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## The Role of Islamic Ideology in Iran-Pakistan Relations from 1947 to 1979

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### Abstract

*Ideology is an important determinant in foreign policy. However, it has its implications. Pahlavi Shah's Westernization policies and their dissociation with Islamic ideology were the main features of their rule. The early leadership of Pakistan and Iran (Muhammad Reza Shah) were secular in outlook, paid little attention to ideology and had shared interests. While in Pakistan, the religious identity and its liberal national identity are still debated, and Pakistan has to reconcile between the two competing points of view. The Islamic revolution was unique in character as the earlier resolutions in the world were predominantly secular, while in Iran, it had religious trappings. The intellectuals in Iran like Jalal Al-Ahmed, Shariati, and all shades of parties played a significant role in inciting the people for the revolution. In South Asia, Allama Iqbal, Jamal ud-din Afghani, and Maulana Maududi influenced the people for Pan-Islamism and a utopian Islamic society. The aftermath of the Iranian revolution were grim, and people at the helm of affairs at the time of Shah were either executed or left the country for good. The relations between Zia ul-Haq and Khomeini, two proponents of Islamic ideology, were not good. Zia combined the elements of Islamism with pragmatism, while Khomeini was more radical and committed to its ideology.*

**Key Words:** Ideology, Iran, leadership, Pakistan, Relations, Revolution

### Introduction

“Ideology is an important determinant of foreign policy while ideology simply can be defined as a set of beliefs or ideas. It purports to embody the truth, a world view and an aspiration for the future. These major elements of ideology serve as a screen through which policy-makers observe the international system and its dynamics” (Rizvi, 1983, p.48). Although ideology plays a significant role, but it has its own foreign policy implications. “The ideological approach causes problems when other factors, impinging on foreign policy (e.g geopolitics,

human and material resource constraints and power politics) conflict with dictates of ideology” (Rizvi, 1983, p.48). The problem with an ideological State arises when it feels to be the harbinger of certain ‘truth’ and seeks to impose its ideology domestically and beyond. When a State seeks to profess a certain ideological doctrine, it fundamentally excludes the other States. As all identities are formed by placing the ‘self’ against “other”, Pakistan’s fundamentalist Sunni identity defined “itself” as opposed to Shia revolutionary

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Iran, which became the "other" ([Kaleji, 2012, p.146](#)). The importance of ideology professed by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and by General Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan was conflicting, and Pakistan drifted towards Saudi Arabia's Sunni-Wahabi ideology. The Islamization of Pakistan's society indicates that ideology is an important determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy. In Pakistan, the army is also the guardian of its ideological frontiers. But ideology is not all time and everywhere applicable. OIC is a bloc of countries with ideological aims and interests though not very effective. Pakistan has no ideological compatibility with China, but China has very cordial relations with Pakistan.

### Pahlavi Shahs' Westernization and bypassing Ideology in Foreign Policy

Reza Khan imposed a Western and modern way of life on his Iranian subjects. He was much impressed by Kemal Ataturk and discarded old traditions of society, banned Muharram processions and veil, and introduced a new Western dress code. The second Shah too followed his father's footsteps, bypassed the Islamic period, and glorified the Iranian monarchy under the ancient Achaemenid empire of the Cyrus about 2500 ago. He reserved Iran's old Persian heritage and paid little heed to people's religious/cultural sentiments. Vali Nasr substantiates this as, "..... in Iran the Pahlavis aped Ataturk and pushed Secularism by a decree as a prelude to modern development ([Nasr, 2016, p.106](#)). Western presence, its culture, technology, and corruption in Iranian high society alienated the Iranian masses and clerics. The atrocities committed by the Iranian secret service -SAVAK against intellectuals and political opponents led the different factions of the society towards revolt. The image of Shah in the West was shown as a modern leader and Huntington "hailed the Shah as the epitome of a modernizing monarch" ([Mishra, 2017, p.129](#)). In foreign policy too, the Shah played the role of US policeman in the Gulf and was a pawn in the American scheme of foreign policy. His relations with Arab countries were far from good. However, his ties with Israel were cordial at the expense of Palestinians. Iran also remained a member of CENTO as global strategy against the Soviet Union. Therefore in Shah's framework of foreign policy,

there was little room for Islamic ideology, and he was part of American realpolitik and geopolitics.

