

Strategic Uncertainty in India's Nuclear Doctrine: Collusive Threat, Implications for Pakistan

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Abstract

Technological advancement in the realm of nuclear weapons has emerged as one of the most salient security issues in the context of two South Asian states, India and Pakistan. Newly emerging India-Pakistan animosities, historical and on-going power progression of New Delhi distresses Pakistan's security framework. India's endurance of military modernization and stronghold of political leadership under Modi in order to seek power status is shaping distrust for Pakistan as both states assume each other as rival neighbours who raise serious concerns. The nuclear arms race and uncertainties in India's nuclear doctrine has triggered Pakistan's assessment of their security paradigm that has added fire to the already existing security dilemma. Thus, demands and acquires the dire need to discuss loopholes which the article explores about India's intentions regarding Pakistan as well as to certain level with China, Nuclearization implications for Pakistan and how Pakistan should overcome it for its deterrence.

Key Words: India-Pakistan, Nuclear-Armed States, Strategic Partnerships, Regional Environment.

Introduction

India's efforts for attaining nuclear energy at the beginning of 1974 was quite limited than that of in the year 1999 when they presented their draft doctrine, which was not less than the sketchy draft, and with the passage of time, its policies and implementations both proved it as the clear difference between them. In the initial stages of their declaration about becoming a nuclear weapon state, India leads emphasis on "credible minimum (nuclear) deterrent" (Tellis, 2020) but India's continuous technological advancement though different from 2003 their declared doctrine, presented nuclear posture and including other ambiguities in it. Not only had this, but the increase in arms also pushed Pakistan to take serious note about the raising concerns over insecurity matters, in return which also prepared himself for retaliatory actions in response to movements made by India and hence resulted in competition. But it is also true from the mixed findings in the lenses of international relation theories that historical and domestic political factors contribution mainly to upraise such concerns over it.

Undoubtedly, India's rising nuclear capabilities also got attention from the international community, and its gradual efforts to become a global nuclear power are of utmost importance. But alongside strategic changings in nuclear doctrine and hidden plans behind presented and non-presented principles under

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doctrinal draft is also creating confusion to understand the ambitions about changing direction or bringing a drift. Pakistan's induction of "battlefield" (Pandey, 2017) their development of nuclear weapons due to the rationale of the Indian no first use policy has gained attention to the issue that the state government should review their nuclear policies. In addition, though BJP led government already upraised their voices before their regime to revise and update the policy in accordance with environmental circumstances.

Furthermore, the main purpose behind changings is to achieve their goals and to make their state perfect and that under such attempt they will be able to take entire stance predominantly in accordance with country's national interests. But now, more than other specific reasons, there are new things adding to India's foreign policy that how old ideas are constraining Modi policies and his "pragmatism and the promise for medium change" (Estrada, 2017), which is now forcing the leadership to take steps of their own choice by changing the previous long-held notions of predecessors. So the cognitive dissonance of one individual, mainly the prominent one, is important that has serious concerns for the state of Pakistan due to opacity in plans made by the Indian leadership.

South Asian region is one of the dangerous places in the world due to its geographical importance of it and mainly because of these twin states. The situation has now further moved on from security perspectives to seek protection from both Sino-Pak and the hegemonic aspirations or for deterrent purposes, and now such transparency is inevitable to predict either India is presenting itself as a responsible state only for the purpose to attain membership in United Nation Security Council. But now the question is about the factors behind the increase of nuclear arms and what will be the end of such an arms race in the future or its impacts on Pakistan in the years to come. However, India has been well aware of adversary state capabilities without denying his action and reaction response, nonetheless not much powerful like India but has capabilities to deter.

India's quest for power status during the Nehru-Bhabha years was based on self-reliant India and those strands that are diplomatic, scientific/technological activity and third based on a mixture of first two in nuclear affairs (Raja, 2016), which has now replaced by other approaches under control/command, massive retaliation and by the first use of weapons in times of crisis all this lead to think about the implications for world war III or what will be it going to happen needs to discuss. The study has made an effort to ponder on moving posture from national security to foreign policy goals which may be due to civil-military relations or might have some role of government leadership in re-articulating of nuclear policies without considering its consequences. Not only this, but looking for more to achieve something beyond expectations and perceptions.

