

Engineering Electoral Design in Terms of Globalization of Institutions: A Case Study of Pakistan

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- p- ISSN: 2520-0348
- e-ISSN: 2707-4587
- ISSN-L: 2520-0348

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Abstract *Pakistan needs reforms in electoral institutions inherited from the colonial era which have minimal roots in its diverse soil led to political wrangling in federating units for more representational space in the federal structure. Conflict management through the engineering of an inclusive electoral system in Pakistan is the aim of this paper. The challenge of changing demographics and the demand for a fair share in power can be met with the introduction of a suitable reform package as set forth by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in its verdict in June 2012. With this decision in view, this paper attempts to examine a feasible way to introduce a less perilous electoral package in Pakistan which can resolve issues of political exclusiveness.*

Key Words: Alternative Vote (AV), Electoral Globalization, Colonial Plantation, Regional Imitation, Preferential Vote (PV)

Introduction

The urge for achieving quality governance pushes developing countries to reform their political institutions. This is a global phenomenon. Therefore, a comparative study is important to check concerns of political polarity and fragile administrative structure. Particularly, how the electoral design is important for the pavement of a strong political system is a noteworthy area of research. The main task of electoral institutions is to bring forth political leaders from diverse communities who can negotiate, compromise, and govern effectively. For that reason, it is important to fix the rules of the elections for fair representation as it can cause moderation through proportional outcomes which further generates a fair governance system.

In the wake of the 3rd and 4th waves of democratization, the global concern about the electoral choices is again in limelight (Satori, 1994). According to Huntington (1991), the wave gave birth to new democracies where “new constitutions were drafted, new electoral arrangements were debated and new political systems were introduced”. Resultantly, it stimulated a huge argument on the adoption of various ways of political engineering through electoral choices (Huntington, 1991). The traditional argument concentrates on power-sharing through proportional representation (PR) and governability through plurality elections (Reynold & Reilly, 1997). The electoral system should be inclusive in a heterogeneous society divided into social and cultural lines i.e. diverse ethnolinguistic, racial, religious, or regional features. Therefore, the maintenance of a peaceful co-existence of different social groups within the same territory through designing an inclusive electoral system is an interesting subject (Nohlen, 1984). For instance, elections in a heterogeneous society are considered as next to a national survey, “Under conditions of free

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elections, groups in polarized societies will line up behind ethnic-based political parties representing their respective groups” (Horowitz, 1991, 96).

Theoretically, there are two streams on electoral politics under the globalization of electoral institutions i.e. Majoritarian (needs majority votes) and Proportional Representation (works in plurality votes). Mainly Arend Lijphart (1977) and Donald Horowitz (1991) are two main schools of thought on Preferential Voting (PV). However, STV and AV as voting mechanisms under these models, in conjunction with colonial transplantation, regional imitation and normative appeal for the implementation of the system, are the main concerns of this paper. In a preferential electoral system, a different combination of voting patterns can be designed (Bastian & Luckham, 2003). These are labeled as AV and STV (Ali, 2009). In a comparison of FPTP which depicts ratio difference between total national votes and seats in parliament, these two voting systems lessen the gap amid a ratio of national seats, a party gets in parliament (Jenkin Commission, 1998). Proportional Representation (PR) is used for both national and sub-national elections. In the case of Pakistan, the FPTP electoral system is a colonial plantation. United Kingdom (UK), as the colonial ex-master, is itself in search of reforms, and in spite of strong systemic forces for the status, quo voices were raised in favor of AV/supplementary or AV Plus (80% AV and 20% PR list) (Horowitz, [n.d]).

This article is composed of three sections. The first one converses present political hitches in Pakistan in relation to particular electoral institutions. The second part confers two voting methods, i.e. AV and STV, which are being used in elections for many countries successfully. The third section converses salient features of STV. Lastly, the paper concludes by proposing electoral redesigning for the betterment of the Pakistani political system and society as well.

Preferential Voting as Electoral Choice

It is broadly agreed that many political ills can be cured by installing proper electoral institutions. A societal compatible electoral system has remained the most debatable concern for a divided society. Some critics argue that the formation of ethnic parties does not alleviate the adverse effects of heterogeneity, rather it replicates prevailing racial splits in the parliament. This view does not recommend the growth of ethnic parties because, according to them, it does not help to bridge the gap between ethnic segments of society. But they advocate such an electoral system that can promote accommodation and teamwork amid contender groups to lessen the complexities of ethnicity. Donald Horowitz (1991, 97) expounded “reciprocal vote-pooling, bargaining, and accommodation” across group lines through designing an electoral system. The reciprocal voting system pushes politicians to attract votes other than the votes of the community they belong to.

