CrossMark | Cite Us

Rafida Nawaz [*] | Muqarrab Akbar [†] | Syed Hussain Murtaza [‡]

Political Culture of Elitism as Barrier to Distributive Justice and Inclusive Democracy in Pakistan

Headings

Abstract *The research aims to examine the democratic ideals of participatory, inclusive democracy with "strong public" and clear means of interest articulation, in contrast to transitional, "delegative democracy," with local and national dynasties and the marginalized public. Employing the concept given by John Dewy, Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, Samuel P. Huntington, Takis Fotopoulos, the study is analytical and evaluative in nature, measuring the gap between theory and practice. The prime area of concern is Pakistan, and the study is meant to answer "why" questions about the pendulum movement from authoritarian military rule and democratic dispensations; and the inability of the delegated transitional democracy of Pakistan to transform into a consolidated democratic system. The supposition of the study is that though democratic norms and awareness of people's interests are present even in the far-off peripheral regions of Pakistan yet in the presence of strong local dynasties with local hegemonic designs, Pakistan remains a transitional democracy.*

Key Words: Democracy, Public, Political Participation, Political Culture, Elite Rule, Pakistan

Introduction

Pakistan emerged as a result of colonial political discourses like elections based on restricted franchise and politics of negotiation and dialogue between elites. Elites participating in the political process and involved in interest articulation were not only representatives of two major national parties, i.e., Muslim League and Congress as apparent from dominant historiography of the Sub-continent partition; or local, regional, and national; the elites in the subcontinent on midnight of August 14 were representative of different factions and interests, i.e., landowning, industrial, bureaucratic-military professional establishment and Religious. The regions comprising Pakistan were feudal in character during the Mughal period. The landed aristocracy retained its power position in hierarchical social stratification when the British introduced the system of private property, and feudal lords became the collaborators of imperial rule. British consolidated their rule on a capillary level even in far-off peripheries of the subcontinent with the help of these collaborators, who in turn were passive participants of modern colonial state institutions like local representative councils. The other profession for semi-literate lower-middle classes coming from small towns and suburban cities of the region comprising present-day Pakistan was Army. Declared as martial races, the Pashtuns

[*] Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, Punjab, Pakistan.

[†] Chairman, Department of Political Science, Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, Punjab, Pakistan. Email: muqarrabakbar@bzu.edu.pk

[‡] Ph.D. Scholar, Department of Political Science, Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, Punjab, Pakistan.

GLOBAL Political REVIEW www.gprjournal.com

and Punjabis were saviors of the empire, earning a lot of respect and honors to fight for the imperial cause in alien lands. The other profession for upper-middle classes was law, and these professional urban elites were real participants in the political arena. Muslims from Muslim minority provinces were far ahead in education, urbanization, and modernization due to the Muslim renaissance movement known as the Aligarh movement led by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. These educated Muslims entered the administrative structure of British imperial rule. It was Aligarh University where the idea of Pakistan germinated. (Cohen 2005) Religious aristocratic elites have their exclusive sphere, and they were influential in motivating people due to strong religious leanings of the Muslim masses in the presence of religious others and being part of the minority. (Hussain, Elite politics in an Ideological state The Case of Pakistan 1979)

In the presence of elites representing different factions, Pakistan's political culture at the dawn of independence was factionalized, yet all factions considered themselves to be part of the Pakistan movement despite their differences. All factions have their particular views about postcolonial polity and their place in the political system of Pakistan. The tenants and Peasants backed Muslim feudal lords as they wanted to be free from the clutches of non-Muslim feudal. Feudal lords backed Pakistan movements in Punjab and Bengal as they were scared from the land reforms propagated by Indian National Congress. The rare class of Muslim bourgeoisie like Habibs supported Pakistan to flourish their business without the competition and capture the market of the newly established state. As the state was declared as an Islamic ideological state in the 1949 Objective Resolution, the influence of the religious elite was further rooted in the mass and body politic of the state. The elites had not only competing for interests but also had differences in perception of the nature of the political system, making the task of state-building paradoxical. (Sayeed 1960) (Alqama 1997)

Though masses and the public also had aspirations and visions about Pakistan polity, they remained passive in the presence of elites, or their views were a replication and mimicry of the elites after whom they were rallying. After independence, Pakistan had pendulum swings from authoritarian to democratic rules, it experimented with models of democracies borrowed from ex-mater Great Britain and present-day hegemon, the USA, yet its democracy remained in flux. Further, the situation was aggravated by the presence of inequitable regions and classes. Democracy in Pakistan cannot be attributed as inclusive.

