

Pakistan's Journey to Civilian Rule (1958-70): An Analysis of Ayub Era

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Abstract

Pakistan, since its inception, has passed through several phases of transitions to civilian rule and authoritarian reversals. Similar to the pattern of transition between civilian rule and dictatorship, there is a pattern of change within authoritarian Regimes that could be observed in all the three experiences of transition in Pakistan. This paper identifies the pattern of change from military dictatorship to civilian rule from 1958 to 1970. The key questions addressed in this paper are: firstly, how the military regime consolidated its grip on power after the October 1958 coup? Secondly, how early cracks appeared in the military's control over power and matured with the passage of time, resulting in a national crisis? Thirdly, how failure in crises management led to the transition to civilian rule, as well as, the disintegration of the state.

Key Words: Pakistan, Authoritarianism, Military, Political Parties, Civilian Rule

Introduction

Political instability, weak political culture, economic crises and continuous intervention of civil and military bureaucracy during the first decade after independence led to the October coup of 1958. The regime established in the post-coup period showcased itself as the proponent of the reform agenda. After banning all political activities, a reform program was launched in all the major political, social and economic sectors. General Ayub Khan, with a self-acclaimed missionary spirit, declared to reform Pakistan to make it a significant Asian power. Despite very optimistic growth indicators and international support for the military regime, in the context of the Cold War, the regime crumbled within a few years. Political parties were revived, and political elites re-organized themselves. Growing economic and regional disparity and immense increase in poverty led to tarnishing of the image of Ayub Khan as a reformer. Anti-Regime sentiments were exploited skillfully by the two major political parties; Awami League and newly emerging Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Losing grounds at domestic levelled to the loss of international legitimacy for the regime. Amidst political and economic crises, Ayub Khan handed over power to General Yahya Khan who ultimately declared elections to be held in 1970 and promised to transfer power to the civilian leadership. Despite the promise of elections, the political crises started during late Ayub era lingered on, in the post-election period, finally culminating into the disintegration of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state. The main focus of this article is to identify the pattern of change, under the military regime, leading to a nationwide crisis and subsequent transition to civilian rule in 1971. This pattern consists of five important sequential stages:

Regime Consolidation => Selective Cooption=> Rising Discontent=> Crises=> Transition

Keeping in view these sequential stages, this article is divided into five sections, followed by a conclusion. The first section describes and analyzes the post-coup efforts of the military regime to consolidate its grip on power. The second section highlights the emerging challenges and factors leading to selective co-option of the political elite to retain its grip on power. The third section includes a detailed discussion on the causes of rising discontent against the regime and re-alignment of political elites to exert pressure for a transition to civilian rule. The fourth section deals with the transformation of discontent into nationwide crises. The fifth and last section discusses the dynamics of transition to civilian rule.

Regime Consolidation to Selective Co-Option

Ayub Khan, after capturing power ruthlessly went for crushing the opposition. He declared political parties as divisive forces and politicians as corrupt, selfish and incompetent; who were responsible for

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instability in Pakistan during the first decade of its independence. He imposed a complete ban on political parties, sealed their offices in all the major cities, confiscated their records and freeze bank accounts of major political parties like Pakistan Muslim League, Jama't e Islami, Kirshak Sirmak Party, Awami League etc. [Afzal, 1987, p. 10]. Along with the already existing tool, PARODA (1949), of punishing political opposition, he issued Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) in 1959, which was frequently used to detain political leadership. Hamid Yusuf observes that about 7000 persons, 3000 from West Pakistan and 4000 from East Pakistan, became a victim of EBDO [Yusuf, 1998, p. 73]. Among the most prominent names who were victimized by EBDO were Chaudry Muhammad Ali, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Doltana, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, G. M. Syed, Abdul Ghafar Khan, Abdul Wali Khan and many others who could challenge the regime. The political leaders were given two options; either to face the trial or to accept disqualification from political life for seven years [Afzal, 1987, p. 11]. Ayub deemed it necessary to depoliticize the society in order to consolidate his regime. For this purpose, section 144 of the CPC and Defense of Pakistan rules were frequently used to ban the political activities of the students and for detaining the political activists [Waseem, 1994, p. 164].

