



Propaganda and Lobbying against the Future Prospect of Pakistan: Causes, effects and its Implications

Headings

- [Introduction](#)
- [Analyzing Pakistani Politics and role of religion through Ted Gurr's Theoretical Model](#)
- [Recommendations to tangle](#)
- [References](#)

Abstract: *The concept of propaganda and lobbying is not new to researchers. Historically, propaganda was used by many states to manipulate policies in their own favors and to oppose the other states. During WW1, WW2 and the Cold war, media was used as a propaganda tool to demoralize opponents. Gradually lobbying was initiated as foreign policy tools. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Russia was the most powerful lobbyist in the USA. Indian lobbyist started an anti-Pakistan campaign in the USA based on rivalry since the creation of Pakistan. This is true focuses on destabilization of the US-Pakistan relationship and to weaken the strong lobbyism between the US and Pakistan.*

Key Words: Propaganda, Lobbying, Implications, Conflict

Introduction

Over the most recent thirty years, researchers of functionalist and communist perspective have established religion as a “false consciousness”, subduing class battle and power intended for societal balance. Such new sociologists of religion have depicted strict establishments and philosophical perspective of religion as an expression of class as opposed to the solid philosophical authority of religion. Religion is used as a tool to fuel hatred, prevalence and predominance. It is the politicization of religion and culture that, through its nexus, breeds religious intolerance dampening the social structures. An extraordinary piece of the writing on religion's influence on political & religious radicalism could be divided into 3 sections. Vries and Juergenmeyers (1991) believe religion is consistently “violent”, [Vries \(2002\)](#) gives an arrangement that there is no religion without viciousness. He further expresses that there is no brutality without religion. The

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thought that violence unavoidably shadows our moral, political commitment and choices, including our understandings of individual and collective identity. Juergenmeyer contends in wording that religious animosity is an outcome of people's tendency towards violence that results in making their lives a fight among great and malevolence. He further argues why individuals with religious inclinations choose brutality to represent the purpose of God. He reliably contends that because of a person's trust, they are essential for the vast battle between the force of good and noxiousness - a fight to deliver solicitation and harmony once again from turmoil and lack of definition. The contention between the qualities of murkiness and great can be fathomed not as a blessed fight yet rather as a certifiable battle that regularly include political maneuvering. However, a real-world battle can be imagined where adversaries of identity crises and legitimacy are defamed. This article explores (i) how religious groups have influenced state machinery and (ii) how they can tame state these religious actors to their benefit. The study takes Ted Gurr model of relative hardship as a theoretical lens to analyze the role of religious parties in Pakistan politics. The paper shall provide a guiding light for those who aspire to understand the role of religion in Pakistani politics along with its solutions to address the gaps in order to establish a developed and prosperous Pakistan.

Analyzing Pakistani Politics and role of religion through Ted Gurr's Theoretical Model

Although there are greater descriptions of where religion has transformed into a vital "apparatus" in legislative issues & its extreme sign, for example, Ted Gurr's model of comparative hardship, preparation & complaints are applicable to comprehend the interference of religion in administrative issues & breed radicalism. It is routinely said that religious revolutionaries are not the least fortunate of the poor ([Richardson, 2011](#)). Considering this, the people who are generally denied, oppressed, most out of luck, are not the people who, when in doubt, ruthlessly revolt. Obviously, every one of the critical actors in the overview of the liable gatherings in late history has wound up being the people who were accomplished and, for the most part, well off. Although there had been food riots and labor rebellions, violence and viciousness have also occurred as circumstances have improved or are changing, and by individuals who aren't the most marginalized. The change in outlook, anyway, generally focus on two recommendations. Right off the bat, to relate hardship is abstract and a component of a man's discernment, necessities, and information. To nail hardships to an objective or all-out shortfall of something like opportunity, consistency, or food is to dismiss the way that significance of these movements as shown by chronicled person, position, society and culture. The subsequent suggestion deals with the social standards or norms. It centers that we take our normal capabilities, achievements and accomplishments as a base of assessment against our requirements or needs, or what we believe we ought to have. The hole among assumptions and accomplishment would add to the ability of individuals to revolt. Specifically, this hole shall lead to the emergence of rebellion which shall be fueled using the vicious circle of depreciation.