The aim of the paper is to find the barriers to inclusive democracy and distributive justice in Pakistan. As scholars have different views on Pakistan's flawed democratization process, the study is contextualized in literature.

Review of Literature

Nancy Fraser borrowing from the classic pragmatic thinker John Dewy the concept of "radical public," believes that democracy requires revitalized communities often with competing interests to engage in dialogue and deliberation. (Fraser 2009) These reflexive communities not only engage with each other but also with the political institutions termed by Dewy as State. Dewy distinguishes between the state represented by the lawmakers and the public, often an incoherent body of citizens who have to face the negative consequences of state policies. (Dewy, The Public and Its Problems 1927) Dewy introduced the concept of the radical public in response to Walter Lippman's "The Phantom Public" (Lippmann, 1925), who believed that idea of the public or citizen body is illusionary, and phantom. Fraser, though, does not equate with Habermas's concept of the public sphere (Habermas 1979) and calls it a post-bourgeoisie concept of a deliberative arena as a neutral space where status distinction will be neutralized. Fraser's concept is relevant for a country like Pakistan with a multitude of differences, inequalities and competing regional interests are present. The idea of strong public aware of its status and interest involved in deliberations in public space is a way forward for the countries like Pakistan challenged by disparities.

Muhammed Hussain et al. is of the view that such deliberative space can be created through media and digital media in the present age. The end result is awakening and demands for a more participatory role leading to overthrow of a

repressive regime and constitutional amendments of inclusionary nature, hence more and more democratization. This trend leads to a wave of democratization with a snowball domino effect. The Arab spring is considered to be the fourth wave of democratization (M.Hussain 2013), a sequel of the first three waves of democratization, demand from below by "radical public" youth of the Arab world who were denied a voice in decision making of their polities by repressive authoritarian regimes.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, the First wave started in North America and Western Europe, with French and US revolutions. The second began after Second World War and the Third in 1970 with the revolution in Portugal. But the fact about waves of democratization is that these are often reversed and avoided by the power who gain legitimacy through performance. Hence the main factor leading and reversing democracy like a pendulum movement remains economic development that can also serve as a transforming agent for culture and political culture. Huntington indicates two phases of democratic evolution and development, i.e. transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy. Democracy consolidates when democratic values are internalized by all political and nonpolitical actors and stakeholders of society. It is a political order when democracy evolves as a complex web of institutions, rules, and patterns. (Huntington S. P., 1991)

The attributes of another typology are discussed by Donell (Donnell 1994 Volume 5, Number 1), who is of the view that existing theories and typologies of democracy refer to representative democracies as practiced invariants and typologies in developed capitalist countries with evolved liberal norms of individualism, but in postcolonial states appropriate model of democracy is not a movement towards representative inclusive institutionalization but endurance, with no immediate threat of authoritarian regression. These democracies are categorized as delegated democracies. The ideal for Pakistan postcolonial states like Pakistan with competing elites, regional disparities and are inclusive democracy with distributive justice but with authoritarian political

culture operating at local as well as national level the model of delegated democracy as presented by Donell can lead to consolidation of democracy.

Ayesha Jalal (Jalal 1995)is of the view that a formal is a genuine democracy; so far, it guarantees the right to vote and freedom of expression. Yet it is far from the normative ideal and substantive meaning of democracy. The ideal believes in the empowerment of people as active agents capable of pursuing their interests with a measure of autonomy from deep-rooted structures of dominance and privilege. Jalal believes that colonial legacy institutional, strategic, economic and ideological articulated state-society relation and democracy in South Asia is in the guise of authoritarianism denying people voice.