The study is aimed to identify core reasons for the arms race between two South Asian states and the components that are forcing India to bring changings in nuclear doctrine. This study will be momentous and will present some productive ways to lessen the worrisome environment between two adversary states. It is very important to keenly analyze those factors that are contributing to complexities or other impacts, mainly in the Pakistan perspective. The approach Indian government is adapting from non-alignment to multi-alignment and pragmatism; in return, adversary state initiatives are a matter of concern to discuss. It is of utmost importance to think about the results of mentioned dynamics, by taking into account the historical aspects and by comparing leadership roles, specifically their consequences.

Stratified Chronology of South Asian Issues

The strategic culture of the South Asian region is characterized by the hostile relations between Pakistan and India, which has further ramifications in terms of both states insecurity, and ultimate nuclear arms race continuity is the evidence of continuous hostility. To understand the issue first, it is of valued importance to understand the actual meaning of doctrine, which means the environment in which armed forces operate; now, 21st-century doctrines are different from the classical doctrines of the previous times. Nuclear doctrine

stands for the strategy about the employment of nuclear forces, specifically in times of crisis and any severe threat to the state.

Post-1998, India's nuclear doctrinal shifts responded by Pakistan with adequate answers, when India brought shifts from Sunderji to Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) under which they started military modernization along with the idea of limited war underneath the umbrella of nuclear. With time as the author explicitly states, the technological edge in the conventional weapons system will increase and that their views based on the assumption that they can undertake surgical strikes owing to their alliance system with the US to be accepted their military might, shifting from CSD to "surgical strikes". ([Khattak, 2018](#))

The author critically analyzes their policy of limited no first use, and massive retaliation failed in explaining because of their assurance towards massive unacceptable response towards their state and in the case adversary first strike against them. Furthermore, that primary purpose is not to punish the aggressor but to secure its own sovereignty under international rules and laws ([Jain & Seth, 2019](#)). India's nuclear weapons options limited not due to NFU but in line with the nature of nuclear weapons and their own needs. To use nuclear arsenals first is so disproportionate that the state will lose its credibility from doctrine.

Deterrence and retaliation automatically take place to not use weapons, but it shows the logic to use them in certain cases. Only the ideological opposition matters no other element of careful assessment of strategic logic behind NFU. The controversial right from the beginning "retaliation" and then will respond shows idealism political strategy to demonstrate themselves as a responsible international actor. ([Rajagopalan, 2019](#)) Doctrinal changings from 2003 clarifies all government officials, military leaders and that strategists history of their statements and suggestions all shows a lack of understanding and interpreting statements that are not filling the strict interpretation of NFU policy, that they might adopt a policy to use first in any case of military crises. The diplomat's commitments about NFU as giving proof of "responsible" state so that the only way to resist any pressure from signing the treaty. ([Sundaram & Ramana, 2018](#))

Use of Nuclear weapon is based upon mutual killing prospects instead of use to kill, defined deterrence that to give a hint to the adversary to take inaction, posture from going nuclear to a peaceful nuclear explosion so that to undertake action in response, their initial concept of deterrence developed in the region under Brass-tacks crisis. ([Ahmed, 2018](#)) Nuclear trajectory after 20 years now evoking surprise one is concerned about nuclear arsenal nature and other about its ambitious scope, its quick building efficiency by disfavoring India's strategic culture, India's own scientist disavowed nuclear weapons competition. Here the author analyzed the specific contribution of civil-military relations and how they are adopting an operational model for deterrence. ([Kampani, 2019](#))

But has not mentioned the cognitive dissonance of state leadership; the way their behavior is contributing in a sense not easy to understand. Shakir Hussain shared his opinion about Pakistan capabilities though limited to neighbor whereas India's latest intercontinental ballistic missile target is going beyond its neighboring states which the author has mentioned about new seeds of escalation implanted and might repeat the same incident of 1945 "little boy" and "fat man" bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As both states are empowering for a matter of prestige but have some vague picture in case of flaunting. (*India and Pakistan*, 2019)