The discussion on religious extremism dependent on violence, brutal phenomenon of radicalism bears witnesses toward Ted Gurr's hypothesis, which is really the hole among the assumptions for a system dependent on "valid" confidence & the truth of a "debased" system that shows such self-declared caretakers to utilize savagery for the sake of religion. A religious minority may suffer unnecessarily in a given society, and this sort of complaint can incite trouble over the social lines that perceive the minority bunch. In many spaces of the globe, through cultural & strict developments that are savage in the description, the subgroups resisting the framework. South Asia is an illustration of religious revivalism in outrageous structures in the entirety of its pained zones was started by strict greater parts. In to comprehend the interference of religion in governmental issues & the miracle of religious radicalism in Pakistan, a single requirement to grasp the part of the danger. One supernatural occurrence if Winston Churchill comprehended the overall diplomatic exactness of his proclamation, which "we don't have anything to fear, anyway dread itself." The steady subject which piles wild diplomatic developments collected is terror. This is legitimate by virtue of savage strict developments. The terror of being denied somewhat energies a person to proceed powerfully; however, the terror of being neglected direct developments in contradiction to predominant powers. Disregarding the way that it is neither the primary rousing component for the diplomatic indication of religious fierceness nor in a general sense the most plainly obvious, it is unmistakably present at all conditions.

- Contextualizing role of religious actors in prompting religion-based influence in Pakistani politics.

In order to understand why hatred is harbored, or why they will murder or pass on for a reason, it is vital to understand the relationship of fear'. Religion-based extremist groups are joined due to the presence of fear. Whether or not they are Hindu, Jew, Muslim or Christian, the terror of being denied the rank which those people imagine & will be targeting to attain goes about as a shared factor. However, fear of change is present among few traditional groups as they believe change shall challenge their existing norms and values, while in view of some religious extremists, this fear drives youth to stay within their limits and forbids them from wrongdoings.

These religious fanatics despise education, particularly when it contradicts their religion's teachings ([Murphy, 2013](#)). They fear a scenario wherein they would have no control and would be unable to comprehend. In this vein, if comparative adversity can understand religious fanaticism amongst religious groups terror of becoming deprived of ordinary position as well as the failure to obtain an "alluring" culture can describe the rise of radicalization & animosity amongst these religious majorities. The illustrations from South Asia where religious parties predominant experience had negative implications due to the fear factor have resulted in events like Gujrat Massacre, Tamil extremist activities and Jihad in Pakistan post and during the war on terror.

The civil-military leadership of Pakistan has comprehended religion for national integration and political legitimization. The use of religion for political gains is also not new in Pakistan. In order to gain public support, slogans, seminars and conventions relating to religion is part of the

political culture of Pakistan. The politicization of religion has expanded the extremist mindset, other than contributing to religious fundamentalists. The late years have seen a renaissance of religious aggressiveness in Pakistan through lobbyist fundamentalism ascending in religious devotion. By way of previously, in Pakistan, alteration lucidness actually depicts the improvement of religious practices. Pakistan has tried different things with the coordination of Islamic assemblies into the running of the state, yet neither one of the countries definitively affects administration. In this day and age, religious conventions are changed and influenced by monetary and political change. Core religious practices will continue changing much later on, as each and every living society do. Although being the Islamic Republic, there was an appropriate separation among religion and politics and refinement among private and open Islam, on any occasion in the significant years after the development of Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in his debut discourse to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly scheduled 11 August 1947, obviously communicated that religion was a secluded matter of a person & featured the correspondence of religions.

The religious community's power had already been minimized, or perhaps the objectives of the pioneering founders who would take over the control of Pakistan was already overlooked because the Constituent Council passed the Objective proposal on March 7, 1949, pledging to draught an Ismaili charter in less than two years since the debate. Through the severance of East Pakistan, the religious, ideological groups tried to fortify the philosophical reason for Pakistan & joined Islamic directives in the 1973 Constitution. The foundations of identity crises of Muslims date back to the pre-segment period. The matter of community virtue arose after the decrease of Muslim force when Muslim evangelist in the subcontinent endeavoured to safeguard the particular character of the Muslim people group over exacting obedience to unadulterated Islam. Such people felt that the Indian Muslims had develop communally & socially "dirtied" attributable to their nearby relationship with Hindus. This deduction converted into the requirement for removing themselves from the Hindus concluded the production of a different country and seeking after their religion with no unessential impacts. The possibility of a partnership among 'ulama' and fundamentalistic pioneers was shown in 1953 when genuine revolting is overdrawn in Lahore over whether or not the individuals from the Ahmadi group ought to formally be viewed as a non-Islamic minority.