Like many other Postcolonial states of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, Pakistan was not the outcome of a "People", resisting the colonial subjugation and demanding independence from foreign rule with a clear vision of postcolonial polity and society. Independence was bestowed by the colonial masters in response to the demand of a small class of urban Urdu middle class which defined a "self", on the basis of religion in relation to "other," that was not the alien masters, but the followers of 'other" religion signified as a nation by Muslim identity engineers. (Daechsel 2013) As the new state comprised of people from a multitude of ethnic backgrounds, Islam was considered to be the strongest bond between its people forging primordial ethnic identities intonation. Asif Hussain is of the view that being categorized as an "ideological state", its political and economic development cannot be compared with other modern states. The scholars analyzing the ideological polities fell into surface traps. On the surface, one finds all democratic institutions like the constitution, bicameral legislature, political parties, and general elections giving an indication that democratization is the prime objective of the state. Nonlinear vertical analysis of polity reveals that the political arena is occupied by competing interests led by different elites. (Hussain 1979)

As elite politics had turned Pakistan into a praetorian state through their competition for political authority, Pakistan's military is the most

powerful elite group cannot limit itself to a non-partisan role. (Hussain Vol. 16, No 10, (Oct.1976)) Tariq Ali (Ali 1970) is of the view that Pakistan's international treaty commitments and its partisan role in cold war politics proved detrimental for the evolution of democracy. Stephen P Cohen is of the opinion that though most of the key power players, including the army and civilian bureaucracy in Pakistan, adore the notion of democracy and wish to construct Pakistan as a democratic political system but they are not willing to make it so. Even the advocates of democracy, in theory, are inclined to authoritarianism. (Cohen 2005)

Problem Statement

The democracy in Pakistan, like other postcolonial states of South Asia is not an organic process but the result of the social engineering of British colonial rules. British designed these reforms not for the sake of creating a radical strong public having a clear vision about their role as citizens and duties and obligations of the state. As instruments of colonial state, local chiefs were created to suppress and curb the democratic voices. Politics remained a restricted arena, and democracy was a power-sharing between internal and external colonizers. Postcolonial history witnessed the continued legacy of dynastic politics. The pendulum of history moved between authoritarianism and democracies led by dynasties of chiefs. Hence Pakistan's democracy in the presence of a culture of dynastic politics cannot be attributed as a participatory, inclusive democracy meant to redress the grievances of people and remove social inequality. The present research will be conducted in this backdrop to give an explanation to the following research questions.

Research Questions/ Supposition of Study

Research Questions

- Why does democracy remains Delegative and Transitional in Pakistan and cannot be transformed into a consolidated System with clearly defined norms honored by all the stakeholders involved, i.e., Political and non-political, leading to Pakistan's periodic shifts from democracy to authoritarianism?

- Whether Political Actors really represent the public or there exists, dynastic politics in all levels of the state, i.e., National and Local and Pakistan public can be categorized as non-radical phantom public with no awareness about democratic ideals?

Supposition of Study

The supposition of the study is that though democratic norms and awareness of people's interests are present even in the far-off peripheral regions of Pakistan yet in the presence of strong local dynasties with elite hegemonic designs, Pakistan remains a country in transition as far as a democratic ideal is concerned.

Objectives of Research

- To understand the facts about why certain countries transform into consolidated democracies while others remain delegative democracies or transitional democracies.
- To analyze the working culture of dynastic politics in Transitional democracies.
- To understand the phenomenon that can transform a phantom public into a radical public demanding more rights and distributive justice, and lead to consolidation of democracy in Pakistan.

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

The study in the literature review has taken account of John Dewy's concept of Radical democracy that inspired the works of Ambedkar, Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, Samuel P. Huntington, Takis Fotopoulos and Charles Tilly. All these thinkers believe in a broader, inclusive, sustainable view of democracy in comparison to a narrower definition of electing public representatives. Dewy also distinct citizens electing state officials from the public representatives of common interest. Public according to Dewy emerge as a response to negative externalities. (Dewy 1916) (Dewy, 1927) Habermas drawing on Dewy, defines Public sphere as comprising of "strong Public", and an open space where status distinctions are neutralized. The primordial characteristics of such a democracy are pluralism, participation, social equality and the