Comprehensive work has been done on related topics, and many researchers discuss these uncertainties and shifts in the Nuclear Doctrine of India. This research will raise serious concern over the issue by including that there is a dire need to understand BJP leadership cognitive dissonance, which may be going towards hiding and bide with time by presenting ambiguity in their nuclear decisions and if in case of any change in NFU policy its repercussion is of utmost importance to consider. Reality is far different from adversary pressure, state security, alliance partnership (Sino-Pak) threat for India. More than anything else, the futuristic situation is indicating root cause for enhancing such measures which the BJP is taking; being a democratic state creating opacity in nuclear matters and hidden foreign policy goals requires some attention now which the study will be going to discuss its implications mainly for Pakistan's security.

Theoretical Framework

The applied theory of Nuclear Deterrence explains two scenarios first about stable strategic equilibrium, secondly, when it gets unstable. On a realistic note, both states nuclear advancement mechanism is not a threat until or unless they contribute to the potential escalation of both states insecurities. Deterrence theory will explain the power projection behavior of one state without undermining other regional states priorities either the adversary state intentions are for competition or for their own national security or in other words, will keenly analyze the two bird with one stone (Nuclear and deterrence) Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Peter Lavoy one optimistic school of thought which encourages this theory. It explains the 'irrational actor' behavior and that it is all about the war in man's mind. Henry Kissinger explains the nuclear age turned strategy of deterrence and that turned into an esoteric intellectual exercise. Another applied theory of realism will explain the Modi pledge of strengthening India that how states project power via the accumulation of material power.

BJP leadership, who led assumptions based on realistic thoughts and criticized nehruvianism foreign policy, replaced that concept of idealism with realism. Not only this but by focusing on state interests and eliminating unprecedented threats mainly from the external side. The political government which presented their viewpoint behind making the state weak and had limited power due to following idealism, which they preferred to attain hard power by giving new concept by replacing historical one. Modi's pragmatic thinking, which the amalgamation of his cultural and religious beliefs, is associated with Hindutva to set New Delhi for itself by following such ideological concepts. India's leadership ideas are filled with realist principles to gain support for political choices, which are the leading factor to bring changings in their foreign policy.

The pragmatic approach which the state politicians are adopting in order to assume the logically incompatible ideas in order to give answers to those hidden and unresolved logics; in other words, those radical changings maybe provide some transformative policy successes. Policy shifting from idealism the old concept replaced and now realism has taken hold and gauging further foreign policy directions under realism, that requires more deep understanding. The main elegance of this theory that it is deceptive because of its layers of complexity which it contains under it raises a question regarding the type of attack and of the target as well. Four schools of deterrence explain about theory, first the one who talks about existential deterrence in which states deterred by the mere option of retaliation in response, secondly those about the minimum deterrence so that to ensure state deterrence, thirdly who talks about assured retaliation who are more pessimistic in nature and holds the possibilities of robust deterrence only when it is about to near-certain, proponents of the last school who talks about assured destruction not only presents about chances for assured deterrence but of intense, massive response.

Modi Realistic Foreign Policy

In BJP's first term, the Modi government enunciated five pillars of his foreign policy: Samman (dignity & nobility), samvad means engagement & dialogue, samriddhi (joint harmony), Suraksha (worldwide security) and sanskriti evam sabhyata (cultural connections together with civilizational). It is firm to divine *martial spirit/ the virtue* of India's diplomatic relations under Modi. One of the other facets of India's foreign policy includes being *Islamophobia* manifested by harsh posture in their diplomacy towards neighbouring Pakistan. Austerity deeply manifested in Modi's external policy towards Pakistan. Post-independence India adopted a strategy in their foreign affairs in which looking to distance itself from political including economic structures established by global forces.

Simultaneously, intentions got changed, and they began to adopt a strategy that strives for status among the member states at the global stage system and which remain the main attributes of Modi's foreign policy. Modi took forward strategy as adopted by his predecessors, moreover carrying the state post-cold war status-seeking strategy now which is looking upon to *be as leading power instead of as power balancing*. He has also continued and put forth a strategy to build social capital for upward mobility through connecting

both in aspects of bilaterally and multilaterally so that to gain a proper platform in global politics by maintaining self-image as a major player. New Delhi bandwagoning with Washington gives proof of it in raising status in the global system.