Parallel to dealing with the forces of political defiance, Ayub tried to regulate and reform the administrative structure of Pakistan. Purging of bureaucracy started, and a number of CSP officials were trialled and terminated. Saeed Shafqat argues that the purpose of this purging was to bring the civil bureaucracy from a co-equal to subordinate status [Shafqat, 1989, pp. 23-72]. While Waseem [1994] disagreed on the point and claimed that the Martial law Regime was actually a joint venture of civil and military bureaucracy. No institutional reforms were introduced to weaken the civil bureaucracy; rather, it was strengthened during the regime. He noted that the enquiry commissions established during Martial Law years were dominated by civil bureaucracy. There were 280 members in 33 commissions while the percentage of civil servants was 42.1% in these commissions as compared to 6.4% of military officials. Thus, Ayub promoted the civil-military partnership during the Martial Law period.

The purging of the CSP officers can best be explained as an effort of getting rid of unwanted officials in the guise of showing the regime's commitment to eradicate corruption and misuse of power. While Rizvi agreed with Shafqat and noted that the military captured the leading role in the military-bureaucracy partnership. He further argued that military was well aware of its limitations in administering the country without the support of civil bureaucracy; similarly, there was a strong feeling in the civil bureaucracy too that it would not be able to retain its privileged status if it did not cooperate with the new ruling class. Thus, the mutual interests of both institutions led them to enter into a more intimate partnership, where civil bureaucracy accepted to serve as a subordinate partner [Rizvi, 1987, p. 78].

Media is a very important tool of influencing public opinion; therefore, in almost all authoritarian states, it is strictly regulated. Ayub Khan also came hard on media after the imposition of Martial Law. Some of the notable journalists of high repute who were sympathetic to the Left were arrested and sent into imprisonment like Syed Sibte Hassan, Ahmad Nadeem Qasmi and Faiz Ahmad Faiz editors of *Lail o Nihaar*, *Imroz*, and *Pakistan Times* respectively. In April 1960 Press and Publications Ordinance (PPO) was issued to regulate the media. The regime showed zero tolerance for anti-Regime comments or reports in media [Afzal, 1987, pp. 11-46].

Press was used to project the image of the regime. Different types of pressures were used to regulate the newspapers in both wings of Pakistan. For example, in 1961 Associated Press of Pakistan, the largest and the most dominant news agency was taken over by the government through an ordinance, Associated Press of Pakistan (Taking over) Ordinance, which gave the regime a significant opportunity to control the main source of news coverage [Afzal, 1987, p. 47]. Official advertisements were also used to put pressure on newspapers. If a newspaper did not give due coverage to the projection of government policies, or it gave undue coverage to the opposition parties, was ultimately punished by blacklisting it. Blacklisting of a newspaper meant the withdrawal of all official advertisements from it [Afzal, 1987].

In the absence of legitimacy at the domestic level, authoritarian Regimes in Pakistan have always looked outward. They tried to ally themselves with the USA in order to get international legitimacy and henceforth international recognition. Pakistan was getting closer to the United States from the period when Ayub Khan became defense minister of Pakistan, but after his seizure of power as Chief Martial Administrator the relations between the two countries became more intimate. The volume of military aid increased rapidly while the number of projects in technical, commercial, health and educational assistance multiplied [Ziring, 1980, p. 93-94]. Thus, generous flow of aid from the United States of

America helped Pakistan's economy to improve its efficiency during the early years of Ayub Regime. [Yusuf \(1999, p. 77\)](#) noted that Pakistan's growth rate reached 6.7% per annum, leaving almost the whole of the third world behind.

