'Empowered Iran' in a Complex Region (Middle East): Tehran's Foreign Policy Challenges and Dimensions in the 21st Century

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Abstract

Foreign policy is a serious module in the lives, behaviour, of all nation-states. Recently foreign policy study has acquired new dimensions as a result of a paradigm shift in Iranian foreign policy. Iran has moved away from began camp follower of the United States to an independent political actor with its independent foreign policy. Tehran, from a loyal U.S. collaborator, turned out to be a stalwart opponent. In this backdrop, the study investigates the geo-strategic importance of Iran in the Middle East and Asia as a whole. In fact, because of Tehran's natural resources like natural gas and oil, etc., this region has always been the centre of attraction for major actors. But since Iran has changed her foreign policy roles, from western to Islamic, the region has confronted numerous security issues because of its strong Islamic history. Besides, the data for the study has incorporated from primary source taken from the official website of the foreign office of Iran, and Overall, the study examines why this alteration of the conceptual, political framework in Iran, from nationalism to Islam, has led to assume Iranian foreign policy conferring to Islamic vision.

Key Words: Iran, Paradigm, Middle East, Foreign, Strategy

Introduction

In 1979 the collapse of the Shah regime due to the Islamic Revolution and the outbreak of the first so far positive constitutional expression of the Islamic lobby in contemporary history. Iran converted from the loyal U.S. friend to a persistent opponent. (Axworthy, 2013) The role of CENTO was removed after Revolution in the state, and needed disparity in Iranian stances particularly Israel and set as the main objective of foreign policy is the freedom of Jerusalem from Israeli rule and the sanctity of the city overall Muslims. (Frye et al., 1975) In the Sunni school of thought, a parallel growth has not transpired so far notwithstanding the determinations of the Islamic Brotherhood and al-Qaeda. The main purpose of Islam is the complete elimination of Western aspirations from the Islamic world, the substitution of nation-states by numerous territories in the short-term. (Shanahan, 2009)

Conversely, the 1980-1988 conflict between Tehran and Baghdad banned the increase of rebellion to other Muslim countries excluding Lebanon, where Hezbollah was positively recognized (1982) Afghanistan, whereas, Tehran backed her proxies to exile the Soviets from the state.

During 1989-1997 was a time of internal restructuring of the state (Švejdová, 2017), it was important to shaping the Middle East region and begun to further strengthen the Islamic Revolution after the essential

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restructuring and the concurrent end of the Soviet Union. ([Khatib, n.d.](#)) After the death of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003), the voice of Iran is now, in a very clear sense, and unpredictable too. ([Davis, 2008](#))

Therefore, differences in Iran's foreign strategy before and after 1979 indicate that Iran's geopolitical discourse has chosen a physical division comparable to similar geopolitical developments. ([Barzegar, 2009](#)) The shifting philosophical agenda from secular-nationalism to Islam has given a new impetus to Iran's foreign policy. Iran's geopolitical goals now include the Freedom of Palestine, which the Shah did not take seriously. The Islamic ideology is more appropriate for Arabs and Turks because of the universality of their message to Tehran. ([Saleh, 2016](#)) The core message to the Muslims from Iran is the unity of Islam, which represents a stronger understanding of the specificity of the Muslims of each nation, region, and Sunni-Shia sect. For example, Hamas, the Palestinian Sunni organizations is influenced by Iran, after the 2006 War Hezbollah got popularity in Lebanon, and the Sunni world. (Khatib, n.d.)

Challenges of Iranian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

In the second term, it dominated and shaped Iranian politics after Pahlavi with an influential Islamic structure. The Maktabis rejected relations with the West and sought to spread the Second Revolution (1981-2008), recognized for Tehran's rejection strategy. ([Barzegar, 2005](#)) During the Iran-Iran conflict, Iran was the only welcome-country: Iran will remain neutral with Syria, Libya and southern Yemen, Turkey, Pakistan and Algeria. Iran's main objective at that stage is to overthrow Iraq on the battlefield, expel Arab countries from Baghdad in the Persian Gulf, and strengthen Tehran's ties with Shiite Arab countries. The core success of Iran's foreign policy during this period was the expansion and consolidation of the Iran-Syrian Connotation and the penetration of Hezbollah in Lebanon ([Ramazani, 2004](#)). Moreover, The Iran-Iraq nation is a structural integration process that facilitates the transition from extremism to rationality. With the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598, the conflict must end, and Tehran allowed to create and restore internal stalemate with most Arab countries. The same thing happened in the Soviet Union case when she was expelled from Afghanistan (Salam and Othman, 2011). Iran's pragmatism was also fueled by the Iraq-Kuwait war and Tehran's uneven gesture. Rafsanjani's policy expected to avoid any interference as Iran's foreign policy avoids the risk of positively affecting the country's development. ([Taremi, 2005](#))