### Pakistan and Iran early Relations- the Ideology at the Back-Seat

In the early days of Pakistan, the discourse in body-politic of Pakistan was liberal to a great extent, and so was the foreign policy, which was pragmatic. Most of the early leadership of Pakistan was from the Shia sect of Islam, but they didn't take into account the Shia-Sunni divide that would plague the future relations of both countries. The founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah himself, belonged to a Shia branch of Islam. President Skandar Mirza, General Yahya Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later Asif Ali Zardari were also Shi'a Muslims. Therefore, there was congruity between the leadership of Pakistan and Iran on religious grounds and they may had a soft spot for each other. But it was due to the secular and Western outlook of the early leadership of Pakistan and Iran that led to common grounds for close ties. Both Pakistan and Iran had Pro-West foreign policies and were also members of CENTO (Central treaty organization). In the wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, Iran supported Pakistan both morally and materially. Iran's interests lay more with Pakistan as Iran's other neighbors were the Soviet Union and left-leaning hostile Arab nations. According to Vali Nasr, "The rivalry between Nasser and the Shah in the 1950s and 1960s, and more so that between Iraq's long line of radical Arab nationalist rulers and Iran in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as Iran's friendly ties with Israel at that time, cast Iranians as Arab enemies" ([Nasr, 2016, p.108](#)). Pakistan's next-door neighbors were India and Afghanistan who were bent on harming Pakistan. Communist threat and American aid and military hardware also led the two countries to be subservient to American dictates. The early relations between Pakistan and Iran were on the basis of shared interests, and ideology was considered of least importance.

The Shah put the ideology at the back-seat in politics, but he was oblivious to the ground realities and simmering public uprising. Unlike the Shah's time and barring Pakistan's early twenty-five years,

there is a solid ideological current in Iran and Pakistan's internal and external policies today.

### Debate over Pakistan Ideology and Foreign Policy

Pakistan and India were divided on religious grounds in 1947. "India remained secular while there is still a debate going on in Pakistan that the country had been founded on the basis of Islamic ideology while others say that Quaid-i-Azam envisaged a secular country. Jinnah's (Quaid-i-Azam) early death in 1948 left an unfortunate leadership vacuum and a perpetual internal debate over Pakistan's national identity" (Jalal, 2017). "Since the country's inception, Pakistan's leaders have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of Pakistan's identity. Under ostensibly Pro-Western rulers, Islam has been the rallying cry against perceived Indian threats" (Schneier, 2016, p.123). The Islamic ideology was also emphasized to bring a sense of unity to multi-ethnic and multilingual countries, but the deep social, economic and political contrasts led to the breakup of Bangladesh in 1971. In hindsight, by looking at the outlook and orientations of early leadership, we can say that they were Westernized and pragmatic in their policies; therefore, the body-politic of Pakistan was liberal to a great extent. General Zia and General Yahya were secular and liberal, at least in social matters and kept the religious parties at the fringes.

The early leadership of Pakistan was from the Shia sect of Islam but religion meant little in their world-view. The exigencies of the time led Quaid-i-Azam to seek financial help and military hardware from the USA. Likewise, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan-Liaquat Ali Khan, visited the USA in 1950 and cancelled his tour to USSR. Pakistan underwent a change in foreign policy in the 1970s when the Islamic ideological aspect of Pakistan's internal and foreign policy was highlighted. Shireen T. Hunter discusses this phenomenon on the following lines: "For the first 25 years of Pakistan's existence, Jinnah's vision largely prevailed although Islam remained the most important identity and culture maker in the country. By the late 1960s, Islam became an increasingly important factor in Pakistan's domestic politics and its foreign policy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the first Pakistani politician consciously to use Islam as an instrument of its domestic and foreign policies"

(Hunter, 2010, p.144). But this seemed to be a ploy by Bhutto to appease the religious groups. In fact, Bhutto combined Islam and Socialism for its electioneering campaign. With the Shah of Iran, he had a close affinity and received much help from the Shah during the 1965 war and curbing the insurgency in Balochistan in the 1970s. However, Shah was not happy with Bhutto's friendly overtures with Iran.