The flow of foreign aid increased the foreign exchange reserves of the country. These reserves were utilized to build another alliance within the state with industrial-merchant classes. As Ayub Regime's focus remained on the capitalist road to development; therefore, he introduced such economic reforms that helped the industrial-merchant classes to grow and develop. Two of the most significant instants of government's efforts to help industrial development in Pakistan were the establishment of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and the introduction of Bonus Voucher scheme. PIDC was a semi-government organization established with the purpose of assisting industrial development in the country. It was established in 1951, and it cooperated in the establishment of textile, paper and sugar mills as well as jute and fertilizer factories ([Qaiser, 1991, p. 40](#)). Similarly, Bonus Voucher Scheme was introduced to help the exporters and importers of goods in the accumulation of capital and obtaining of foreign exchange for the purpose of importing those goods which were given in the bonus list ([Sayeed, 1968, p.58](#)). [Qaiser \(1991, p. 41\)](#) observed that this breakthrough in the economy of Pakistan was made possible only because of an uninterrupted flow of foreign aid and loans provided by United States of America, Germany and United Kingdom. Thus, the regime's alliance with the Western World helped it to consolidate its position in the domestic context by getting the support of rising industrial-merchant classes.

Industrial development also depends largely on the availability of cheap labor. In order to supply cheap labor, it is pertinent to keep the prices, of items of daily use, at a lower level. Otherwise, the price hike ultimately leads to demands for more wages. Therefore, the measures taken by the Ayub Regime to control prices, of all the commodities of daily use, had a dual impact. On the one hand, it ensured cheap labor for newly emerging industries while on the other hand, it relieved the people a bit which ultimately helped in building the good image of the government among common citizens. These measures included fixing the prices of items of daily use, declaring sale or resale of these commodities above fixed price as black-marketing for which a maximum of fourteen years of imprisonment could be given as punishment. Hoarding of foodstuff might bring huge penalties. Thus a 25% fall in the prices of consumer goods was observed within four days, and the trend continued in the following days touching many luxury items too ([Afzal, p. 4](#)). [Waseem \(1994, p. 45\)](#) noted that the Martial Law government presented a social welfare posture of it and established a number of commissions for social, economic and political reforms. These commissions included Reform Commissions on Landholding, administration, police, agriculture, law, education and finance etc. Daily newspapers reported government's efforts to eradicate corruption, screening committees for government officials, the imposition of price control, increase in foreign exchange reserves of the government, the promulgation of laws against teasing women and provision of facilities for working classes. All this helped in increasing popularity and gaining social legitimacy for the regime. This is why the marginalized political elite failed to launch a popular movement during the initial three to four years of the Ayub era.

In 1959 the Military Regime decided to expand its influence to mass population level for two purposes. Firstly, to give the people a chance of participation at the local level, whereas, they were refrained from participating in politics at the national level, and secondly, to use the local bodies as a tool for legitimizing the regime. Therefore, on October 27, 1959, the Basic Democracy Ordinance was promulgated. 80,000 B.D members were to be elected from the two wings of Pakistan. The system was structured in a way that these Basic Democrats were heavily dependent on the local bureaucracy; therefore, they could be very easily influenced and controlled by the Regime ([Ziring, 1997, p. 255](#)). After the election of B.D members on January 23 1960, President Ayub Khan got a vote of confidence from these Basic Democrats in a referendum that was held on February 14, 1960. Ayub Khan celebrated the event and took oath from the Chief justice of the highest court as the first elected President of Pakistan.

Thus, Ayub Khan successfully consolidated his authoritarian regime during the initial few years of capturing power by introducing various reforms and ensuring economic development with the help of foreign aid coming from the Western World. But early cracks, though tiny, started to appear in the regime after the promulgation of the 1962 constitution and with the revival of political parties. As the political activities started Ayub Khan was compelled to co-opt pro Regime political elites in order to prolong his rule and respond on the same pitch where the opposition political parties had started their campaign against his authoritarian regime.