The fourth part presents Muhammad Khatami's general strategy (1997-2004). This rules-based on cooperation, moderation and equality. He promoted the principle of the discourse of civilization as a source of life with the West. However, Khatami's struggles were rendered ineffective by the after the 9/11 (Afrashibi and Maleki, 2003). In 2002, Washington's tightening of its grip on Iranian-American influence in other republics along the Iranian border also hit Iran's stubborn elite and forced a major shift in Iran's foreign policy. Its bullish fears fundamentally changed its foreign policy (Warner, 2013). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's position on isolated issues in the country was in response to a change in the U.S. statement on the situation in Iran and the Muslim world Since 2001, Iran decided to accelerate its nuclear program and took a firm stand. Hezbollah and Hamas through Iran expanded their multilateral foreign strategy by developing a traditional tactical link with Damascus against Israel. Ahmadinejad controlled all plans of Iran's foreign policymaking.

Recently, the governments in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon now have the full support of the Iranian authorities in the region. Iran's current foreign policy in the region is an undeniable process of national political thinking and the above-mentioned American charisma in the region. In the context of the country's growth and Islamic philosophy, two important foreign strategies of Iran are now being developed - traditional theorists and moderates. ([Barzegar, 2009](#)). The fundamentalists were fiercely confronted by the Hajjatiyah movement. This movement functions were one of the main conservative policies in the state at this time. Their positions consist of Maktabis militants, primarily priests of allied priests and defenders of the Revolution. They formed separate entities in state administrative models and had carried out larger missions in the Islamic Republic's continuity plan since 2004 ([Zarif, 2014](#)) and had combined projects with other traditional theological representatives. Strengthening Iran's self-sufficient nuclear program and its relations

with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. They continue to comment, despite the impact of its low-cost approval. Their main argument is that Iran's tough policy on the basis of political, financial and ethnic dialogue is the primary means of persuading the United States in the region (Ramzani, 2004), a reasonable foreign policymaker to promote peace. In the West, it also affects close interactions with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, but not in the form of a strong cane. They see themselves as more rational, and their main contradiction is that there is no need to quickly and aggressively dismiss the broader geopolitical maturity that supports Iran's hegemony and the impact of its negotiations. However, they prefer to meet with the West and then continue to develop Iran's foreign policy in a more quantifiable way. Islamic expansion can be taken to mean that conservatives and oppressors are at the forefront of determining foreign strategy (Salam and Othman, 2011). Go to Tehran in an effort to improve relations with these republics and deepen their ties. The coalition's proposed name in this study, the "Islamic Axis", is similarly focused on the Iranian security structure in the region and is different from that of Iran, in contrast with the U.S. duration "axis of evil." (Frye et al., 1975)

Also, the apparent development of Iran's nuclear program over the past decade has caused widespread unrest in the Middle East. Israel and several Sunni Arab countries have explored the possibility that Iran (Shia) would conduct experimental calculations to achieve final or latent nuclear capability, although characteristically the details of this threat differ among them. The locale has more evidence: Iran's nuclear ambitions will reduce the security of any country and increase local immortality. (Fatima and Safar, 2014) As a result, Iranian actions have called on many former opponents and participants to unite against the dangers identified by their superiors. Iran's nuclear development is extremely dangerous for Israel. Its presence completes the nuclear inspection. How has the Jewish state enjoyed the Middle East in the last four spells? It was 'shrewdness in Jerusalem' that such an expansion would greatly weaken Israel's influence and position (Nasr and Tekih, 200). There were also concerns among Israeli decision-makers that Iran would take nuclear action, with supporting preparations with Palestine and Hezbollah in addition to nuclear against Israel. (Dalia Das Kaye and Efron, 2020) From Israel's risky perspective, the agreement between Israel and Iran has grown steadily since 2002. Israel was at the top of many continental decisions. The Times talks about the consular and economic situation in the Islamic Republic, which aims to sink or at least shut down its nuclear program. Many Israeli pioneers have also made clear pressure on the use of force against Iran's nuclear program. In particular, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), speech on Israel made great progress. Iran also called on Israel to play a role in establishing a political relationship between its nuclear program and Israel's position by declaring a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (Saikal and Al-Isratijia, 1997). Involved in performing austerities hidden from each other. The catastrophic number of cyber taxes in Iran's nuclear program was discovered in June 2010 by Israel and the United States, particularly the Stuxnet virus. (Cooper, 2012) Many an Iranian researcher has also been subjected to a complex assassination in Iran's nuclear program. Of course, there are Israeli sources behind this liquefaction. Iran, on the other hand, is concerned about biased efforts against Israeli signatures in many parts of the world. The allocation of non-state actors as Hezbollah and Palestine should also be strengthened as a tool for Israel to spend against the nuclear program. Although relations between Israel and Iran were strained in the 1990s, in general, the report on Iran's nuclear program paints a picture of an infiltrating strategic war in the past, with Iran's nuclear program contributing to it. These countries, however, are less important about Iran's nuclear program, especially because of the combination of national and local political influence. However, there are indications that they consider Iran's nuclear vistas is significant, calculated competition or equate perfect risk (Corsi, 2009).