No evidence showed regarding *Hindu nationalism* using in its foreign policy under BJP of Modi and is not as useful for Modi. (Basrur, 2017) Amongst players of Asia, essentially Japan, ASEAN countries, Australia, along with India as well have been come across plus modifying latest measures in accordance with circumstances, perhaps designated as regional power metamorphosing. Assessment is true that 2000 onwards India presents completely changed picture in which inclination emerged towards to become a major power. Modi has brought popular so-called Modi-wave of which he hives proof of it by adding to the election slogan, "Shreshtha Bharat means Great India". Though he followed his mentor Patel in adopting the policy, Patel was realistic and pragmatic, which Modi thoroughly following.

Substance without any doubt true, that it is merely difficult to grasp India's foreign policy, which fully deploys its policies fully in accordance with prevailing circumstances. India has always seemed playing-off with powerful states for the achievement of its diverse interests. Newspaper Japan tends to characterized their (India's) foreign policy as omnidirectional. (Horimoto, 2017) In the second term, the political mandate is to be expected to challenge long-standing Nehruvian status quo foreign policy within an ever-changing global scenario. There are possibilities mostly that India will pursue an interest-based strategy by separating trade and the phenomenon of geo-politics when necessary.

His policy will turn in notably three directions. The first one is that it will fortify its base with close proximity states by making greater inroads; secondly, India will make it feel about its presence in world organizations such ADB (Asian Development Bank), IMF and World Bank, which are under the influence of European, American and Japanese. Finally, they will continue past partnerships, but an implicit to the US is in the offing to India. To the present day, Foreign policy dominated by Modi, led by their own persona as well as the optics all-over his chemistry with worldwide leaders. (India's Foreign Policy under Modi's Second Term, 2019)

Modi diplomacy can be viewed as it's contiguous with predecessor practices as of Nehru. The over-riding policies, non-alignment as well as panchsheel formulated on elements of tranquillity at first glance, but little changed in it. As Modi constant drive regarding the domestic policy to transform and reform India, giving priority to business for gaining position for leading commercial power with a business sharp brain. All his concerns show the new definitions of business-friendly and mainly on a *transnational scale*. Making of bond with Xi Jinping, President of China, and Trump, India's strong putting forward relations demonstrates his charismatic agility, all that clearly describes the progression of the globalized world, which was unknown to Nehru rather than to say it as change. Modi's economic engagement is the utmost important thrust of his foreign policy; thus, the 'Modi Doctrine' further refining for the attainment of the development agenda. (Weigold, 2018)

BJP's wider vision in global politics at the core of their foreign policy in the current 21st century also includes the concept of multi-polarity world order. Thus *Modian* style will leave a normative impact on external state policies in the case of succeeding next elections of 2019. *Tone shift* consists of three components, i.e. style, character and attitude of Modi are critical. In comparison to previous, they were slow, building on past policies, whereas the current presents energized version. (Ogden, 2018) India's stepping forward to practise balancing between two major power rather than to utter the world non-alignment, which may not have their concern maybe.

Not a wide difference but brining of change in nomenclature, i.e. from 'Look East to Act East Policy', but along with its continuity of engagement with South-East and East Asia. (Pant, 2019) Jaishankar indicates a desire the mentioned the policy of Look East to Act East so that to inject new close relationships with Eastern Borders. In the process, major expectations and stress laid on to make functional diplomacy but the criticism raised by analysts still not increased political options to manage relations with its neighbouring

states. Before Modi, the *Gujral Doctrine* of I.K. Gujral's renowned predecessor also took the initiative for fixing India's image with immediate neighbours' notably, Pakistan.