Yet, that electoral system that encourages accommodation among rival groups is appreciated. Evidently, Preferential Voting (PV) empowers electors to specify how to choose among the remaining contestants if their preferred contender could not win. This option mainstreams a political system because provides absolute majority and plurality of votes side by side. Multi-member districts are constructed in STV as a PR voting system (a kind of PV) which is subjected to elect more than one member in each district. It can include small minorities in the political system when the vote is transferred to the next preferred candidates in a similar way as happens in AV. The immediately elected candidate is the one with the most first preferences on the ballot. But the candidate with lowest votes will be removed and the latter preferences of that candidate will be reallocated among the other remaining contenders. For heterogeneous societies, this feature of STV encourages such campaigning which can attract vote not only within a community of a candidate but outside of his specific ethnic or linguistic group. Now it would be important to “generate a centripetal spin to the political system to pull the parties toward moderate compromising policies” (Horowitz, 1991). The preferential voting system may become the prime choice which facilitates electors to order candidates of any party according to their preference.

The discussion on FPTP, AV, and STV shows that plurality elections are associated with moderation and is suitable for heterogeneous societies with the distraction of voters in the center. The outcomes of a

plurality voting system may vary from society to society. Evidently, the study on implications of FPTP in Northern Ireland depicts that it converted the numerical strength of Protestants into political and administrative hegemony over other segments of society. The key drawback associated with the plurality voting system is that in the absence or lack of 'floating voters', it generates a perpetual and fixed vote bank which results in "ascriptive majority rule" (Lewis, 1965). Furthermore, plurality elections are not suitable for heterogeneous societies in single-member constituencies. Lijphart and Horowitz are two main opposing figures on the utility of plurality elections in divided societies. They quote from Arthur Lewis (1965) "the surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of First-Past-The-Post" (Bogaard, 2001). Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly (1999, 97) claim that "for ethnically divided states, the prevailing academic wind clearly blows in favor of proportional representation and against plurality". On the other hand, the PR system is valuable because "it allows for the faithful translation of social cleavages into political cleavages through political parties, ensuring that every salient societal group is represented according to its size" (Arms, 1997, 114). It is often said that PR system does little for moderation; but Reynolds and Reilly (1999) articulated that PR encourages political parties, no matter what its size, to attract votes from outside of their group boundaries. In that case, they use mixed party slates. "PR also encourages parties, both large and small, to create regionally, ethnically and gender diverse lists, as they need to appeal to a wide spectrum of society to maximize their overall national vote" (Satori, 1968). However, a PR system promotes tolerance, but it normally could not function properly in heterogeneous societies of developing and under-developing countries, where conduct of elections is generally partisan and this practice hampered the growth of accommodative political parties.

Some other authors argue that the electoral system is not meant to produce moderation but accept proportionality; Arms (1997, 114) says "the electoral system cannot be expected to be everything". But an electoral system should be based on fair representation of people according to their wishes, which a PR system can do exactly.

But on the other side, an opposite argument comes from Giovanni Sartori (1968, 121-22) who believes that politics is not a fair game and electoral system is its manipulative tool. But the inclusion of few at the expense of exclusion of all is not for the benefit of a plural society. Arms (1997) suggests that STV is best to maintain proportionality and cross-cutting cleavages. So the lack of electoral engineering can be overcome through constitutional engineering. He proposed that the characters of a government should be "national unity, formal power-sharing arrangements, and a more informal arrangement on the Swiss model of government-opposition relations" (Horowitz, 1991, 196).

Through integrative consensual institutions, it is possible to create an institutional setup to encourage cross-cutting cleavages and include minorities in decision-making. According to Reynold and Reilly (1999), this can be possible through the Lijphart recipe of government i.e. parliamentary government, STV, Coalitional government and decentralization of power. But critics say that it is for those states where the tradition of accommodation exists. Horowitz (1991) also criticizes Consociationalism as insufficient to bring moderation, but moderation is not the sole aim of the electoral system as Lewis, Reynold and Arms propounded. However, Horowitz admits STV as a variant of PR where voters can make choices as many candidates are in the field. But STV is weak, as was used in Ireland in 1970, and Satori (1968) and Horowitz (1991) are unwilling to use the PR system because of the transient nature of coalitions through vote-pooling (AV and STV). But the world-emerging consensus is against Horowitz and in favor of STV/PR.