existence of factual social rights, and an enabling environment leading to the exercise of entitled freedoms. (Habermas 1979) Ambedkar the drafter of the Indian constitution coming from scheduled caste Hindu strata believed that the prime objective of democracy is the creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all have a share. Hence it means a polity that sought mechanisms for not only equal rights but also equitable rights, with guarantees to include the vision of marginalized segments of society in public policy, giving them a voice. (Maitra December 2012) Tilly is of the opinion that democratization means integration of networks into public politics and insulation of the public arena from categorical inequalities and suppression of coercive power centers. He believes in a sustainable view of democracy and questions that whether a given regime enables human welfare, freedoms (individual and collective), social equality, and peaceful means of resolution of conflict? If so the regime qualifies the definition of democracy. (Tilly, Democracy 2007) An inclusive view of democracy and distributive justice is also advocated by Takis Fotopoulos (Fotopouos 1997). Combining the classical liberal democratic tradition with Socialism, he broadens the realm of the public sphere and includes political, economic, social as well as ecological dimensions to the realms of public. Hence democratic norms of inclusion and participation must be implemented in all spheres of human activity.

In contrast to such theory is the work of Guillermo O' Donnell and Almond & Powell who coined the terms "Delegative Democracy" and "Transitional Democracies", where political culture believes in the hegemony and authority of certain dominant groups. Instead of competing vitalized communities competing with each other and state for more and more rights and public space, contending dynasties compete and compromise with each other for political and social influence. Pakistan as a democratic country lies in the second category where a stark difference prevails between theory and practice. Though the people of Pakistan aspire for a sustainable, inclusive view of democracy, the system based on elitism serves as a barrier to even democratization and a catalyst for de-democratization in the words of Charles Tilly.

Methodology

The study is comparative in nature comparing the representative consolidated democracies with transition democracies. As democracy remain an aspiration of people across the globe, the study will account for general factors leading to the transition to democracies. Study employing the Historical-Comparative approach will evaluate the working of democracy in Pakistan and identify causes of the pendulum swings from authoritarianism to democratization. Further analyzing the culture of resistance to restore democracy in Pakistan, the study will categorize the Pakistan "Public", whether they are radical, socialized people aware of democratic norms. If a deliberative political arena is present with a radical public engaged in dialogue, then what is the cause of Pakistan being rated as a repressed transitory polity or hybrid regime by global indexes.

Discussion

The discussion in the coming sections revolves around the research questions related to the typography of Pakistani democracy as a hybrid delegated transitional set up with aspirations of the public to convert it into sustainable democracy with a neutral public sphere for deliberation of issues and conflict resolution through consensus.

Democracy in Pakistan: Consolidated, Delegated or in Transition to Sustainable Democracy

According to a broader sustainable view of democracy, the countries can be placed on a scale. The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy index is one such scale that rates and evaluates countries according to not only horizontal signs of delegated democracy like general elections but also the political culture that serve as enabling environment for democratic norms in society. On maxim of scale is Functioning democracy with an independent judiciary, an administrative structure with effective checks and balances, independent and diverse media, and democratic political/public sphere of communicative action where status distinctions are neutralized. Flawed democracies are countries that can be attributed as Delegated democracies with free and fair elections, respect for civil liberties. The significant weakness in governance capabilities and

low level of participation, and absence of a neutral public sphere of communication makes them flawed democracies. The hybrid regimes category in which Pakistan is placed indicate that corruption has become the norm of business, rule of law and institutionalization is weak, media is not independent and political culture is far less participant than flawed democracies and public sphere based on more of neutrality and status equity is missing. This category fulfills the definition of delegated democracies and is far better than authoritarian repressive regimes or outright dictatorship by individuals, dynasties, or state authoritarianism. The countries like China and North Korea with state control are rated in this group by the unit.

The countries performance is calculated on five broad concepts with various sub-indicators of measurement: the Electoral Process and Pluralism; Functioning Government; Political Participation;

Political Culture and Civil Liberties. Hence 49.4% of the World's total populace live in some kind of democracy but only 8.4% in full democracies. As China is rated as an Authoritarian regime with minimum civil liberties world population not experiencing democracy is 51.6%. The top five countries categorized as functioning democracies are Norway, Iceland, Sweden, New Zealand and Canada. Mauritius is the only Muslim country ranked 20th with a score of 8.14 that is placed on the scale as full democracy, while Malaysia 39th and Indonesia 64th are rated as flawed democracies. Bangladesh 76th is the top hybrid regime. Morocco's 96th, Bosnia 101st, Turkey's 104th, and Pakistan's 105th position make them hybrid regimes. Pakistan is categorized as a hybrid regime in democracy index 2020 titled "democracy in sickness and health". The following table will give a vivid picture of Pakistan's position on the Democracy Index in comparison to South Asian countries.

