Whereas the two nations have had excellent political relations for decades, it is shocking that these historical connections have not resulted in improved economic and trade cooperation. Transport facilities between Turkey & Pakistan are insufficient, and a joint cargo line/regular charter vessel service between Karachi & Istanbul is considered necessary. There is also a need for a public display center for Pakistani brands in Istanbul ([Philip Kowalski, 2019](#)). There are enormous improvements to be made in financial, exchange, tourist industry, & technology and science collaboration. Exports of Pakistan to Turkey totaled \$357.44 million in 2020. Along with increased arms sales, Turkish increased investment in Pakistan has grown exponentially. Turkish direct investment in Pakistan has surpassed \$300 million since 2009. Zorlu Energy, a Turkish firm, has built a number of renewable independent power initiatives. Arçelik, the Turkish conglomerate Koç Holding's household appliance subsidiary, paid \$258 million for the Pakistani company Dawlance in 2016. Since 2012, Lahore's solid waste management has also been subcontracted to two Turkish firms ([Arif Rafiq, 2021](#)).



Graph: Historical overview of trade between Pakistan and Turkey

Turkey and Pakistan are also looking to a broader range of countries for imports. The goal is to eliminate the economic and political compulsive behaviors & complexities attached with a heavily dependent on current import sources. In Turkey's scenario, USA, China, Russia, Germany, & Italy, while looking at Pakistan case, USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE and China, Japan & Indonesia, As a result, it makes more sense for Pakistan & Turkey to increase intergovernmental yearly trade, which has managed to stay less than \$800 million so far ([Rahat Shah & Wang Li, 2020](#)). While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's latest trip to Pakistan, both the countries have signed some business and financial accords and accepted to significantly raise bilateral cooperation up to \$5 billion annually. Between the two partner governments, there still are substantial trade opportunities. However, how quickly they can accomplish this intended objective is dependent on how quickly the two can overcome geostrategic obstacles ([Madiha Afzal, 2020](#)).

The proposed Strategic Economic Forum includes 71 important items, including a defence industry, technology transfer, building capacity, and free trade agreement. "We will be using the resource of Türk Exim bank and also the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to fund those initiatives," said Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan. Pakistan has decided to invite Turkey to join

the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in an attempt to implement the economic zone viable (Syed, 2021). Turkey has also shown interest in joining CPEC in order to bolster its relationship with Pakistan & China. They both agreed to work on the Implementation of Knowledge Sharing Programs for exchange of information on national, regional, sectorial and strategic planning. Turkey planned to invest in CPEC in order to build up the free trade zone. Through this way, Turkey will access international flights attaching Pakistan to Central Asian states (Ashraf, 2020).

Challenges in Bilateral Trade

Pakistan & Turkey are both strategically located in regions with complex security environments. As both nations were part & victims of Cold War at the same time and also post-Cold War chaos in respective areas. Right after Pakistan's inception, both countries have maintained friendly and welcoming ties. Nonetheless, the essence of companionship & oneness occurs predominantly in discourse. There seems to be little attempt required to convert existing positive reputation into meaningful partnerships that can profit for both ([Bozkurt, Abdullah, 2009](#)).

While talking about the challenges faced in bilateral trade, Pakistan and Turkey have many things in common, but some Geo-economic and Geostrategic issues are in their way, which they

might need to address if they want to fully utilize their resources and the friendship between them. the commerce secretary of Pakistan while presenting a briefing highlighted these as challenges for bilateral trade Inadequate market exploration, No direct shipping & logistics, Easier trade finance accessibility, Banking access, Import duties structure, Harmonization of Standards, Matching Export Products with no intra-industry trade ([GOP, 2020](#)).

Recommendations

Both states must also strive to enhance the amount of trade between them. Whatever trade barriers come in the way, such as import duties, must be removed in order to expand trade. Because Turkey is rapidly being an industrial powerhouse and a part of the G-20, it really should consider transferring its companies to Pakistan, particularly the textile & household appliance industries. Furthermore, it seems that Turkey's development of the construction industry is nearing an end, & it may well be enticed to focus on Pakistan, particularly on low cost residential units.

Correspondingly, Turkey's agro-based businesses which including milk processing might profit Pakistan. They have the ability to contribute & export to Istanbul. Pakistan is the world's fourth-largest producer of milk, however for high-end buyers; we nonetheless import cheese from the EU. It is possible that Pakistan can fulfill this need too.

Conclusion

The collaboration in the defense sector is apparent in the two countries' trade arrangements. Pakistan plays a vital role in publicizing stability and peace in South Asia, & Turkey is continuing to work to assist

Pakistan in overcoming the obstacles to peacebuilding. Acknowledging defense and security & economic necessities is critical to carrying out the national foreign policy agenda. Pakistan's economy & international standing will benefit from the formation of alliances & cooperation with regional allies such as Turkey. With regard to the neighborhood, Pakistan must prioritize military budget through defense trade relationships in order to bolster regional and local security. The great deal of power shifting and the ever changing global geopolitical structure, along with Turkey & Pakistan's significant strategic collaboration, all add up in each case.

Pakistan & Turkey acknowledge the importance & prospects of their own bilateral cooperation on a global and regional scale. The above mentioned relationship could be intensified, in specific, though the structural transformations like foreign direct investment, trade, & business. Pakistan requires infrastructure facilities; nevertheless, Turkey is wealthy in infrastructure and seeks to support Pakistan.

In the field of information technology, Turkey can also be of assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan can discover such methodologies from Turkey because it has productive land for agricultural production & uses less water for agriculture. Pakistan also should seek Turkey's help and support in the research sectors of engineering and innovation, trade, industry, & energy. The above type of collaboration will be advantageous to both counties.

Along with all such economic and strategic cooperation, both countries can bring stability in the Muslim world. Pakistan being a neighboring country of Iran and close ties with Saudi Arabia can mediate between them. In this mission, Turkish support to Pakistan can boost its confidence.

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