Polarization, Extremism, and Pakistani Electoral Institutions

Pakistan faced an inherited dysfunction in governance. With the passage of time, the mother party, All India Muslim League, polarized intensely and all hopes of a national unity dashed to the ground. Gradually, hundreds of other small parties rose heads which made the scenario more complex. Consequently, this polarization led to a hung parliament in the lower house. The last few elections are a witness to this fact of hung parliaments. Deepening polarization has paralyzed the good governance efforts of every government.

While the quality of governance is already compromised at the expense of minority rights, polarization, if not dealt wisely, can harm the trust of voters. This may harm the trust of the majority of voters in a representative democracy. This gives birth to flank/independent voters. The problem of governability is a structural problem implanted in our electoral institutions inherited from colonial powers.

The elections in Pakistan, on the state and national levels, are held under the FPTP arrangements. In this electoral system of single-member district, a candidate wins technically if he gets simple plurality votes. The ascriptive majority is neglected where clear majority votes are needed to rule. This brings disproportionality when most of the votes are cast against the ruling party. Because of this tendency, the electoral system is being reformed worldwide.

Rethinking “First Past the Post”: Lessons from Abroad

On a petition of the Pakistan Workers Party, the historic verdict of the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 23rd June 2012 against FPTP can be considered a milestone in the history of Pakistan. The court declared that FPTP “violates the principle of majority rules” as 40% of seats in 2008 elections were won through plurality under 50% votes (Royal Commission Report on Electoral Reforms of New Zealand, 1986). The Court did not recommend any system but advised the ECP to use run-off/AV or PR Mixed Member districts. In the background of this decision, a few examples of Majoritarian and proportional representation are discussed hereinafter.

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: New Zealand, Japan, and Italy

Newborn states facing simultaneous projects of state-building and nation-building, like Pakistan, considered FPTP a better option for state-building. But reformers who criticize this system tend to propose a new combination of FPTP and PR system, like a mixed-member constituency system. In this system, the Majoritarian system is combined with Party-list proportional system and voters elect both; a candidate and a political party. This system was first practiced in Germany as an independent system, followed by other states like New Zealand, Japan, and Italy. Furthermore, it was adopted as a model in Scotland, Wales, and Canada. Independent form of mixed-member system regulates the general distribution of seats to each party for which voters vote. In Japan, this system applies proportionality rule to that chunk of seats elected from the party list only. In this section, a comparative observation is expressed to apply the suggested mechanism in Pakistan while currently, Pakistan is using FPTP in National Assembly and PR/STV in the Senate election.

New Zealand

New Zealand is a homogeneous society. In New Zealand, FPTP remained functional until 1993. Chronologically, in 1986, the Royal Commission recommended mixed-member proportional (MMP). After a national referendum in 1993, this system was adopted and a mixed system of FPTP and Party-list was initiated. After the election under this reform, parliament was composed of members elected through FPTP and from party lists as well (Reilly, 2002, 162).

Until 1993, New Zealand faced the inherent deficiencies of FPTP while it was using a single-member district for election to the unicameral Parliament. Major parties (with less than 40% of votes) remained successful to get the majority control on legislation through minority votes and smaller parties remained neglected to get a share in power-sharing. Hence voters felt this as an exploitative minority rule which functioned dictatorially. Moreover, the issues of governability worsened with rising unemployment and low economic growth, for which the voters changed the electoral system of the state that had failed to form a government which was not accountable for their campaign promises (Reilly, 2002).

Hence the commission worked in a much-needed direction. The commission provided a forum for national debate for reforms which turned into a mass-based movement. In this transitional period, the

public was involved in an informal education campaign started with the help of electronic media, including television advertisements elucidating that how the MMP worked.