Table

S. No	Country with position	Electoral Process & Pluralism	Functioning Government	Political Participation	Political Culture	Civil Liberties	Overall Score
1	India (53)	8.67	7.14	6.67	5.00	5.59	6.614
2	Sri Lanka (68)	7.00	5.71	5.56	6.25	6.18	6.14
3	Bangladesh (75)	7.44	6.07	6.11	5.63	4.71	5.99
4	Pakistan (105)	5.61	5.36	3.33	2.50	4.71	4.31

Though Pakistan's performance is not significant yet Pakistan is making progress as a delegated democracy. During Musharraf's regime (the last military-led era in Pakistan) in 2006, Pakistan's overall score was 3.92. Though in that period as well representative bodies and election processes were regular. The reason for Pakistan being categorized as a hybrid delegated democracy lies in fact discussed in introductory lines. Elite dynasties compete for reward and their share in the system making Pakistan a praetorian state and resulting in pendulum swings from authoritarianism to democracy.

Pakistan Swings from Authoritarianism to Democracy

Pakistan experienced military-led hybrid democratic regimes from 1958-1971; 1979-1988; 1999-2008, and civilian-led government with strong

influence and backing of the military from 1947-1958, 1972-77, 1988-1999, and 2008 till date. The country's political system is clearly hybrid in nature. The political parties, election alliances, general elections, parliaments (national & Provincials), and local bodies; the features of democracy remain intact even in military-led civilian setups. The constitution though abrogated in the first and second martial law of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan and held in abeyance in third and fourth Martial Laws of Zia ul Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf, the provision constitutional orders and legal frameworks were upheld by the superior judiciary under the doctrine of necessity. (H. Khan 2001) Administrative apparatus of country administered the state even in time of proclaimed Martial rules according to standard operating procedures of an administrative state, and legacy established and consolidated during the colonial

period. The bureaucracy remained the steel pin keeping the order intact, and Pakistan never fell victim to anarchy. The parliaments under military regimes are constituted as a result of direct or indirect elections, and elites, especially the candidates representing landed dynasties, participate in these elections as they do under the civilian period. One example of such controlled indirect elections was in the Ayub period. Ayub khan introduced the concept of controlled democracy with local government as Basic Democratic institutions. The Basic democrats in turn, were the electoral college for National, Provincial Assembly elections and also cast votes for president. In the national assembly emerged as a result of indirect elections party named as Convention Muslim League were leading the house and party faction of Muslim League, i.e. Council Muslim League were holding opposition chairs. Many factions of the Muslim League are registered as the political parties, almost all enjoyed power under military leadership and later entered the political arena as civilian leadership. (Shafqat 1997) (Rizvi 2000)

A neglected area of research is Pakistan's Civil society, its media personnel, and academician that kept the public sphere alive even in times of worst repression. Hence though Pakistan political culture is considered to be the subject culture in nature yet the participant of the communicative public sphere struggled for civil liberties and freedom of expression. The judiciary though defamed for its doctrine of necessity yet it upheld the rule of law and basic freedoms, and this is the reason that in Pakistan, the use of arbitrary abusive power was checked. Zia Martial law is considered to be the worst for civil rights, but in this period in Pakistan civil society, academicians, journalists contested, detested, and resisted the oppressive tendencies of the state. (Toor 2011) (Ali 1970)

The trend of authoritarianism is not exclusively limited to military intervening and influencing the political process. Pakistan takes pride that its formation as the state is the result of dialogue and deliberations not only with the colonial masters but also the other stakeholders of sub-continental politics. In elections of 1945-46, the Muslim masses decided in favor of the Muslim League manifesto of

a separate homeland of Muslims. The elections of 1945-46 were conducted by the colonial masters with restricted limited suffrage giving an edge to Muslim landowning propertied elites as property along with education was one of the conditions to cast vote. The other dominant group taking part as participants of this particular election was the Muslim intelligentsia that later constituted the bureaucratic establishment of Pakistan. Further, the Muslim League transformed it beyond a political party to a movement for the cause of a separate homeland. Cleavages of different interests and stakeholders came to the surface immediately after partition when Muslim League alliances in two major provinces, i.e., Bengal and Punjab, parted ways. The postcolonial government according to Ayesha Jalal preferred the colonial legacy of viceregal rule by curbing the dissent through force. The drawing-room politics of shifting alliances made the democratic parliamentary system a façade.