Ayub Khan after taking over the power tried to co-opt the industrial bourgeoisie, through economic reforms, in urban areas and middle farmers through Basic Democracies system in rural areas in order

to build a strong alliance to consolidate his Regime [\[Shafiqat, 1989, pp. 23-72\]](#). As politics always poses a serious challenge to status-quo therefore, he tried his best to depoliticize the society by imposing a complete ban on political parties till 1962. Yusuf observed that Ayub ignored a very fundamental fact of political behavior that economic improvement can never substitute share in political authority [\[Yusuf, 1999, p. 82\]](#). But the realization came in the fall of 1962 after the promulgation of the constitution and with the start of political activities by National Democratic Front (NDF). It is pertinent here to give a brief description of the activities of NDF in order to comprehend the situation that led the Ayub Regime to go for selective co-optation at the national level of politics.

On June 6, 1962, National Assembly's inaugural session was held, and Martial was lifted on the same date. As political parties were banned; therefore, the session of the National Assembly failed to bring any organized opinion about the new constitution on the floor of the assembly (Afzal, p. 120). The first attempt in mobilizing an organized opinion about the constitution was made by a group of nine politicians of East Pakistan belonging to different defunct parties on June 24, 1962, in Dacca. The Group of "Dacca Nine" openly discarded the constitution and called for its abrogation. They demanded parliamentary democracy through adult franchise and based on federal principles. Thus, the first major challenge threatening the legitimacy of Ayub Regime appeared. A wave of anti-regime statements followed in the upcoming days by individual politicians. The sequence carried on by holding public meetings in almost all the major cities of East Pakistan. In these meetings, the politicians of defunct political parties addressed huge gatherings, openly criticized the regime and the new constitution as well as the policies of the regime; which benefited few at the cost of many. Anti-Regime movement, initiated by individual politicians, at last, culminated in the formation of National Democratic Front with the release of Hussain Shaheed Suharwardi and his taking up the charge of the movement (Afzal, pp. 121-123). Thus, the situation became alarming for the Ayub government as early cracks had started to appear in the regime. Alliance with the urban bourgeoisie and rural middle farmers was not sufficient to consolidate the power. There was no alternative for the vacuum created at national level political activities. The situation that had been created in the wake of time might pose a disastrous challenge in the future. It was, therefore, pertinent to respond in time. The regime, therefore, decided to pick up the bulk of pro-regime political leadership under the umbrella of a political party that could mobilize pro-Regime opinion in the mass population. The Political Parties Act had already encouraged many political leaders to revive their defunct parties (Yousaf, 1999, p. 75). Two options were considered in the meetings of Ayub's cabinet, either to launch a totally new political party or to revive Pakistan Muslim League (Afzal, p. 54). The later was opted because it was argued by the supporters of the idea that the Muslim League had a special appeal for common masses as a party that created Pakistan [\[Yusuf, 1999, p. 75\]](#). The next challenge was to organize the party and get the support of the prominent leaguers. A convention was called under the chairmanship of Choudhury Khaliq al-Zaman on September 4-5, 1962. About 800 delegates took part in the sessions [\[Afzal, p. 57\]](#). With reference to this convention, it was named as Convention Muslim League. Despite all efforts of the government to attract prominent leaguers and the mass population towards Convention Muslim League, it failed to bear the status of the legitimate heir of former Muslim League; the founder party of Pakistan. Parallel to it emerged Council Muslim League with a number of prominent leaders of Pakistan movement under the leadership of Khwaja Nazim al-Din. Attempts to unify the two leagues also failed bitterly. The situation was changing rapidly. Especially after the presidential elections in 1964 and the following series of crises in the post-1965 war period, the ConML showed little ability to mobilize people in favor of the regime. Thus Ayub Khan's attempt to co-opt the political elite for the consolidation of his regime failed to fill the cracks that had emerged in his authoritarian regime.

