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The Changing Dynamics of Pakistan's Relations with the Former Soviet Union 1947-91

Abstract

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Keywords: Afghanistan, Communist, Cold War. Geo-Strategic, Mujahideen, Soviet Union

Authors:

Mohammad Ayaz: (Corresponding Author)

Lecturer/In-Charge/ Chairperson,
Department of Pakistan Studies, Kohat
University of Science & Technology KUST,
Kohat, KP, Pakistan.

(Email: mohammadayaz@kust.edu.pk)

Saqib Nawaz: Lecturer, Pakistan Studies, Government
Degree College Shakardara, Kohat, KP,
Pakistan.

Kiramat Ullah: Lecturer, Department of Pakistan Studies,
Kohat University of Science & Technology
KUST, Kohat, KP, Pakistan.

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The Changing Dynamics of Pakistan's Relations with the Former Soviet Union, 1947-91

Authors:

Mohammad Ayaz: (Corresponding Author)

Lecturer/In-Charge/Chairperson, Department of Pakistan Studies, Kohat University of Science & Technology KUST, Kohat, KP, Pakistan.

(Email: mohammadayaz@kust.edu.pk)

Saqib Nawaz: Lecturer, Pakistan Studies, Government Degree College Shakardara, Kohat, KP, Pakistan.

Kiramat Ullah: Lecturer, Department of Pakistan Studies, Kohat University of Science & Technology KUST, Kohat, KP, Pakistan.

Abstract

Throughout the Cold War era (1947-91) relationship between Pakistan and the Soviet Union fluctuated up and down. Due to the important geo-strategic location, and rivalry with India, Pakistan was compelled to join Southeast Atlantic Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Tensure its security requirements Pakistan needed a friend who could help in internal and external security issues. Thus, Pakistan became a front-line state against Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and therefore, had strained relations with Moscow throughout Cold War era. However, despite Pakistan's alliance against communist expansion the US imposed embargo on providing weapons to Pakistan during 1965, and 1971 war with India. Consequently, Pakistan had to chang her foreign policy and due to changing geo-economic dynamics was forced to mend relations with USSR. This research paper seeks to explore the historical relationship between Pakistan and the Soviet Union during the cold war period.

Keywords:

[Afghanistan](#), [Communist](#), [Cold War](#), [Geo-Strategic](#), [Mujahideen](#), [Soviet Union](#)

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Introduction

Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the relationship between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) was

hostile throughout the Cold War era, and consequently, it has deep impact on Pakistan's choice in international relations. The Soviet Union tried to make a strategic partnership with the newly created dominions of India



and Pakistan. This was the era of Cold War politics, where the world was divided into two adverse ideological poles; the capitalist camp was under the auspices of the United States, while the communist world was led by the Soviet Union. These two superpowers shaped international politics and global economic relations. The countries of the Third World were to either take sides with the USA or USSR, and the case of India and Pakistan was not exceptional (Saikal, 1985).

Pakistan established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1948, but the relationship between the countries could not progress due to the ideological differences, as well as Pakistan's entry into the capitalist bloc led by the USA. Further, the membership of Pakistan in military alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization CENTO annoyed the Soviet Union, which is the prime reason for strained relations between the two states. Under the influence of these military treaties, Pakistan played a frontline state against the spread of communism in South Asia (Ali, 2011). The strategic partnership with militant *Islamist* organizations and the ultimate hosting of the International *Jehad* against the Soviet expansion in bordering Afghanistan made it a challenge for Pakistan to establish a smooth diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. Thus, the relationship between the states had remained strained throughout the Cold War era (Chaudhri, 1966).

However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relationship between the two states underwent a significant transformation, and due to the rapidly changing global political landscape in the post-Cold War era, it was obvious to have a gradual rapprochement between the two states. Since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan and Russia have made enormous efforts to strengthen their diplomatic relations as well as establish cooperation in various areas, including defense, trade, and energy, etc. This Research paper highlights external factors, such as the role of the United States, India, and China, which had severely affected the dynamics of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Pakistan.

Historical Background of Pakistan-Soviet Relations

The land and geographical areas that later became part of Pakistan after the partition of British India on August 14, 1947, had historically a close connection with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The cultural and linguistic diversity in united India shared many similarities with the question of nationalities in the pre- and post-Tsarist Russian empire. The success of Vladimir Lenin and his Party in Russia, with the Communist revolution of October 1917, had a direct impact on the

development of revolutionary politics in British India and later on the post-colonial Pakistan (Coppola, 1974).

Soon after the Communist revolution of October 1917 in Russia, the anti-colonial revolutionaries of British India started to make contact with the Bolsheviks. Many of them, including Maulana Barkat Ullah Bhopali (1882-1937), Mahindra Singh Pratap (1886-1979), Manabendra Nath Roy (1887-1954), Abdul Rab Peshawari (1890-1957), and Maulana Fazal Mahmood Makhfi (1898-1960), visited Moscow and worked closely with Soviet revolutionaries (Adhikari, 1925).