The second democratic era of Pakistan, 1972-77, was also populist in nature bearing the coloring of authoritarianism. The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto even assumed the role of civil martial law administrator. Later he declared himself president and then Prime Minister confused about the system of the country that whether it will be parliamentary or residential in form. Bhutto was the uncontested chairman of his political party, sometimes mimicking the Chinese Communist Party leader Mao. Bhutto curbed the provincial autonomy in Balochistan and Northwestern frontier Province, despite the fact that the government in NWFP was constituted by the National Awami Party with whom he shared the ideological stance of Socialism. Through an amendment in the 1973 constitution, he even squeezed the sphere of the judiciary. Bhutto called for military operation in the province of Baluchistan to control the situation. Military option in place of democratic process of negotiation was his preferred problem-solving mode. Many retired journals entered in Pakistan People Party, but the most controversial inclusion was that of feudal lords in the party against whom party candidates of middle and lower-middle classes contested the 1970 elections. In the 1977 election political arena was again in control of local hegemonic dynasties.

The Third civilian-led democratic era started in 1988 with the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto coming to power with a restricted mandate. Her real opposition was posed by the government of Punjab led by Mian Muhammed Nawaz Sharif, who entered the political arena during the Martial Law period of Zia. The opposition was criticized by the government to have clear affiliation with the army. 1988-1999, the eleven-year witnessed two terms of Benazir Bhutto and two of Mian Nawaz Sharif as prime minister. Stephen P Cohen is of the opinion that these civilian-led governments were indirectly influenced by the army and continued in office till the pleasure of institutions controlling the strings.

Since 2008 a norm in the political culture of Pakistan has been established that the governments complete their five-year tenures, yet they are contested by anomic or other means by other civilian power contenders. The trend is positive but the negative aspect of this trend is that government use accountability mechanism to curb dissent and revenge political rivals.

The swing from civilian-led authoritarian governments influenced by non-elected institutions like Army and Judiciary and Army direct control with restricted institutional freedoms, to make Pakistan, by all means, a hybrid regime.

Pakistan Public Sphere for Deliberation and Categorization of Pakistani Public

Samuel P Huntington is of the view that a higher level of economic development leading higher rate of education and upward mobility of masses in the middle class generates a system of support for civic culture and democratic norms. (S. P. Huntington 1991) A majority of Pakistani masses live under feudal landed aristocracy. Pakistan lacks a civic sphere for converging democracy into an inclusive system. It gives a seeming impression that Pakistani democracy will always remain transitory or delegated. John Dewy distinguishes between public and state as well as between the incoherent body of citizens that elect state personnel and public. He is of the opinion that ordinary citizen body is converged into public aware of their common interests when they are exposed to negative externalities and face the consequences beyond their control and comprehension as a result of these

externalities. (Dewy 1916) The previous discussion brought to light the fact that Pakistan has an elite-oriented political culture where elites compete and cooperate to maximize their rewards and sustain their power bases. The system structurally promotes injustice. Justice according to Fraser has two interlinked facets, i.e., Distributive Justice, meaning equitable resource distribution; recognition Justice that mean the equal recognition of different groups and strata of society. (Fraser 2009) The presence of stark inequalities, i.e., regional, income, class, and structural injustices of type, oligarchic political elites, and civic culture devoid of freedoms and liberties serve as a negative externality that converged Pakistan citizen folk into the public as defined by Dewy during times of resistance against repressive undemocratic regimes.