The Jihad, contrary to socialism & Zia's convenience of the sacred right-wing, changed the general public from a lenient Muslim community to a united seized through the Wahabi attitude, driven by the Taliban. ([Ghazali, 1996](#)) Fukuyama notwithstanding imagines that "One is slanted to say that the recovery of religion here and there confirms a wide despondency with the indifference and profound vacuity of liberal consumerist social orders." "This misery was to discover its demeanour, in the plan of action to religion, yet in response to radicalism. In any case, though this could be functional to created social orders, Pakistan is an alternate situation. Formerly the nation accepted religion as an instrument to legitimize its standard; religion was at that point profoundly inserted in the public eye – anyway, it was absent in the beginning. It's the lenient, Sufi form of Islam that remained generally cooperative & has stayed rehearsed all through

the sub-mainland intended for quite a long time. Since there was no otherworldly vacuum in the first place, no hole to be filled thus, strict radicalism was not a piece of history pre parcel that one could recognize, which was occupied over religion & far along formed in strict fanaticism. It was the constrained burden of the way of thinking that start with Bhutto on youthful personalities and individuals every day that change the memory of resistance towards different religions or significantly different factions inside Islam. Thus, Pakistan didn't prompt liberal socialism and misery and, therefore, religious fanaticism. The politico-strict patriotisms have been overwhelmingly tried by "extremist" variations; these varieties have a couple of perceived characteristics in the Pakistani setting.

Beginning from Bhutto until Gen. Musharraf & the current legislature of Imran Khan, in any case, have been more accommodative of religious universality. The recent incidents of Tehreek e labaik protest sit inn, the government giving up on their demands clearly illustrates the nexus of religion and politics in Pakistani society. It further supplements the argument on how religious parties materialize upon religion card manipulating masses for their personal agenda. In order to understand the course of actions, it is vital to study the factors that contributed to the rise of these extremist groups that are now able to influence state machinery. Analyzing the history, it is no secret how the "Taliban and whole Talibanization" was a characteristic result of the arrangements of the past. What's more, the madrasas at that point set up in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are producing huge quantities of 'Taliban' consistently. Despite the fact that they don't become 'prepared to murder fanatics quickly, they have no openness to the lenient side of Islam, all things considered. In this way, the accentuation is more on developing a jihadist outlook than giving really religious direction. The vast majority of such madrassas have private stakes since they are below the security & oversight of religious groups; not very many of them are autonomous and get assets from different bases, as well as some Islamic nations, above all, Saudi Arab. In Pakistan, it is a religion that gives worth to the arrival of individuals' repressed displeasure and dissatisfaction against monetary and political issues.

The main drivers of "identity mobilization" are identified with the fundamental attributes of legislative issues in a powerless government & its susceptibility to the interruption of peripheral authorities in its form diplomatic. Denominationalism in Pakistan exhibits which the objectives of legislative issues in a state join through the benefits of worldwide performers to settle in the "identity cleavages" in the diplomatic procedure. Performer and early-stage clarifications of preparation of individuality are deficient. Secondly, religious fanatics try to change the arrangements of majority rule possessing controls like Israel and the US by impacting their general assessment – one might say making the involving power endure a similar degree of embarrassment they have felt. In the event of Pakistan, mobilization of the ordinary citizens has been because of the way that the pre-parcel religious groups proved unable to "prevent" Pakistan from turning into a reality notwithstanding their obstruction. The fundamentalist pastors went against the idea of Muslim patriotism, which they discovered conflicting to the idea of Muslim "Uma" which need not bother with a cutting edge country state.

Subsequently, When Pakistan arose into existence, such fundamentalistic religious-based groups experienced a feeling of underestimation that prompted the sensation of embarrassment. Hence, to settle the score with the "counter Islamic" powers, they contended that since the state was accomplished based on Islam, the nation ought to be changed to an Islamic one. Diplomatic preparation accordingly began and, in this manner, prompted the "Objective Resolution" in 1949, approved by the Meeting for Islamic direction in the undertakings of the state. In request to maintain the ideal of a cutting-edge reformist state, & to handle the legislative issues of "medieval religiosity" in a post-colonist Islamic dominant part nation like Pakistan, an intentional communal designing drive was required. Notwithstanding extreme restrictions in comprehension, dissecting and characterizing modernization within the Pakistani society, there is an enormous level of moderate, metropolitan citizens inside Pakistani civil society, who have the scholarly quality, capacity & understanding of communal involvement & are the lone noticeable social power which could battle the strict universality and assume a viable part in setting up a state that has controlled religious influence.