According to the Israeli strategy, Sunni Arabs firmly believe that Iran will use nuclear power in the region to advance its interests in countries such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain and Palestine. There were also concerns among Sunni Arab rulers that if Iran publicly asserted its nuclear capability, it would provide Tehran with a large regional Arab fund, which would interpret Iran's nuclear program as a suitable opportunity for Israel nuclear domination. (Hitchcock, 2013) Consequently, the snowball of many

Sunni Arab countries that instructed Iran to weaken the development of Tehran's nuclear packaging. The Sunni Arab nation does not compare economic truths and diplomatic pressure on Iran. In fact, with open nuclear programs, many Sunni Arab countries have become loyal supporters of political motives and political organizations. (Rawshandil & Lean, 2011)

Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have been particularly isolated and have had to deal with closer ties with the United States in an effort to persuade Washington to exert significant influence on Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia has also called for the destruction of Iran's budget and thus, in a bid to run its nuclear program, has maintained relatively outstanding oil production in an effort to add value. Iran has responded with special tactical arguments against Sunni Arab countries, especially before the start of the 2011 Syrian civil war (Klausen and Rubin, 2005). It opposes its nuclear program in an attempt to identify the target of the Arab campaign. Needless to say, the Iranian proposal aroused great skepticism and concern from the Sunni Arab government, which helped to expand and widen the growing Sunni-Arab-Iranian pressure and rivalry (Ansari, 2007). Over the past decade, Iran's nuclear program has played a major role in provoking tensions and animosity between Iran and Sunni Arab countries. Of course, Iran's nuclear program was not the only result of their discussions. But it turns out to be a dangerous issue and is the main basis for the differences between Tehran and Sunni Arab countries. (Chubin, Zabih, & Seabury, 1974)

Novel Strategic Associations

In the Israeli-Iranian and Iran-Sunni-Arab talks, Iran's nuclear arsenal remains a matter of deep frustration, and it reinforces local issues. Strictly speaking, Iran's stance on its nuclear program is a major and openly developed strategic threat to the establishment of cooperation and unity among Sunni Arab countries, which is difficult to achieve. (Strategic Consequences of the Iranian Nuclear Forces), perhaps even better, Iran's nuclear program is aimed at providing real and practical assistance and governance between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries. For example, in 2013, the state of Israel unknowingly revealed its secret political role in the Persian Gulf, the work of several experts to replace underground cooperation between Israel and Sunni Arab countries on the Iranian nuclear issue. Of course, since 2002, great progress has been made in cooperating and coordinating between Sunni Arab countries and between Sunni Arab countries and Israel (Danowax, 1993).

Greater aid Iran is making great strides in its nuclear field, driven by the notion that Tehran is pursuing a real or delayed nuclear capability, and that the United States can no longer be proactive in the aftermath of the Iraqi conflict. Or it could protect Iran from the efficient use of nuclear energy (Corsi and Smith, 2005). The overall sensitivity has strengthened cooperation between Israel and Sunni Arab countries in a number of important and variable ways. In particular, there are proposals to spread intelligence about Iran and its nuclear program between Israel and a handful of Sunni Arab countries. In fact, this cooperation continues in the Sunni-listed state of Israel, and the Sunni Arab countries, as well as the Jewish state, have a legitimate relationship with Israel (Corsi, 2009) due to intelligence. Regarding the Israeli intelligence service working with Saudi Arabia's dietary supplement, the unprotected political discipline has revealed that Bahrain has leaked Israeli intelligence to Iran. Most importantly, the existing diplomatic cord also determines how such spies often exacerbate the situation of members of the Israeli-Bahraini family. In fact, Bahrain has blocked Israel's resistance by not calling on it publicly. "Zionist organization" (D D Kaye, Nader, & Roshan, 2012)