Japan

Japan is also a homogeneous state. Till 1994, Japan used a combination of multi-member districts with a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) for the elections of members of the lower house. However, voters were given a choice to elect a candidate in districts with 3 to 5 seats. In this scenario, from 1955 onward Japan was dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) allegedly ruled often through pork-barrel politics at the expense of issue-based politics. Moreover, opposition parties were fragmented and prone to internal polarization. After a mass-based agitation, the government initiated legislation to institute major electoral reforms in 1994. In the newly adopted Majoritarian system, single-member districts (300 seats to be elected) were designed under the mixed-member system, while 180 seats were to be filled through proportional representation. The new system tended to initiate interparty competition. However, after electoral reforms in Japan, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the general elections in 2009. Afterward, the two-party system emerged on the national horizon. Hence, the mixed-member system proved similar to the FPTP system of the Majoritarian model. Since 2001, lack of cooperation between parties in the lower house and interparty and intraparty competitions is resulting in obstruction in legislation.

Italy

Besides New Zealand and Japan, the third recipient of the wave of electoral change in Italy. Till 1993, Italy practiced a proportional system. But it was generating coalition governments dominated by a single party. Therefore, the Democratic Party (DC) remained an essential ingredient of every coalition from 1945 to 1993. Moreover, Italian politics faced problems of internal polarization in political parties which proved fatal for the stability of coalition governments.

In 1993, electoral reforms were initiated by the Italian parliament which billed 75% of the seats to be filled through FPTP elections and 25% to be filled through the PR system. The new system faced the same fate as Japan's, and it expanded the two-party system. However, minimal party fragmentation was noticed with an enhanced check and balance system for better accountability of members and parties. In 2005, another amendment was introduced by Prime Minister Silvia Berlusconi to benefit his party through the PR voting system. After this amendment, the winning coalition with the majority vote was promised to get 54% of parliamentary seats in bonus on party lists. This amendment was struck down by the court as unconstitutional alongside closed party-list because it generated disproportionality. Many times, the appointed, rather than elected prime ministers, served to save the vulnerable coalition governments. Furthermore, these reforms could not introduce stability in Italian politics.

Some of these states are facing problems with institutional weakness of FPTP or one-party rule and weak coalition governments. For this purpose, a blend of the inclusive system (proportionality) with exclusive democracy (FPTP based for good governance), as Horowitz articulation, remains best for these countries. However, the mixed-member electoral system is getting popular world-wide, but experiments vary from state to state with their institutional design. But it can be applied under different forms i.e. in multi-member (PR) or single-member districts (FPTP). For this system constitutional amendment is needed, like for party-list system in which some additional members on proportionality base are elected, to mainstream it by including diverse parties through the party-list system (Lijphart, 1977).

STV: Examples of Australia and Ireland

Another expressive form of preferential voting is STV which improves electoral systems. In the case of STV, Single-Member Districts are arranged on 'one member one vote'. Many states around the globe are using the STV system; the two successful examples are Australia and Ireland. But like a colonial plantation, without

normative debate, the imitation of regional application of a system will not benefit Pakistan. This discussion is detailed in the coming section.

Australia

Australia is often labeled as a well-organized democracy. Its main helpful feature, among others, is its use of preferential voting to thwart fanaticism. However it boasts a homogeneous population that is highly diverse in its essence; 40% of its diversity consists of immigrants (Reilly, 2002).

Australia has blended a mixture of federalism and parliamentary structure. Much of it has been borrowed from the United States and Britain's political systems. For elections to the upper house (Senate), Australia uses STV in a multi-member district system while for the lower house of Australia; AV in the single-member district has been adopted. The STV encourages a healthy competition in which parties campaign beyond their natural constituencies to attract voters who can rank them even on second or third preferences. Sometimes, preferences work like a game-changer and in Australia over 60% of seats are not filled on first preferences of votes. Therefore, in this sense, the proportional system has initiated a process of moderation and centripetal tendencies are emerging where parties try to reach the center to bag the vote. In Pakistan, the national assembly, the lower house, has a representation of 342 members which is lower than other established democracies i.e. the UK, Italy, Germany, and France. These states devise more than 550 members in their lower houses while having a population size of less than 100 million. This proportion can be increased in size by 55% through the addition of about 200 seats elected on proportional electoral systems like party-list (Hudler, 2013). This system varies in form. According to Ben Reilly (2002), this can create confusion among voters and they might not be attracted to cast their votes if the number increases. But it can block the negative campaigns that are a very common feature of elections in a single-member district (Electoral System in Pakistan, [n.d]).

Like Belgium, Australia has a compulsory voting system in which every registered voter with 18 years of age has to cast vote. In case of absence, they are fined. For this, a national campaign for public awareness is administered under election commission in which people are told how to vote under preferential voting.