Historians of Pakistan political history highlighted the regional divide in the pre-1971 era, naming it the East-West divide. The view is that cleavage between Pakistan East wing (The province of East Bengal predominantly Bengali) and West Pakistan (dominated by Punjab) was deeper than the Bay of Bengal. But the people of East and West Pakistan united in action in January-February. The resistance movement ended in the fall of Ayub. Pakistan democratic movement brought together ideologically antagonists political parties together. The alliance partner was Council Muslim League, Jamat-e-Islami, Nizam-i-Islam, Awami League, National Democratic Front, Pakistan People Party, and National Awami Party. Though the resisters of the regime were diatonically opposites in many ways yet they called for distributive as well as recognition justice. The resistance movement brought to fore Z.A Bhutto and Mujib-ur-Rehman. (Ali 1970)

Bhutto exercised uncontested unprecedented authority in post-1971 Pakistan, despite the fact that he was accused of dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh due to his dismissive, non-sharing attitude. Nine opposition party alliance Pakistan National Alliance contested 1977 election. Though Pakistan People Party emerged victorious, the results were detested by a mass movement demanding Nifaz e Shariat. The situation became uncontrollable, and Martial Law was imposed in urban centers like Karachi, Lahore, and Hyderabad.

The Martial Law legitimacy was challenged in the Lahore High Court, and the full bench of the court declared Martial Law unconstitutional. The movement though paved the way for the Zia regime, yet it was a moment of self-expression for Pakistani masses who expressed their resentment against the system of unequal reward and recognition system. (H. Khan 2001)

The alliance between Zia and Pakistan National Alliance was short-lived and ended in October 1979, and all political forces were ordered against Zia, though a faction of the Muslim League led by Pir Pagaro of Sindh supported Zia. Though the political elites were against Zia authoritarian regime yet, they were ambivalent to join hands with Bhutto People Party. The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was formed in 1981 and its action politics induced Zia to share power with some sort of representatives of people. Though democracy was not restored till Zia's death in August 1988, in 1985, a civilian government under the leadership of Bhutto assumed limited power. (H. Khan 2001)

Pakistan Public expressionist-self awakened again in 2007 with the Lawyer's movement. The movement started when Gen. Pervez Musharaf suspended Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March 2007, at the time when was hearing the case legality of Musharaf's dual role as Army Chief and President. Pakistan legal community organized save judiciary movement started. Under pressure, Musharaf resigned from his military office yet retained his civilian role as president of Pakistan and declared elections in January 2008. Benazir Bhutto's assassination in December 2007 was the last nail in the coffin of the authoritarian regime. The internal pressure of the Lawyers movement was mounted to the level that people freely expressed their opinion in general elections held in Feb 2008.

The self-expression of the Pakistani public against the negative externality of authoritarian regime and aspiration for distributive-recognition justice is a factor that Pakistani system remained hybrid delegated democracy and never assumed the traits of the totalitarian absolutist repressive undemocratic regime.

Conclusion

The above discussion validates the supposition of the study that though democratic norms and awareness of people interests are present even in the far-off peripheral regions of Pakistan and people expressed their self in movements to restore democratic order yet, democratization and de-democratization remain a recurring pattern. The political sphere remains an arena of elites representing different interests. Pakistan is often described as a praetorian rule that is defined by Max Weber as domination by honorators (honorable nobles). The military Praetorianism means the exercise of political power in a given societal setting by virtue of an actual or perceived use of force. Military tends to intervene and influence the civilian government of Pakistan and in other times, assume direct control when civilian government fails to pursue national interests, internal as well as the external and defined objective of economic development. In democratic societies, the army assumes praetorianism when the legitimacy of government is challenged by external or internal forces. In postcolonial states with delegated democratic dispensation, the legitimacy of civilian order is challenged by the military that assumes Praetorian tendencies. The reason discussed by Amos Perlmutter is that in a complex society dichotomy between civilian and military roles is non-existent. Neither civilians nor the military can be limited to their theoretically defined roles. Even in advance sustainable democracies, the military-industrial complex indicates a nexus between business and military interests. (Permutter 1977) Military perform business activities and carry out economic projects in Pakistan; hence it is a participant and stakeholder of the economic arena as well.