Rising Discontent Leading to Crises

Domestic politics of the third world nations is largely influenced by the combination of internal and external factors. Change in the global environment affects the flow of foreign aid either negatively or positively. As the performance of domestic economies depends heavily on the flow of this aid, therefore, the frequent flow of foreign aid may help in consolidating the domestic economies and vice versa. Prior to the Indo-China war of 1962, Pakistan enjoyed the privileged status of a most allied ally of the United States in the South Asian subsystem. But China's superiority in 1962 war-obsessed the Western World with China's perceived expansionist fear. This obsession led the United States to incline towards India more in the post-war period in order to check China. During the same period, Pakistan's inclination towards China in order to check the perceived Indian aggression annoyed the United States of America [\[Hussain & Hussain, 1993, pp. 34-35\]](#). Thus, American indifference to Ayub Regime started creating problems for the regime. In a situation where Ayub Regime was losing its international support, it turned

towards the domestic allies to consolidate its position. After the promulgation of the 1962 constitution, he was compelled to enforce the Political Parties Act that lifted the ban from political parties and allowed the defunct political parties to revive. As the political activities started, Anti-Ayub sentiments appeared to surface. Co-option of pro-regime politicians under the umbrella cover of ConML was not of much help in connecting the common people with the regime, as ConML lacked popular mass following (Yousaf, 1999, p. 82). Persisting economic problems, the growing disparity between the two wings as well as between the rich and the poor were breeding a deep sense of deprivation among the common masses in general and East Pakistanis in particular. Yusuf (p. 81) noted that the disparity between the two wings had reached to such an extent that the Finance Commission in 1963 confessed that the only way of bringing the two wings at par with each other was to decelerate the growth in Western Wing. Thus, rising discontent with the policies of Ayub Khan in East Pakistan helped the cause of NDF first and later the demands of provincial autonomy.

Ziring (1997, p.2) on the economic problems of Pakistan during the Ayub period claims that the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) was a success story as far as statistics were concerned, but it had little improved the living standards of the common masses. Growing poverty, mounting expectations with little sense of political participation were breeding unrest in the majority of the society. Sayeed observed that the percentage of the people living below the poverty line during 1963-70 were 60% if the poverty line is set at Rs. 300 per capita income (Sayeed, p. 60).

Table 1. Approximate Rural Population Living Below the Poverty Line

Year	Percentage of Population	Number in Millions
1963-1964	60.5%,	23.46
1966-1967	59.7%	24.80
1968-1969	61.5%	26.72

Source: S.M Naseem, "Mass Poverty in Pakistan: Some Preliminary findings", *Pakistan Development Review* 12, no.4 (Winter 1973): 322.

As the Ayub government adopted capitalist road to development; therefore, it inevitably led to broadening the gap between the few rich and the majority of the poor with the passage of time. According to an economist of high repute, Mahbub ul Haq, only twenty-two (22) families held the ownership of 80% of industries, 79% of insurance assets and 80% of the banking assets (Haq, 1963, p. 113). As a result, a deep sense of social injustice leading to breeding of discontent evolved over the period. This found its expression in the public gatherings of Combined Opposition Parties (COP) during the presidential election campaign of Miss Fatima Jinnah. She addressed the huge gatherings in urban cities of both wings. Although, Ayub's self-structured institution of Basic Democracy helped him in winning the elections, yet the post-election scenario resulted in a never-ending series of mass protest and criticism on the government.

Another shock that pushed Ayub Regime into a vulnerable situation was breaking out of the war between India and Pakistan. The war further engulfed Pak-U. S relations because of the United States' China obsession (Hussain & Hussain, p. 63). In the post-war period when President Ayub concluded a treaty with India at Tashkent, it was neither accepted by the people of Pakistan nor the hawkish elements within the regime. The war had dual implications at the domestic level. On the one hand, it further intensified the growing grievances of East Pakistan while on the other hand it was followed by anti-Tashkent Agreement protests in West Pakistan. Thus, with the passage of time-frequency of anti-regime feelings and mass protests, intensified and discontent reached its peak. The causes of this growing discontent can be summarized as under:

1. Change in an international environment
2. Indo-Pak war of 1965
3. Anti-Tashkent Declaration movement
4. Worsening conditions of industrial labor and rural tenants
5. Growing sense of social injustice against the economic hold of 22 rich families
6. Growing sense of deprivation in East Pakistan leading to rising in centrifugal tendency
7. Formation of democratization alliances and their success in mobilizing the people
8. The shortage of sugar and scarcity of wheat and vegetables in small towns
9. The alleged progress of Ayub family after coming in power
10. Opposition to Family Laws Ordinance and Population Planning programs (Waseem, p. 223).