Ireland

Another example regarding this research is that of Ireland. The well-known peace treaty 'Good Friday' signed in 1998 between Protestants and Catholics allows the use of preferential votes (STV) to generate communal inclusiveness in the divided society of Northern Ireland. Resultantly, the 30 years communal violence was summed up into successful power-sharing between Unionist and Nationalist in Northern Ireland assembly. Although in 1973 and 1982 similar electoral rules were followed, but it could not achieve the desired pro-peace results (Pakistan Election (2018).

Ireland uses a proportional voting system (STV) for both houses of legislation in the multi-member districts. It focuses on the quality of democracy to generate good governance. The candidates are concerned to help citizens rather than just passing legislation. Therefore, political polarization is not an issue of Irish politics but accountability, vulnerable legislative houses, and lack of disparity between parties are a few major problems due to lack of focus on policymaking and legislation. In 1999, constitutional reforms were introduced through a commission. The electoral system was reformed through a national campaign soon after the economic recession of 2009. Hence a new round of constitutional reforms was initiated in 2013, hence the proposal for adoption of the mixed-member proportional system (AV) was introduced. Public response for electoral change was neutral as they were demanding change in the voting process but not refurbishing it (Report of 7th Youth parliament of Pakistan, 2016). However, in the new electoral recommendations, the increase of seats per district as a minimum of five representatives along with suggestions for improvement of registration and voting system was made (6th National census, 2017).

Pakistan: The Case of Preferential Voting

With this background, it is worth exploring how can a state successfully engineer a compatible electoral system for the survival of democracy in the presence of deep racial, religious, linguistic, or ethnic cleavages. In most cases, during elections, clever politicians in such societies can exploit masses by playing ethnic cards while using emotional and communal appeals. In that sense, the rhetoric of public and leaders can hurt moderation in the society when centrifugal forces dread national politics in the form of FPTP. Contrarily, FPTP is considered the best source for acquiring a strong center as a centripetal force (Report of 7th Youth Parliament of Pakistan, 2016).

The electoral designs base on the PR system may prove more inclusive for societies. But it may also deepen the divisions in place of alleviating them. For unitary states, like Britain or New Zealand, the majoritarian system can detach the administration from the necessity of a comprehensive consultation and accountability process. However, despite the dire need for 'electoral engineering' there are no easy choices for states (Cox, 1999).

The strategy for inter-ethnic harmony in multiethnic political party systems, like Pakistan, would require an inclusive electoral system. Scholars agree that good voting methods facilitate -better norms of voting behavior that is crucial to promote both democracy and a successful reconciliation process. It can be done through inducements to political parties in search of electoral success.

Pakistan's constitution of 1973 resembles the Australian constitution. Australia uses preferential voting whereas federalism is the norm in Pakistan. Pakistan also does not imitate Britain's structure, which is a unitary system that practices the parliamentary system. However, Germany, India, and Australia are federations that may become sources to replicate or borrow from as an external resource. The notable difference between Pakistan and Australia is that the latter's senate members are directly elected. India and Pakistan have roughly the same socio-economic conditions, but provincial boundaries are sacrosanct here but in India, the states' boundaries are being redrawn on the basis of languages to add more states to the federation. Also, the separation of powers in India is already settled (6th National Census, 2017).

Currently, Pakistan uses FPTP/SMD to elect national assembly members. The very essence of FPTP is electing a party with simple majority votes which encourage wastage of votes cast in favor of smaller parties. It generates 'minority rule', the ruling party wins with simple majority though majority votes may be cast against it. Consequently, SMD can produce minority rule. The PR system is usually used by developed countries where political parties get seats according to the proportion of the vote they bagged. However, this system is a tough time for smaller parties as they have to achieve some milestones i.e., minimum threshold or smaller district size. So, federal legislation would be needed to create multi-seat districts. Preferential voting might produce results where the elected candidates mirror the proportion of the preferences of the voters. A mixed-member system is a mixture of two systems, usually FPTP (SMD) and PR. But it can still result in a two-party system that is incompatible in the multi-party political system. The second choice, STV can also be used in the single-member district where one member is elected, but voters can rank their choices in order of their preferences. In this case, candidates need an absolute majority to win. For STV, no state/federal legislation is required as it employs Single Member Districts. Supposedly it encourages tolerance and moderation through seat-pooling for which a candidate has to attract votes from beyond its natural constituency (Hudler, 2013). This develops non-partisan constituencies to result in moderate policymaking.