Over the coming next five years, it might have likely invested in three main spheres, firstly BIMSTEC termed as '*Bay of Bengal*' initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and Economic Cooperation, with Pakistan plus the tricky last one is about Indo-Pacific. Modi 2.0 strategy to isolate Pakistan is making the first hurdle in its neighbourhood first policy. Despite attempts to make good ties which results in the visit of Nawaz Sharif to India and Modi visit to Pakistan in 2015, though waxing and waning of both states relationships, not surprise anyone anymore. Recent attempts of cross-border terrorism, Pulwama attack and subsequent airstrikes in Balakot, air battle of both states all worsened more in prevailing conditions. 2018 Wuhan Summit displayed India's constructing engagement along with it by experiencing roadblocks in the way. ([Das, Kamala Prasad, 2019](#))

The Horizon of Indo-US Strategic Partnership

Two leaders with the biggest democracies are pursuing dangerous and nationalist visions towards other nations, and those visions are at odds in their own countries. From the last twenty years, both states partnership blossomed, and the potential to further grow; one of the main rationales of the Indo-US partnership is to counter China and also economic prosperity. Both states need one another to tackle climatic changings. Modi is pursuing nationalist agenda at the expense of economic growth, a reality which is noted by the Eurasia group and also marked his move as one of the top ten economic risks in the year 2020. On the opposite side Trumps, xenophobic policies in America might hurt the economy. ([Fuchs, 2020](#))

Forgiving concrete shape to Indo-US partnership, Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership was made which was actually initiated in 2013, and acceptance in Modi regime is now calling it as "New Designation" to both countries bilateral ties. Together to take steps against terrorist groups, this includes Al-Qaeda group, ISIS, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and all other affiliations with them. ([Basu, 2020](#)) In terms of terrorism, Trump shows his side by giving a statement in favour of Modi and in which targeted specifically Muslims that "we are making a commitment to safeguarding our people from "radical Islamic terrorism" and also working with Pakistan in combating terrorism which is fuelling its soil. (*Remarks by President Trump and PM Modi, 2020*)

For enhancing the security of their homelands, both states intent to establish between their law enforcement agencies the new Counter-Narcotics Working Group so that to jointly fight the international crimes (human & drug trafficking, violent & terrorist extremism and cyberspace crimes etc.) Tump even more welcomed endeavour by Indian Space Research Organisation besides National Aeronautics & Space Administration joint mission and developmental progress to start in 2022 with world's first dual-frequency Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite and added into more goals about earth observation, planetary exploration, the space flight for humans and commercial space co-operation. (*Joint Statement, 2019*) As Trump Administration about geographic conception National Security Advisor, Mathew shared his view about the stretching of the region as *California to Kilimanjaro* stirring position. In regards to Covid-19, the mutual co-operations to control it another logical fit for their relations.

Side by side, it also holds problems in policies as Trump description of the Indian state as *tariff king* and that state has done *absolutely nothing* in mitigation of climate and also mocked Modi for his response towards Afghanistan in which Modi didn't offer enough assistance to Afghan's. ([Kugelman, 2019](#)) Moreover, there have been more trading disputes among them consists of; one is the Trump Administration terminates "Special State Status" from India to which India gave response through retaliation by increasing tariffs on most products as US duties imposed on steel and aluminium two years ago. Therefore, both states relationship extends beyond the friendship of India and the US or as a reflection for states solidarity amongst them. ([Mondal, 2020](#))

Apache and MH-60 Romeo, these two helicopters are one of India's proofs of its military deal with the United States that he has agreed to purchase \$3 billion of military equipment's of the US. Agreement made on trading to scale up crude oil and liquefied natural gas. (Roche, 2020) At present, in 2020, US-Australia expanded their Indo-Pacific geographical definitions in order to match those with India and Japan as well. Trilateral discussion started beginning between India-US-Japan; after that, quadrilateral talks began among Australia-Japan-US-Australia. Established 2+2 amongst Indo-US defence ministries and the first one tri- military service they did in the year 2019, an informal dialogue which is known as in a formal term, "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue."