As far as Pakistan Public is concerned it is conscious of its interests, yet its sources of consciousness are diverse. The public has a clear view of economic development and progress and considers the political elites' inefficiency and corruption determinants of Pakistan's economic plight. According to Samuel P Huntington, if a non-democratic state develops exponentially in power and begins expansion beyond borders, it leads to

stimulation of authoritarian movements in-country and the de-democratization process gets public consent. (S. P. Huntington 1991) The narrative in popular media creates cognitive dissonance for democracy in the mass opinion by narrating the Chinese success story that instated the present authoritarian system in 1949. Huntington also believes that the religious fundamentalist narrative is also anti-democratic in nature. In Pakistan religious elite narrative highlight an age of Muslim glory in the middle-ages of Islam under authoritarian rulers. The narrative provides a support base for non-representative institutions' supremacy over the civilian government. (Hall 1986) The paradoxical aspiration of the Muslim Renaissance, Chinese Model of state all reflects masses' tacit aspirations for economic distributive justice and recognition of all on basis equality. The objective of the Pakistani public detesting corruption, glorifying Muslim glorious past, impressed from Chinese model of progress and economic development are in reality demands that can be fulfilled by the Pakistani political system if model of an inclusive, sustainable democracy is opted.

References

Banuazizi, A., & Weiner, M. (1988). *The State Religion and Ethnic Politics, Afghanistan Iran and Pakistan*. USA: University University Press.

Ali, T. (1970). *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Alqama, K. (1997). *Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan The Road to Disillusionment*. Karachi: Royal Book Company.

Chadda, M. (2000). *Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Cohen, S. P. (2005). *The Idea of Pakistan. Lahore*: Vanguard.

Cohen, S. P. (2012). *The Future of Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard.

Daechsel, M. (2013). *The Politics of Self-Expression, The Urdu Middle Class Milieu in Mid Twentieth Century India and Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Dewy, J. (1916). *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan.

Dewy, J. (1927). *The Public and Its Problems. Herry Holt and Company*: Naw York.

Donnell, G. O. (1994). Delegative Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 5(1). 55-69.

Enns, D. (January 1, 2000). *Emancipatory Desire and Messianic Premise*. Philosophy Today, 175-186.

Fotopouos, T. (1997). *Towards Inclusive Democracy*. London & New York.

Fraser, N. (2009). *Scales of Justice: Re-Imagining Political Space in Globalized World*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Habermas, J. (1979). *Communication and Evaluation of Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Hall, S. (1986). *Media Power and Class Power. In J. E. James Curran, Bending Reality The State of the Media*. (p. 515). London: Pluto Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The Third Wave Democratization In Late Twentieth Century*. Oklohama: Oklohama University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1997, Volume 8 Number 4). After Twenty Years: The Future of Third Wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 3-12.

Hussain, A. (1979). *Elite politics in an Ideological state The Case of Pakistan*. Kent England: Dawson.

Hussain, A. (1976)). Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan. *Asian Survey, 6*(1), 18-930.

Jaffrelot, C. (2014). *Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience*. London: Hurst Publishers.

Jalal, A. (1995). *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kennedy, G. (1974). *The Military in the Third World*. London, New York: Duckworth.

Khan, H. (2001). *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford.

Lippmann, W. (1925). *The Phantom Public*. New York: Transaction Publishers.

Hussain, M. P. N. (2013). *Democracy's Fourth Wave Digital Media and Arab Spring*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Maitra, K. (December 2012). *Ambedkar and the Constitution of India: A Deweyan Experiment*. Contemporary Pragmatism, 301-320.

Permutter, A. (1977). *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*. London : Yale University Press.

Powell, G. A. (1966). *System, Process and Policy*. USA: Little Brown & Company.

Rizvi, H. A. (2000). *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*. Hounmills: Macmillan.

Sayeed, K. B. (1960). *Pakistan The Formative Phase*. Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House.

Shafqat, S. (1997). *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Shah, A. (2004). *Pakistan: Civil Society in Service of an Authoritarian State. In M. Alagappa, Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting the Democratic Space* (pp. 357-3888). California: Stanford University Press.

Stephen, J. L. (1996)). Towards Consolidated Democracies. *Journal of Democracy, 7*(2), 14-33.

Taylor, R. H. (2002). *The Idea of Freedom in Asia and Africa*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Thompson, M. R. (2003). *Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.

Tilly, C. (1985). *War Making and State Making as an Organized Crime*. In D. R. Peter Evans, In Bringing the State Back (pp. 169-187). Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (2007). *Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Toor, S. (2011). *The State of Islam Culture and Cold war Politics in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford university press.

Young, I. M. (1990). *Justice and thethe Politics of Difference*. Princeton: New Jersy.