There is no end to the story. But in addition to the involvement of intelligence agencies, the Israeli military and the unique desire to use them in the Arab capital are also seen as a valuable means of assisting the European Union and the United States. Be strong and caring and fight financially with Iran, although they do not facilitate the Israeli war process because of their attachment to the Party for their own political resources. (Saleh, 2016) The weight of the Arab ambassador to Israel on Iran's nuclear issue justifies Israel's voice about global approval and strategic gravity. Repetition of Israeli-Sunni-Arab cooperation and reputable media reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has decided to grant access to the no-fly zone for any military action that opposes its nuclear program. Iran; It is not just taken from Israel and Riyadh. This does not mean,

however, that such a permit has been granted, or that Saudi Arabia or even Israel has ratified the agreement. Such events, however, represent assistance between the two countries in this regard and raise awareness of this element in both capitals. (Chubin et al., 1974).

The report said Israel and Arab countries had discussed and decided on a possible armed strategy to provide real technology that would force the Transcontinental community to take action against Iran. On the other hand, cooperation between Israel and Arab countries increases the possibility. (And the possibility) that Israel could violate Iran's nuclear capabilities. There is no doubt that Israel's bombing of Syria in 2007 added to Israel's support for Sunni Arab countries. In particular, the cause of the attack had nothing to do with verbal criticism of Sunni Arab countries or frustration or significant damage to the Israeli-Sunni Arab organization. (Nasr & Takeyh, 2008)

Similarly, it has been rumoured that Israel and Sunni Arab countries are working together in response to the interim agreement between the continental community and Iran on the nuclear platform in 2013 (Gleason, 2012). Similarly, Israel and the Sunni Arab states did not agree with the project was extremely saddened by the fear that Iran may not be able to use its potential and training for further nuclear development. As a result, Israel and the Sunni Arab states had to close the talks, and if they failed, they joined the military in the fight to ensure that the multinational corporations and Iran conducted rigorous and comprehensive investigations as required (Ansari, 200). An Iranian nuclear program called for Israeli-Sunni-Arab cooperation, saying Israel had made it possible for Iran to carry out a catastrophic disaster plan in neighboring Egypt and Jordan. As far as safe Sunni Arab countries alone are concerned, no such request has been made, evidence of Iran's nuclear program and its risk-taking attitude. It is true that these options are considered by high-profile statistics. How can this help strengthen the people of Israel? Sunni-Arab cooperation! (Kaplan, 2014) Clearly, if the missile defense system extends to Egypt and Jordan, it could be a clear indication of better cooperation on the perceived risks between Israel and some Arab countries. In addition to the impact on Iran, the statement said that Israeli-Egyptian relations have been in crisis since the 2011 Arab Spring, and if expanded, would help "deepen" Israeli-Egyptian relations, reflecting more often the strength and support it has provided. Encouraging international players (Javada, N.D.) Unfortunately, Iran's nuclear test has led to better and better cooperation among Sunni Arab countries, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was difficult to achieve or continue in the past (Taremi, 2005). In the nineties and early twenty-first centuries, the GCC's Sunni Arabs sought to find a reciprocal path for society because many member countries were uncertain about the state and the responsibilities of the mining companies. Within the organization, due to concerns about Saudi Arabia's intention to oppose the GCC's power (Warner, 2013). The GCC countries have recently become more committed to addressing the risks posed by Iran and its nuclear program. Cooperation with intelligence agencies, defence agencies and diplomatic conferences on Iran's nuclear program is intensifying.

Conclusion

This article explores how Iran's cooperation in the Middle East has grown exponentially over the past few decades. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have worked together to address Iran's nuclear crisis. And their government continues to work together to thwart local change. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan have called on intercontinental agencies to be especially vigilant in explaining the crackdown on Iran. As a result, Iran's nuclear program in the Middle East is showing promising results, although it has played a role in weakening Israeli-Iranian and Arab-Iranian dealings. Due to the successful foreign policy of Iran, many Middle East states supports Iranian stance, which would not be given good sound to the U.S. and its allies. After reviewing the core resources, this article explains more about how these collaborations and skills are sometimes understood and limited, but also about practicalities. Consequently, Iran's nuclear program has encouraged many stable flows in the region.

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