Recommendations to tangle religion in the Pakistani state of Affairs

- A plausible long time "counter-terrorism strategy" in Pakistan should hope to isolate the aggressors from the average person. The territory of Pakistan remembering to convincingly win the fight with the assailants should test them in the area of thoughts. These suggestions should be considered for a political setup that has less religious influence;
- Education to be used for de-radicalization of the general public the public educational program, all in all, and the Social Science educational plan specifically, should be overhauled to lessen manner of speaking, create basic reasoning abilities and advance the religious upsides of resistance, regard for variety and empathy. For this reason, the public authority should band together with religious researchers as well as religious people. Religious harmony building should be supported in Pakistan to decrease radicalism in the long haul.
- The electronic and print media assume a viable part to scatter the moderate and soft religious thoughts by utilizing Electronic media specifically to advance scholarly discussions and conversations. Religious researchers of global notoriety from everywhere the world ought to be welcomed for addresses meetings with the Pakistani crowd. The public should incorporate youthful understudies from colleges just as madrasas. Orchestrating such comprehensive meetings and broadcasting them to a more extensive public would help individuals put their confidence in context and see its more extensive parts. The effect of radical stories would consequently recoil subsequently.
- Social media is another medium that should be utilized by the public authority and law implementation offices, as this medium is now being utilized by the aggressor associations to proliferate their thoughts. Moment correspondence and entomb connectedness given by online media can be utilized to shape more extensive groups for exchange. Opening up

to helpful conversations and exchange eases the climate of obliviousness under which the radicals' accounts flourish. The assailants use it to proliferate wrong Islamic understandings counter stories to be set up using web-based media in de radicalizing the general public. Network shows, courses and workshops to be held in reverse spaces of Pakistan on Islamic Radicalization and De-Radicalization. Most importantly, a proper policy on social media guidelines to be incorporated so that recent incidents like that of Tehreek e Taliban can not only be avoided but can be catered to responsibly.

- Proper Syllabus of Madrassas should be mainstreamed with formal training in the schooling strategy of Pakistan. Madrassas to be enrolled under neighborhood governments and madrassas discovered liable because of dubious exercises to be prohibited. A legitimate desk work methodology to be presented for the foundation of madrassas with the goal that responsibility and straightforwardness can be guaranteed.
- Ulema part in governmental issues to be diminished and media inclusion to radicals and religious fan following to be disallowed. Narratives and other mindfulness spreading talk to be built. Legitimate ulema to be permitted to interface with the public through media, as it were.
- Pakistan has neither a “counter-terrorism” methodology nor a solid de-radicalization technique. Albeit occupied with incapacitating aggressors, in a real sense, nothing is being done to change their extreme outlooks. Two of the main parts of de-radicalization are business and schooling. Accentuation should be paid on the educational plan being instructed in schools, especially in madrasah's which are known to deliver a high volume of rough fanatics, including a greater part of Pakistan's adolescent self-destruction fear mongers.
- Use of instructive and philosophical variables with the assistance of ministers and, contemporarily, the web. Pakistan can utilize broad communications and college educational plan to counter radical philosophy. The public authority can work on two huge scope projects. Initially, a guiding developer to be set up for revolutionary detainees prior to delivering them back into society. Besides, the 'serenity crusade' starting an online exchange with vicious fanatics can be a work to lead them to revoke their perspectives.
- The adjusted schooling would guarantee the preparation of residents in significant residents' abilities like socialization, resilience, patience, the feeling of equity, individual honesty and uprightness. Hughes contends that the central finish of the instruction is character building. The accentuation on character building joins instruction firmly with morals, in light of the fact that each instructive framework needs to choose what sort of character is its arrangement. Thus, neither religion can be shed, nor life can be separated from current turns of events. When we dissect the instructive acts of different surges of training in Pakistan, they appear to need significant parts of a decent schooling framework.

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