The Pakhtun-majority *Hijrat* movement of 1920, which was an offshoot of the *Khilafat* Movement, was watched with keen interest by Lenin, who therefore directed M. N. Roy to open a training school (After they arrived at Tashkent, these Muhajirin were admitted to the Induski Kurs (Indian Military School), which was established by M.N. Roy for the purpose of giving Indian expatriates military and political training. The school had a spacious building with many services and facilities for émigré students. Therefore, it seems clear that Roy and Lenin were expecting many Muhajirin to be admitted to the school. It was presumed that after their political and military trainings they would be sent back with modern weaponry to attack the British government in the tribal areas of present-day Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region.) for the *Muhajirin* (Ayaz, 2023). After successful training here, some opted to study further at the University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow. Most of these *Muhajirin* turned communists before they returned home (Ansari 1986). They founded the CPI in Tashkent in the 1920s, intending to start work in British India upon their return. However, their plans were disclosed to the government via spies and agents who were sent to participate in the *Hijrat* migration. Further, the British Government set up a secret cell in the Home Department of Police to search and arrest these Bolsheviks (Ayaz, 2022).

Around the same time, a delegation of émigré revolutionaries from India, headed by Abdul Rab Peshawari, met Vladimir Lenin in Moscow on May 7, 1919. They presented the real issues of colonial India under British subjugation and the revolutionary work required there. After discussion on the questions of nationalities and colonial rule, V. Lenin presented his famous thesis in the second congress held on July 28, 1920. Roy, on the instructions of Lenin, also presented a supplementary thesis on the occasion, which set the stage for fusions of local politics and communist internationalism (Maitra, 1976).

Initially, this was aimed at Indian nationalism but however, the starting point of the thesis was the definition of the contradiction between Imperialism and Socialism as a basic contradiction of the epoch. The right of self-determination for India was accepted, as Lenin

elaborated upon the problems of nationalities. He further said that the Communist International must enter a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward countries but should not merge completely in it, and under all circumstances should uphold the independence of the proletariat movement, even if it is in its most embryonic form. The task of communist elements in such countries as India is to create revolutionary parties which could translate communist teachings into a language understandable to the people, and to forge links between the toiling and oppressed masses of these countries and the world proletariat. Lenin told the delegates, "You must base yourselves on bourgeois nationalism, which is awakening and must awaken among those people, with its historical justification" (Ansari, 2015).

Thus, the idea of supporting revolutionary-bourgeois democratic forces in colonial countries, with all their cultural characteristics, including religion, as a united front of anti-imperial struggle, under the condition that the organizational and ideological independence of communist elements is safeguarded. This thesis and the supplementary thesis presented by Roy enabled the grounds for supporting revolutionaries and nationalist bourgeois as a broader network to reach out to the toiling masses (Haithcox, 1963). Thus, the tradition of working in the mass front organizations flourished in the work of the Communist Party of India. Consequently, several nationalist and revolutionary organizations were established during the 1920s throughout colonial India. And there was a very thin line between the formal left movement and the more tactical form of revolutionary resistance in the NWFP with its ever-shifting and changing identities (Ayaz & Islam, 2022).

Another connection between the Bolsheviks and British India was the ideology of Islam, which had a close resemblance to the communist Ideology of emancipation of the oppressed class. Maulana Barkat Ullah Bhopali, the founding leader of the Ghadar Party, was a socialist who supported the call of Vladimir Lenin to Muslims all over the world. For him, "Islam is his religion while communism is a political and economic strategy, for attaining national independence from British colonial rule" (p.67) (Khan, 2014). Besides any supposed commonalities or contradictions between Socialism and Islam, it is worth noting that the theory of Marxism (originated in Europe) has distinct instantiations in Asia and especially in Pakistan, where the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism and language play a dominant role in the socio-political spheres of powers. Language issues and other modes of cultural consciousness have impacts on regional and class inequalities and thus on the transformation of Marxist thoughts in Pakistan (Husain, 2005).

It was at the *Induski Kurs* in Tashkent that some of the *Muhajirs* approached M. N. Roy with a suggestion to allow them to join the Communist Party of Turkistan. A few socialists like Rab and Acharya insisted on forming a Communist Party of India in exile, and after a long deliberation, the CPI was founded in Tashkent in 1920. It was activated in India in 1925 after the party's Kanpur Conference and became the first leftist political party of British colonial India.

The Connections of CPI With Communist Party of the USSR (CPSU)

The newly formed CPI and its leadership had a very close relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), as the latter had sponsored the whole project of spreading communist thoughts among the Indian revolutionaries. The CPSU, and especially Lenin, had given keen attention to the problems of India and its liberation from British imperialism. It was on the directives of the CPSU that delegates and leadership of the CPI were invited by Lenin to present their supplementary thesis in the Third Communist International (Swain, 2010).