Progress was made after the successful completion of *phase one* of their agreements made for trading. Now they have signalled each other for their reliance in countering China regionally and globally and blueprint for mutual co-operation as it is needed to face joint challenge about increasing of pandemic disease Covid-19 on their own territories. (Levesques, 2020) POTUS (President of the United States) said that relationships had never before as good as now connections at present. Additionally, we made such a 'great deal', further Modi about both countries affairs are people-centric & people-driven not merely restricted to two governments. (Online, 2020)

Closer bonds thus clearly indicate by India's nuclear policy, which stood outside Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which no other reached to it and India's this attitude immovable practical and symbolic roadblock due to the close bonding with the US. Increasing their defence and intelligence is indeed an asset for their states. US other leaders also made civil-nuclear deals with India in their regimes; for Bush believed that India nuclear hold as a prospective plus point for American strategy in 2008 the US-India civil nuclear deal was made. Barack Obama also equally invested and called it the defining partnership of the 21st century. Modi presented as the making of deals with the US would serve twin goals.

Trump, though not quite logic anyhow, rebranded Obama's era rebalance to Asia-Pacific with the fresh term he introduced as Indo-Pacific strategy. As both are below the surface of similarities, Modi-Trump is diverse individuals. Modi's Hindu Majoritarianism harsh stance, which has lurked under the surface, is testing the democracy of India and guardrails on the other side ruling person of the US also is testing American's. At present, both states, in their own ways, are part of the problem, falling democracies, unbridled economic nationalism and competition by geopolitical means bounded by rules and sooner they both need to recommit along with their dealings as to being the only better solution they can provide. (Burns, 2020)

Interests and Roles of Super Powers in South Asia

South Asia the most volatile, highly militarized and politically explosive region in the world, which still remains baffling. The most bureaucratized zone also consists of a variety of complex and violent ethnic groups. Not only is the main attention for the US but the region also for other industrialized democracies. Its major strategic significance its routes connect with Europe, its line connections with SLOCs and sandwiched position between two volatile regions, the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia. Major players of this region, India-Pakistan, were divided between superpowers in terms of polarisation.

Despite the US side with India, it feels comfortable with Pakistan for strategic interest but had never been so closed to Pakistan and always misunderstood it to which Pervez Iqbal Cheema called it as "conflictual cobweb of South-Asia" and always put much pressure on it (loyal state) so that not to annoy its other partner India. The decade ahead to come will show about potentialities that how superpower turns responsibilities into power and converts risks into opportunities. (Hilali, 2019) It was the time when for the US, both states were important, but Pakistan's chosen of the capitalist block in the Cold War.

The US have major security and economic interests, would like to prevent terrorist attacks against its own state and its allies. The US supports India, the loss of nuclear material to terrorist's and risks for nuclear fallout, all of which resulting in aggravating security concern for both India and Pakistan. With respect to China, that security dilemma is stoking Chinese fears of their provocative encirclement. To achieve strategic

interest, US one-sided policy about denials of technology, multi-dimensional pressures particularly against Pakistan so that to stop its fast-growing nuke weapons program for security purposes, its Indo-US partnership and giving a signal to give a permanent seat in UN security council. US support for India in almost many domains to contain China have also threatened its interests, but they are firm in India's arms market.

Geopolitical realities are now shifting in which Russia is pursuing the multi-vector policy in the region and for his influence in the region and for state betterment Russia seeking help from China so that in preparing to counter the US. A few years ago, Russia leaning towards Pakistan for the first time making good relations was an alarming thing for Indo-US. China's co-operation with Pakistan and establishment of civil nuclear co-operation with Pakistan under IAEA safeguards, most importantly CPEC project not acceptable to both India and US. China present forging co-operation with India (the old rival who made a strategic partnership with the US to counter China). Doha trade talks and sharing of global goals, and BRICS are now presenting now picture acting grouping than it had never before anticipated.

Big supports and their sides on some side present a balancing posture for two nuclearized states but will remain a potential threat for global peace. ([Khan, 2019](#)) Currently, the US, with space power, sought advanced capabilities employed for homeland security and for civil-economic interests on its opposite competitor China emerged as its rival universal space power. Thus security issue implies "security trilemma" for China, India and Pakistan because the destabilizing development elevates conventional-non-conventional asymmetries challenging for South Asian region states stability as leading towards strategic instability by undermining nuclear deterrence. ([A. Khan & Sadeh, 2019](#))

By virtue, superpowers have influenced much in the dynamics of Indo-Pak relations. The main reason for which the hub always takes attention is their risks for a nuclear showdown; that's the reason for which third parties always put a premium on them in time of de-escalation of three wars. Over-all reality is different, for the sake to advance regional interest, superpowers created an environment which pushed up for the arms race rather than to control weapons in South Asia (the US the key enabler of proliferation both in term of vertically and horizontally), (US support for its ally India despite invoking sanctions of Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, and giving the conditioning waiver to India for purchasing F-16).