The issue of Pakistan's ideology and identity is still alive, and Stephen Cohen observes, "An effective element in Pakistan also thinks that Pakistan is first an Islamic ideological State where geopolitical considerations are secondary and its interests lay in Muslim world (Cohen, 2006, p.22). According to Ayesha Jalal, "More than six and a half decades since its establishment, Pakistan has yet to reconcile its self-proclaimed Islamic identity with the imperatives of a modern nation-State" (Jalal, 2017, p.6).

### The Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini A Unique Revolution in the Age of Secularism

The Iranian society in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was an intermix of tradition and modern, the Islamic identity and vying for ancient Persian identity. In this context, the Islamic Revolution in Iran took place that shook the world, and the region is still grappling with the effects of it. Revolutions are by nature very hard to predict and have been very rare in human history. The French revolution was a bourgeois revolution against the ancient regime of Louis XVI, the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a proletarian revolution, while the Chinese Revolution of Mao Tse Tung was a peasant-led revolution. The Iranian revolution surprised the analysts because of its purely religious characteristics. "For the first time in modern history (that is, since 1789), a revolution has taken place in which the dominant ideology, forms of organization, leading personnel, and proclaimed goal have all been religious in appearance and inspiration" (Halliday & Alavi, 1988, p.32) The revolution came after the rebellious age of the 1960's and 1970s in which religion didn't play a decisive role in world politics. However, the Iranian revolution brought religion at the center of World politics. "While in Islam there is no formal distinction between Church and State. The very

concept of the secular is theoretically excluded, and all social ideas must be legitimated by derivation from the holy texts" ([Halliday & Alavi, 1988, p.46](#))

### The Role of Intellectuals in Revolution

Many intellectuals, writers and poets contributed to the revolution by writing thought-provoking essays, articles, stories, and poems. Two prominent of them were Jalal Al-e-Ahmed and Ali Shariati, whose writings and speeches influenced the thinking of people before the revolution. Jalal Al-e-Ahmed was a school principal in a rural area and wrote short stories, novels and essays and whose essay 'Gharbzadegi' (West stricken or Westofication) in 1962 was critical of Western culture in Iran. Gharbzadegi has two heads: one in the West, the other is ourselves who are 'Weststruck' ([Aslan, 2011, p.389](#)). Farming commenting on Jalal Al-e-Ahmed adds: "We seem to be losing on traditional values that had always sustained us, replacing them with nothing but material things- cars, blue jeans, and hamburgers. Yet nobody since Mossadegh had come up with a positive program. Iranians only complained: about the Shah's repressiveness, the government's corruption, the lack of freedom in the press, the Western intoxication" (Farmaian, 1992, p.358).

Ali Ahmed influenced the left leaning people, but it was Ali Shariati who inspired the young zealots as he portrayed Shiism as a revolutionary creed. He himself had worked with Orientalist Professor Massingnon in France as a research assistant while Sartre and Gurwitch whom he knew personally, left a great impression on him ([Irfani, 1984, p.119](#)). One important part of Shariati's ideas was emphasizing to Islamic and Shia roots while the Shah connected the Iranian identity with pre-Islamic Achaemenians ([Simpson, 1996, p.110](#)). Shariati died at the age of 44 in England, most probably, he was killed by SAVAK, but his sentiments of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism are still echoing in Iran's foreign policy. In fact, the revolution was a collective effort of many groups, students, intellectuals and other parties.