Now the situation had ripened for political change, but the regime was not ready to allow such change. A political deadlock resulted in a series of crises that ultimately led to the breakdown of the regime.

Period of Crises

The early cracks that started to appear after the promulgation of 1962 Constitution and revival of political parties began to widen up in the post-1965 war period. Sheikh Mujeeb's taking over of Awami League's leadership, and Bhutto's parting ways with Ayub Regime and establishment of his own political party (Pakistan People's Party) were the turning points in the political history of Pakistan. The ground was ready for the Bhutto's socialist slogans of food, clothing and shelter and Mujeeb's demand of provincial autonomy, which was reflected in his famous six points, in the presence of growing disparity, inequality and relative sense of deprivation which marked the later period of Ayub rule. Both enjoyed popular following in Western and Eastern wings of Pakistan, respectively. Both were able to mobilize the people in favor of the alternative offered by them in the two wings.

A few days after the tenth anniversary of Ayub's rise to power, the major incident took place which was followed by a series of unending crises. It happened in Rawalpindi when students of Polytechnic Institute, who were protesting against the Ayub Regime, clashed with police. As a result of police firing, some students were killed, and the army was called upon to handle the situation (Waseem, pp. 222-224). The said incident proved to be explosive as the mass protest started against it throughout Pakistan. After few days Ayub Khan was fired at in a public gathering. Though he survived yet, the anti-Regime movement gained momentum. The said incident proved to be explosive as the mass protest started against it throughout Pakistan. After few days Ayub Khan was fired at in a public gathering. Though he survived yet, the anti-Regime movement gained momentum (Waseem, p. 221). Along with these four pillars of anti-Ayub movement, Waseem cited Burki who referred to the role of middle classes, especially urban middle classes, intelligentsia and the middle farmers in the rural areas as a major opposition force in West Pakistan. According to him these middle classes initially served as the constituency of Ayub Khan and were able to enjoy some economic benefits. But as time passed by, Ayub started relying heavily on the feudal classes and industrial bourgeoisie which led to the exclusion of these middle classes from political power. The sense of alienation forced these classes to move towards Bhutto. Waseem objected this view on the ground that middle classes never supported Bhutto, which ultimately led him to mobilize the poor classes; peasants and laborers (Waseem, p. 221).

In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujeeb was able to mobilize people in favor of his demand for greater provincial autonomy. A Student Action Committee in collaboration with Awami League ran the anti-Regime mass campaign in a very coordinated manner as compared to West Pakistan where the student campaign was largely fragmented and localized [\[Waseem, p. 220\]](#).

As the crisis lingered on its intensity increased and opposition camp swallowed. The inclusion of Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, Justice Murshid of Dhaka and General Azam Khan, the former Governor of East Pakistan further strengthened opposition to the Regime (Yousaf, p. 106). Similarly, in January 1969 a major breakthrough, in the political party alliances for the restoration of democracy, was the formation of Democratic Action Committee, with the inclusion of 3 non-PDM parties, on the ashes of Pakistan Democratic Movement; as the latter had passed through many ups and downs but unable to pose a major threat to the regime while the former took a leading role in anti-Ayub movement and virtually emerged as a major threat to it (Afzal, p. 141).