In response to the ruling of Supreme Court of Pakistan, on 23rd June 2012, in the response of the direction of Supreme Court, the Director-General of ECP stated that The reference included a recommendation for an absolute majority election system, complete with a run-off election should no candidate receive over 50% of the votes in the first election. While a run-off system would certainly be an improvement over plurality in Pakistan's fragmented democracy, the problems associated with holding a separate run-off such as low voter turnout in the runoff election, split votes, and extra cost would be exacerbated in Pakistan's unstable political structure. The fundamental flaws of FPTP

elections would persist and a run-off would not alleviate the drastic advantage that an FPTP system has for large parties. FPTP is not good for Pakistan because of regional, religious deep divisions and multiparty system. FPTP produces fake results because candidates win a small fraction of votes and large parties get high seats and small parties get fewer seats because of constituency-based results. For other reasons, FPTP cannot work because of the multiparty system but run-off still faces the same fate. (Hudler, 2013)

In the above-stated background, looking at the poll results of the decade would be interesting. According to a report of Pakistan visionary Forum (n.d) in general elections 2002, the Pakistan Peoples' Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) got 25.8% votes and the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLQ) got 25.7%, but the PMLQ got 125 seats and the PPPP won 81 in the Lower House, the National Assembly. In the 2008 elections, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) got 19.6% votes and the PMLQ got 23% votes, but the PMLN won 91 seats and PMLQ got 54 seats in the Parliament. In the 2013 Elections, the PMLN collided with the independent candidates, bypassing the major parties, to win 125 seats with 32% of total votes. Though 2/3 of total votes were cast against the PMLN, it still made the government to rule the country. Contrarily, the PPPP won 27 seats with 15% of total votes; the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) won 26 seats with 17% of total votes. Women seats and minority seats in the national assembly are ostensibly filled through the party-list system, but practically they are filled on the basis of the FPTP system. In the 2018 General election, the result is again hung parliament where PTI with major votes has to collide with independent candidates and sought seat bargain with other political parties.

Low turnout is a major feature of Pakistani elections. For this, countries such as Australia and Belgium are using progressive reforms of compulsory voting. But Pakistan is highly unlikely to adopt it. One favorable factor of using PR is the emergence of smaller political parties. It cannot increase turnout, but it generates such circumstances in which turnout is counted instead of being wasted.

Another issue with FPTP is the gerrymandering of boundaries of the constituencies. This is worsening the possibility for Single Member District to capitulate to vague or unjust results. In 2013, constituencies were drawn with equal size of population-based on the census but regular census in Pakistan was held with a break of twenty years.

The problem of gerrymandering (altering boundaries of a constituency to exploit vote bank) occurs close to elections which might be fixed with electoral reforms. The registration of new voters can be improved by making it automatic when someone comes to 18 years of age. Low turnout can be improved with the compulsory voting system as in Belgium and New Zealand. The issue of using electronic machines in the election is also a demand. Therefore redesigning the electoral institution has become a prime responsibility of Pakistan under democratic principles.

Besides FPTP, the split votes are another cause of wastage of vote in this system which can be controlled through the PR system/MMD. In Punjab, voters of PTI/PPP/flank voters had no choice to cast their vote that's why the PMLN got 78% of seats with only 26% of votes in the Punjab Assembly. This is an unjust distribution of seats in the representative house of a country. Contrarily, STV permits electors to express their support for more leading parties. In that case, the issue of wasted votes will also be resolved. Pakistan has a rich socio-Ethnic makeup where Punjabis are the largest ethnic group followed by Pakhtuns, Sindhis, and Baluchs respectively. While Saraikis is 10.53% of Punjab, Muhajir 7.53%, Balochs 3.57%, and Hindkowan (Gilgit Baltistan) 4.66%. The lifestyle, thinking and perception of rural and urban areas also vary. Besides, there is variance in religious and sectarian makeup though Islam is state religion practiced by 95-98% Muslims are divided into sects (Electoral System in Pakistan [n.d]).