In South Asia, the poet Philosopher Allama Muhammad Iqbal who influenced the thinking of the people, particularly the Muslims, was himself much impressed by Jamal-ud-Din Afghani's universalism

or Pan-Islamism. According to Tahir Kamran, " on the one hand, he lamented the deplorable plight of Indian Muslims and, on the other hand, the whole Muslim community (Ummah) was his reference point, thus partaking in the Pan-Islamism of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani" ([Kamran, 2011, p.126](#)). Another Islamic thinker and ideologue in South Asia was the Jamat-i-Islami's founder Maulana Maududi who started a discourse for political Islam. According to Mishra, "Khomeini's notion of state power as a tool to produce a utopian Islamic society was borrowed from Pakistani ideologue Abu Al-Ala Maududi whose works he translated into Farsi in 1963 ([Mishra, 2017, p.196](#)).

### Aftermaths of Revolution

We have seen that revolutions are not ordinary events, and the change of system from old to the new carries with it a lot of violence and bloodshed. After the revolution, numerous Komitehs or Islamic revolutionary Committees had sprung up. Thus, began the purging of the supporters of the previous regime. A nationwide purge that would see thousands of those deemed to be 'enemies of the Islamic revolution were summarily sentenced to death. The casualties included the former head of SAVAK, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, prominent Generals, and Amir Abbas Hoveyda, former Prime Minister of Iran. The Chief Judge of summary executions was Sadeq Khalkhali, who was appointed by Khomeini as head of the Revolutionary Courts. Thus the new regime in Iran started its own version of repression and curbing opposition.

The government led by Clerics attempted to purge from Iranian society the remaining symbols of alien influences. Tehran, a capital that had set Westernization on a Persian base, stood stripped of its illusory past ([Mackey, 1998, p.8](#)). Reza Shah had dreamed of turning Iran into a modern and Western country, and in the 1970's the Iranian society and especially its urban centers were places of Western culture and society. It can be argued that both Reza Shah and Ayatollah Khomeini made the mistake of trying to impose on the Iranian society only one aspect of the characteristics of Iran. The Iranian are proud of their glorious past of the Cyrus the Great, but they are equally proud of their

Islamic traditions. The Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of Islamic Iran was no more valid than the Shah's concept of Persian Iran. Like the Shah's glorification of Persia, the Islamic Republic's exaltation of Islam denies the two traditions existing within the Iranian national psyche (Mackey, 1998, p.9). The Islamic revolution formed the militia known as the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran-e-Enqelab) to counter any foreign coup just as the CIA had removed Mossadegh and to act as a helping hand for the powerful Iranian military. The revolutionary guards also helped the country's new rulers in running the country and enforcing the government's Islamic code of morality.

### Formation of Islamic Government and Foreign Policy

Khomeini next move was to hold a referendum as to what kind of government the people wanted. The referendum was held in March 1979, in which 98% of Iranian voted for the Islamic Republic. The next task was to decide on the constitution of the country. Mehdi Bazargan's government hoped for an Islamic democracy guided by the principles of Islam. Iran adopted a unique system based on Khomeini's concept of Velayat-e-Faqih in which power rests in a combined system of Republicanism and Islam. Shireen Hunter writes, "In Iran's version of Islamic government, legitimacy derives from the application of Islamic principles and the supreme religious Leader (Vali-e-Faqih) is the final arbiter of both what these Islamic principles are and how they should be implemented" (Hunter, 2010, p.23). There was a complete U-turn in Iran's foreign policy from that of Shah's time. Hafeez Malik succinctly expresses that "Iran's foreign policy is based on the following main principles: (1) history (2) geographical position (3) Islam's spiritual and humanistic ideals and (4) the principle of complete reciprocity in relation with other states" (Malik, 2014, p. 33).