The situation in both wings of Pakistan was getting worse by each passing day from the start of 1969. Each passing day was marked with protests, strikes, mass gatherings addressed by political leaders, the clash between state agencies and the rioting students and workers of industries. Sheikh Mujeeb's arrest in Agartala Conspiracy Case, in which he was alleged of conspiring against the unity of state in collaboration with India, spread and intensified the discontent and mass demonstration in East Pakistan Waseem noted that whereas labor militancy has taken up a new form of protest like encircling and burn (*Chero jalao*) under the leadership of Bhashani the situation in East Pakistan was even worse where murders, attacks on police stations and members of Basic Democracy have become a routine (Waseem, pp. 223-224). As a last effort to manage the crisis, Ayub tried to engage the leadership of DAC in dialogue, but in the absence of Bhutto, Mujeeb and Bhashani this effort also met with failure. Having lost the popular support and the confidence of armed forces, Ayub Khan was left with no other option than to quit the power corridor (Ziring, p. 97). Thus, on 25th March 1969, Ayub Khan resigned and handed over power to General Yahya Khan.

General Yahya abrogated the constitution of 1962, and a Legal Framework Order was promulgated with immediate effect. Elections were promised on the basis of adult franchise. Sheikh Mujeeb was released, and the election campaign started. Ziring is doubtful of the military's intention for the transition of power. He noted that this election was a gamble on the part of Military Junta. It was a strong feeling within the junta that by replacing Ayub and his system, the intensity of anti-regime feelings could be reduced. The election, on the one hand, would help in reducing discontent in East Pakistan while on the other hand after the election, National Assembly would have to write a new constitution within four months otherwise it would have to face dissolution. It was expected that no political party would be able to win a majority in the elections which would ultimately help the relevance of military junta in the future political set up (Waseem, pp. 101-102).

But election results were against the hopes of the military junta. Awami League in East Pakistan and Pakistan People's Party in West Pakistan emerged as the two major parties whereas Awami League is winning an overall majority in the elections of 1970. This unexpected result made the options scarce for the Military Regime. Military's unwillingness to transfer power to the Awami League, as it was perceived by them as a secessionist party, gave birth to a new crisis (Ziring, p. 102). The dialogue between the Regime, Bhutto and Mujeeb failed to settle issues on six points. As the deadlock prolonged and crisis intensified, General Yahya Khan decided to take military action in East Pakistan. The decision proved to be devastating. Civil war broke out in Eastern wing. International pressure increased on an alleged violation of human rights and genocide of Bengalis. India, claiming that the influx of refugees in its territory from East Pakistan had made this issue beyond Pakistan's internal issue, intervened in East Pakistan. Pakistan military junta faced a humiliating defeat, and the crisis led Pakistani state to collapse in 1971.

Conclusion

Existing literature on democratic transitions is least helpful in addressing the nature of the transition that may take place after the collapse of a state, as a result of movement for the transition to democracy. Pakistan faced this unique experience which can neither be explained by [Huntington's \(1991\)](#) modes of Transformation, Replacement and Trans-placement nor through the game theory of [Prezeworski \(1991\)](#). An attempt to explain possibilities of transition in such a situation, especially where the military serves as an authoritarian regime, may lead to the following set of assumptions:

1. The partial collapse of a state, after losing the war in a part of it, damages the image and shakes the morale of armed forces heavily.
2. In the presence of a popular alternative, it is left with no other option than to transfer power to it immediately.
3. If there is no such alternative available, there are chances of further divisions as the local and regional identities encouraged by the secession of one region may struggle for their independence and the chances of complete dissolution and emergence of many new states are always there. It is relevant, especially in the third world heterogeneous societies which are facing the problems of nation-building right from their independence.

After the collapse of Pakistan in December 1971, (1) and (2) occurred sequentially. In order to get rid of the crisis of legitimacy, power was immediately transferred to Mr Z. A. Bhutto, the leader of the majority party in West Pakistan, who emerged as the first civilian Martial Law administrator of new Pakistan. Martial Law was lifted soon, and with the promulgation of the constitution of 1973, the journey of transition to civilian rule achieved its major milestone.

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