In this background, PR rather than FPTP is more suitable, however, it will not bring 180-degree change in the system. The 2013 election statistics inform that 87.3% of votes were cast for parties while independent candidates received 12.7%. This reverses the criticism on the PR system; critics say that the PR system is successfully working in those countries where literacy rate is high, but in Pakistan literacy rate is not that much good and the bulk of voters come from rural areas. But the statistics gathered after the 2013 elections show that voters have a party-sense or affiliation while voting. Moreover, in the case of

FPTP, a candidate thinks only about his/her district, but in case of PR, he/she has to attract voters across ethnic groups and not his/her constituency alone. In Pakistan gender and religious discrimination is an issue, so the PR suits as it counts every vote and women and other minority groups are given due share as well.

Table 1. The difference in Seat allocation in FPTP and PR system in Pakistan Election 2013

S. No	Political Parties	FPTP	PR
1.	PMLN	130	87
2.	PTI	26	45
3.	PPPP	37	41
4.	MQM	19	14

Source: *Youth Parliament Report, P. 13*

Pakistan is facing electoral reform issues like other democracies and needs institutional redesigning on a normative basis rather than imitation. It is not necessary that same or desired outcomes can be drawn from the implementation of lessons of electoral reforms from other countries because variables i.e. political parties, coalition governments, candidates, societal norms, etc. affect the outcomes in their own way. However, a range of suggestions for reforms come forth from time to time according to possibilities.

The very first thing to be considered is the reflexive effects of translating votes into seats. A comparison between the single-member (Majoritarian system) and multi-member district (PR) is very clear. In the Majoritarian system, constituencies are translated into seats and distribution of seats is based on the preferences of a majority of voters. Therefore, the system does not produce any difference from Majoritarian outcomes. Hence mixed-member system with a combination of the party-list system is supposed to give better results under the majoritarian system. However, the adoption of STV (PR) system is proving beneficial within two electoral cycles in different countries, like the US.

The second imperative is that redesigning of electoral rules can alter the motivation for candidates. For example, the PR system gives the incentive of preferences of voters to candidates which can change the results of elections. Therefore, a candidate's campaign to attract voters from beyond his/her ethnic group. This brings tolerance and moderation to stop the partisan politics that promote Centripetalism.

For electoral reform in Pakistan, successful examples of redesigning of institutions are imitated. For example, New Zealand demonstrated that a national consensus about the electoral system is required to be achieved. In established democracies, the demand for electoral reforms is usually initiated by the public. For this purpose, a public awareness process like Japan, New Zealand, Italy, and Ireland is required to be initiated through election commissions with the involvement of electronic media. In Pakistan, a national level debate among politicians, academician and public shows concerns about the incompatibility of the electoral system with our political and societal norms.

Another must for the success of reforms is patience. The reforms need time to produce vital results. It might take decades to modify the political system, and voters to be used to the changes. Therefore, an awareness program is required on a long-term basis.

Reforms also need a balance between practicability and popularity. Pakistan has a multi-party system therefore no major opposition will come forth against reforms, except few major political parties. However, the awareness against the status quo electoral institution will be effective to find out alternative system which can end the so-called majority rule.

Conclusion

The electoral outcomes of PV or FPTP are quite different from each other. But the thorough analysis of the model countries of the study, using AV, shows that AV is resulting similar to FPTP and it is better for homogenous countries. It includes major parties/segments on the expanses of smaller ones as proved in the case of FPTP i.e. in Japan Mixed member districts proved similar to FPTP because of the two-party

system tendency. It is proving useless especially in the environment of inter and intra-party competition and polarization. Hence it is not compatible with Pakistan, a country with hundreds of registered political parties. Moreover, it has a heterogeneous society by ethnically and linguistically but practicing FPTP which is not proving much beneficial for its diverse soil.

However, PV puts a premium on building broad coalitions as it offers greater choices with the option that it may divert the destructive activism towards positive effects. This system possibly will decrease to some extent, the money game in politics. The incentive to get as many lower preference votes as possible may lessen parochial and extreme ideological activism. A competitor may work moderately to attract votes of opponents' supports in order to get majority votes. Therefore it needs a PV system especially STV which blocks party polarization too. The examples of Australia and Ireland demonstrate that political polarization between parties can be overcome by using the STV system. This system can bring a rise in voting turnout through public administration which eventually will address the issue of 'wasted vote'. Certainly, it would eliminate the option that a small party contestant (such as Imran Khan in 2008) could be, or be supposed to be, a "spoiler," fluctuate the contest from one contender to another, since under PV, the preference votes for such a minor candidate would be reallocated to one of the main candidates. It also wedges the issue of gerrymandering because of multi and transferable choices to the voter.

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