Syed Hossein Mousavian, an Iranian policymaker and scholar writes, "Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, emphasized that remaining neither East nor West should be a fundamental tenet of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy- that is, avoiding subservience to foreign powers, whether Western ones such as the United States or Eastern

ones such as China or the former Soviet Union" (Mousavian, 2018). The twentieth century had witnessed the intervention of great powers like Britain and Russia, and later United States and Khomeini envisaged a foreign policy free from the intervention of great powers. However, despite the seemingly benign intentions of revolutionary Iran, it soon got embroiled in a dispute with the United States.

### Zia ul Haq and Khomeini: Two Islamists on Divergent Paths

The two great advocates of Islam or Islamic values and Principles were very much different and alike in many ways. Zia Ul-Haq was influenced by the teachings of Jamaat -e-Islami and its founder Maulana Ala Maududi and his Islamist policies continue to affect the country to this day. Although Zia-Ul-Haq was part of a military establishment that was very liberal and secular in the early years of Pakistan after independence, but his fundamentals were different. Religion played a particularly prominent role in Pakistani politics only after the 1970s. Ayatollah Khomeini was a born Islamist, educated at Qom; he was unflinching in his attitude towards the cause of Islam. Zia Ul-Haq combined the elements of Islamism with pragmatism by keeping the line of communications open with possible adversaries. Zia ul-Haq and Pakistan could not certainly afford an inflexible attitude owing to Zia's and Pakistan's precarious position in the region. Khomeini was much more fanatical in his approach, he certainly had a much wider support of Iranian society, and Iran could play the oil card in international affairs very well. However, the two Islamists did steer their countries to divergent paths with grave consequences for the people of both the countries. "General Zia ul Haq instituted the 'Islamization' of Pakistan to bolster both his domestic and international legitimacy. Domestically he catered to the growing Sunni Islamic revivalist movement (to be distinguished from the Islamist extremist movements) to the detriment of the Shia minority" (Haleem, 2010, p.15).

"Zia ul Haq's government had shrewdly cultivated relations with Khomeini's associates while he was in exile in Paris before the revolution. Pakistan allowed Khurshid Ahmed (Cabinet

Minister) in late December 1978 to see Imam Khomeini, who was then in exile in Paris. Ahmed met Imam Khomeini in Paris on January 14, 1979" ([Alam, 2004, p.531](#)). Pakistan became one of the first countries to recognize the Islamic Revolution of Iran. When Iran decided to withdraw from the Cold War alliance of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) in 1979, Pakistan also followed suit and became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Foreign affairs adviser Agha Shahi told the press that the alliance had "lost its meaning with the withdrawal of Iran but (Pakistan) had been moving independently to that position anyway" ([Kux, 2000, p.237](#)). The old Cold War alliances were being rendered obsolete, and new alliances and conflicts were shaping. Although RCD was not disbanded and would later change to ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) in 1985 it didn't remain a vibrant organization.

However, Khomeini never took a liking to Zia Ul-Haq and his steps to Islamize Pakistan. Khomeini, a hard man to please and committed to his own ideology, disliked Zia ul-Haq's engagement with the Great Satan (United States). Zia Ul-Haq recognized that Iran would not be as forthcoming in his assistance to Pakistan as during Reza Shah's tenure, but he went along maintaining a semblance of good relations with Iran. He also sought reconciliation with Iran by using the good offices and influence of his foreign minister Agha Shahi, also a Shia. Agha Shahi also visited Tehran, but his diplomatic initiatives were not successful ([Singh, 2009, p.157](#)). It is believed that Khomeini often urged visiting Pakistanis to "get rid of Zia". In reality, the Khomeini camp from the very beginning, didn't consider ul-Haq an Islamist of any sort but an American pawn ([Vatanka, 2017, p.150](#)).

"On one occasion, Zia took it upon himself to caution Khomeini about confronting the United States, warning that it was imprudent to tangle with a superpower. Khomeini retorted that he would never do such a thing and , in fact, had always relied on the superpower. Zia was baffled at first, but then realized that Khomeini was mocking him, saying that his own superpower was God, whereas Zia's was the United States" ([Nasr, 2016, p.161](#)).