The situation of the security environment deteriorating due to the power politics of superpowers, non-proliferation will not attain until and for the reason that superpowers weapons allies increasing of states dilemma process is on-going. ([Zia Jaffery, 2018](#)) On the most sensitive issue, annexation and absorption to Indian union in theoretical terms to which international community continues to resolve it UN mandated the disputed nature of Kashmir but left unresolved. That unresolved issue will lead both states into a conventional nuclear war. The US, as an Asian power, appears to have abdicated its role in Asia as the transition of power is palpable by true means. It might be going true that the US its influence in Asia or becoming a past Asia power because of emerging pole now competing which comprised of CRIPT (China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey). Now a new collective approach on the Kashmir issue will be more likely on a big platform. ([Malik, 2019](#))

No doubt, the move infuriated Pakistan declaring to exercise options altogether so that to deal with them as what it calls an unlawful step taken in Kashmir. Superpowers for a long time involved on different changing sides, intimately. Outside interference at times defuses tension among India and Pakistan; their alliances have lengthened rivalries, in fact, brought the way for conflicts on the border. Pakistan was built by outside forces as a contender towards India, and right after the inception of India is viewed as to be restrained. However, it is a true fact that without external assistance and pressurizing of the state against one another couldn't prolong rivalries, and now with changing global world order, global priorities and their influences continue to matter. For the reason to which will boost such conditions whether the global war on terror or China rise as another factor and Indo-Pak conflict through their own priorities, pre-occupations.

De-escalation and normalizing India-Pakistan relations are beyond preventing all-out war, which doesn't rely on or featured on the agenda of global powers. ([Hoffmann, 2020](#))

For many Indian analysts, the logical outcome of China's intention to further consolidating its economic partnership with Pakistan and China's attempt to take advantage of geopolitical possibilities generated by the global pandemic disease. Immediately after signing the construction contract, India objected to the project by a worded a statement to it by considering it as an infringement of their territorial sovereignty. Both China-Pakistan rejected India's position and have decided to move on with construction. India's diplomatic opposition would never miss any point to go away from missing any opportunity; however, New Delhi will probably use every possible option in disrupting this project. ([Amir, 2020](#)) India's position on any project in PoK remains unchanged. New Delhi has long opposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) because its intended projects in disputed areas include Gilgit and Baltistan, and that certainly hasn't stopped both states project as well; the same thing applies to the project of the dam. ([Aamir, 2020](#))

Conclusion

The domestic politics of India has always been playing an important role in determining its interaction in regards to foreign affairs, especially with the US and Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the intentions of India are hard to identify accurately, but the evidence shows that the entire shift from pacifism to realism posture, hence proved that Nehruvian pacifism old starting point was defunct. The triangle of India-Pakistan-China is determined by mutually perceived threats, further complicated by regional complications and growing confrontations between the US and China. However, Pakistan remains a steadfast ally of China, while on its opposite, India is the only country in the South Asian region that is coming closer to compete with China's rising influence. Moreover, US containment strategy, strategic partnerships with India all are raising concerns that impact China's perceptions along with it on Pakistan, too, as it's an important part of the triangle.

Such a broad level of distrust and misperceptions all will continue to add more to crisis probabilities. However, despite attempts at diplomatic manoeuvres (CBMs) to curb the abandoned escalation, the complex dynamics of these nuclear states triangle further reinforced by the role of the US in the South Asian region, that how the regular phenomenon of conflict has to be managed instead of being eliminated. In order to become a great power, India still needs much more in its military capabilities. In this region, the US-China role will be of utmost importance; it all will rely on them that how to respond India-Pakistan conflict, and that requires agreements to which they need to reach it, to curb the rising conflicting crisis.

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