Zia was in U.S camp while Khomeini rejected the USA. According to Jalal, Zia's motto for the

army was Islam, piety and Jihad, which was the bedrock of Pakistan's foreign policy (Jalal, 2010, p.234). During Zia's time, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries along with the WEST became strategic partners with Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.

### The Ideological Dimension of Iran's Foreign Policy after the Iranian Revolution of 1979

There was a complete U-turn and break up in Iran's foreign policy after the revolution of 1979. During Shah's time, Iran's national interest was paramount and there were no ideological underpinnings to its foreign policy. An example is the Shah's policy in the Gulf which is spelled out by Shah Alam as: "Before the British were withdrawn from the Persian Gulf (December 1, 1971), three significant events took place. Iran's claim over Bahrain; the creation of United Arab Emirates on July 17, 1971; and Iran's occupation of three islands in the Gulf- Abu Musa (administered by Sharjah and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) by force on November 30, 1971" ([Alam, 2004, p.7](#)).

During Shah's time Iran's foreign policy was Pro-West and secular which served the interests of the USA and Britain. He associated Iranian identity with the Pre-Islamic Achaemenian dynasty of Cyrus the Great who laid the foundation of the Persian empire 2500 years ago. Relations between Pakistan and Iran during Shah's time were almost pragmatic and geo-political. When Khomeini took power, 1979 he, changed the dynamics of Iran's domestic and foreign policy. In the beginning, he emphasized more on faith, Pan-Islamism and ideology and the unique concept of Vilayat-i-Faqih in which power rests on a combined system of Republicanism and Islam. Shireen Hunter explains this phenomenon and writes, "In Iran's version of Islamic government legitimacy derives from the application of Islamic principles and the supreme religious leader (Vali-e-faqih) who is the final arbiter of what these Islamic principles are and how they should be implemented". The Supreme leader has a commanding position and ultimate authority in any important decision making. Although students, intellectuals, liberals, Communists, and the people at the bazaar had also played a role along with Clergy in the revolution but ultimately, the clerics

succeeded in forming the Islamic revolutionary government.

After the Iranian revolution, its foreign policy was anti-imperialistic and it was expressed in the light of the slogan 'neither East nor West', and both the super-powers were condemned. R.K. Ramzani lays down six general principles for Khomeini world view: "(1) no dependence on East or West (2) a belief that the United States was the main enemy (3) continuous struggle against the Zionist power, (4) the liberation of Jerusalem (5) anti-imperialism and most important of all, (6) and support for all oppressed people everywhere particularly for the Muslims" ([Rezun, 1990, p.16](#)). Although Iran didn't falter in its Islamic ideological zeal but during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the realities of the war demanded that strong feelings of Iranian nationalism should be aroused. Fred Halliday highlights that Khomeini's conduct in the war situation where nationalism was the most powerful thing: Thus, although he started by renouncing patriotism and the Iranian identity, he began invoking Iran and the concept of fatherland once the Iraqi invasion of 1980 had begun ([Halliday, 2003, p.64](#)). Iran-Contra affair when the USA secretly supplied arms to Iran is a case in point where pragmatism and Real-Politik prevailed.

The conditions of time led Khomeini to allow small changes in Iran and according to Amin Saikal, "By the late 1980s, it had come to provide for the rise of three informal factional clusters within the ruling clerical stratum: the jihadis, or revolutionary traditionalist conservatives; the ijthahadis, or reformist or internationalists; and amalgaran, or centralist pragmatists" ([Saikal, 2019, p.86](#)). The Jihadists were represented by Khomeini and Kani, the ijthahadis by Karoubi and Khatami and the amalgaran by Hashemi Rafsanjani. There were some changes in Iran's internal and foreign policy when the pragmatists and reformists came to power but within the framework of the Shia Islamic order. The real shots were called by the Jihadists and Khomeini.

### **The Contemporary Foreign Policy of Iran**

The important question is where Iran's foreign policy stands today – whether it is following a strong ideological policy or its foreign policy has a

nationalistic dimension to it? In case of Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis (in Yemen) and Sh-ite crescent (running from Iran through Iraq into Syria), Iran's support base seems to be more ideological. Iran and Saudi Arabia are bitterly opposed on sectarian lines as Iran identifies itself with the Shia sect of Islam while Saudi Arabia follows the tenets of the Sunni (Wahabi) school of thought. Both compete for leadership across the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. As Muslim and Arab nations are divisively divided into two nations; Sunnis/Shiites.

R.K.Ramzani believes in the fusion of Islamic and Iranic nature of Iranians and says: "in every major period of Iranian history, the dictates of the circumstances has forced Iranian foreign policymakers to interpret their religious ideology pragmatically in order to advance their State interest" ([Ramzani, 2004, p.11](#)). Vali Nasr states that the tradition of Iranian national interest continues even to the present date. He says that there is a concern in Iran on national interest and security and an example of this is the Nuclear deal. He also pinpoints the 'Forward defense' strategy of Iran in the shape of friendly groups which threaten the Israeli border ([Ramzani, 2004, p.109-111](#)). Both pragmatism and ideology are interwind and mixed in Iran's foreign policy and supplement each other. Iran is coming to terms with the real world and an example of which is the Nuclear deal in 2015. It seems that the ideological zeal has almost lost its momentum in Iran, and its ideology is used pragmatically. Halliday writes...on sovereignty, human rights, the environment or the claims of nationalism, religion has proven to be adaptable, once those with power so wish" ([Halliday, 2005, p.56](#)).

### **Conclusion**

Ideology is an important factor in the domestic and foreign policy of a country, but it has its own pitfalls. Ideological aims may collide with pragmatism or the larger national interests of a country. In Iran, the Pahlavi Shahs' were all out for modernization or Westernization and left the ideology at the back-burner, and Iranian policies were subservient to the American dictates. Pakistan and Iran relations until the time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi were very cordial, but these

connections were not based on religion or ideology. In fact, the early leadership of Pakistan were secular or liberal in outlook. However, a political discourse is still going on in Pakistan about its Islamic ideological identity versus liberal Pakistani identity. Therefore, Pakistan has yet to decide and reconcile the two opposing versions.

The Iranian revolution was unique in its kind as it was distinct from all the previous revolutions in the world. Although differing parties and intellectuals participated in the revolution, ultimately Khomeini's ideological leadership prevailed. In South Asia, Allama Iqbal, Jamal ud-din Afghani and Maulana Maududi aspired for 'Pan-Islamism' and 'Muslim Ummah' on ideological grounds and professed that Muslims were brothers hence on the nation. In Iran, the revolution proved to be very repressive, they executed the Shah's cohorts, curbed the opposition and tried to export the revolution to the neighboring Muslim countries. As a matter of fact, the Shah and Khomeini's policies were poles apart; both repression against political opponents emphasized only one characteristic or aspect of the Iranian nation. Shah ignored religion while Khomeini neglected old Iranian culture.

General Zia and Khomeini were both ideologues in their own way, while Khomeini was a committed revolutionary and was radical in his policies. He was against Imperialism and superpowers, particularly US hegemony and supported the Palestinian cause and oppressed people. On the other hand, Zia ul-Haq was the strategic partner of the USA and Saudi Arabia against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In foreign policy, Zia was more pragmatic and received massive aid from the US and other countries. But Khomeini didn't consider him as an ardent supporter of Islamic ideology but an American ally. However, despite ideological differences and Pakistan's tilt towards Saudi Arabia, there was a semblance of good relations between Pakistan and Iran.

Exigencies of time also compelled Khomeini to invoke Iranian nationalism along with ideology during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Today there is a fusion of ideology and nationalism in Iran's foreign policy. Pakistan and Iran relations are lukewarm and not as cordial as in the early years of Pakistan.



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