In 1921, practical measures were adopted by the Soviet government to allocate further funds to promoting the organization of Communist groups in India and enabling them to intervene effectively in the revolutionary struggle. An extensive network of channels and contacts was built by Roy so that these funds could be sent to India. Ghulam Hussain received a substantial amount of money for the purpose of publishing a revolutionary Urdu paper, *Inqilab*. Shaukat Usmani was provided with sufficient money to organize workers and progressive groups for the socialist awakening. Similarly, Muzzafar Ahmad received a small sum of money regularly for his personal expenses as well as for political work and traveling (Ansari, 2015). Besides these funding sources, Roy had also issued instructions to the Indian revolutionaries to receive copies of Comintern magazines like *Inprecor* and *The Vanguard*, and made arrangements for the publication of articles such as 'India in Transition', 'What do we Want?', and 'One Year of Non-Cooperation'. With the help of these efforts, small Communist groups had begun to emerge in Lahore, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and the United Provinces (Jan 2018).

The CPI leadership at Tashkent had been in touch with the more left-inclined leaders in AINC and other progressive circles of India. It was believed that the party would be made functional in India once its leadership returned from Tashkent. Due to state repressive policies and subsequent arrests of its leadership in the Peshawar, Kanpur, and Meerut Conspiracy cases, though, the party took a long time to establish itself. An attempt to hold

first CPI conference at Kanpur in 1922, was made to hold the first CPI conference at Kanpur in 1922 was made, but due to the raids and arrests by the government, the program was postponed (Salim, 2016).

Finally, the CPI succeeded in holding its first party conference on December 26, 1925, at Kanpur, which was attended by delegates from various communist groups located in Bengal, Calcutta, Bombay, Punjab, and the United Provinces (Raza, 2011). The central executive committee was formed with S.V. Ghat (1896-1970) as Secretary General of the Party. From there, it slowly and gradually started to expand its outreach and gave birth to many class organizations, which shall be discussed in the next chapter. For now, this chapter has shown that not only were Indian Muslims and the Indo-Afghan borderland included in the rise of communism in the Indian subcontinent from the beginning, they and their specific experiences were absolutely formative in that history to the point that we can say that communism and political Islam were, by this stage, distinct but intertwined political positions.

The relationship between Pakistan and the Soviet Union has been significantly impacted throughout the Cold War and especially during the formative phase of Pakistan. In the following pages, efforts are made to highlight an overview of the relationship between the two states from 1947 to 1991, providing the early years of the relationship between both countries and the evolving factors that shaped the relations during the Cold War.

Pakistan- Soviet Relations 1947-1954

After independence, Pakistan established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in May 1948 (Hussain & Fatima, 2013), but these relations between the two countries could not flourish further due to the increasing influence of the United States of America on Pakistan (Khan, 1961). However, Pakistan could not make an effective foreign policy toward the former Soviet Union as Pakistan first opted for a policy of neutrality in the formative phase, and secondly, the invitation of the Soviet Union to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was turned down. The mistrust between the Soviet Union and Pakistan further increased when Khan visited the United States of America in 1950, which was supplemented by military and strategic alliances of Pakistan with anti-communist organizations (Hassan, 2008).

Fundamentally, Pakistan had four choices at the time of independence; the First option was to remain neutral and non-ally in the global context of the Cold War. The second choice was to join the Communist camp, which was anti-imperialist, and many of the progressive elements in Pakistan were expecting it. The third choice was to join the anti-communist bloc, which was led by the US and Great Britain. The last choice was to opt

altogether for a relationship with the Islamic world; however, Islamic countries were not developed at that time, nor were they technologically advanced.

Due to security threats on the western border as well as the Eastern border and the strong influence of colonial legacy, Pakistan had to opt for joining the anti-communist camp, led by the US. The emergence of the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) and its cordial relationship with CPSU and Communist Party of India (CPI) might have created ambiguities and doubts in the policy makers for taking such a step. However, the growing tension with India on Kashmir and military assistance from a technologically advanced world were the obvious imperatives. The split of communist ideology at the global level between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking groups has provided an alternative for Pakistan to neutralize the potential threat on the Eastern border.

On the other hand, among the elites of the Muslim League, who were educated in Europe and America, there was not like the Soviet Union. Some of the leaders of ML and religio-political organizations have also played their role in creating a perception that the Soviet Union, being a communist country, would put the place of Islam in danger in Pakistan. They were trying to equate communist ideology with atheism and an anti-Islamic system of governance.

At that time, Pakistan urgently needed to bolster its defense against India after the 1948 war over Kashmir and to support Pakistan's precarious economic situation. It was also perceived that after losses suffered in World War II, the Soviet Union was not in a position to provide the kind of economic assistance that Pakistan urgently needed (Hanif, 2013). Therefore, Pakistan joined the American camp to get economic and technical assistance. The USSR perceived the division of the Indian subcontinent into two states as illusory as part of the British divide-and-rule policy in order to perpetuate its control over India by creating two hostile states, and nationalist leaders were considered as the stooges of British imperialism (Amin, 2022).

Pakistan was at first opposed to being part of any ideological contest between the two emergent blocs led by the US and the USSR. As Liaquat Ali Khan said that the state started without any narrow and special commitments and without any prejudices in the international sphere (Sattar, 2019). Pakistan took the initiative in April 1948 to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (Dawn, 2010). On the occasion, Liaquat stated that it had been the desire of Pakistan to have friendly relations with all the nations of the world, and the decision to exchange ambassadors with Russia was in consequence of that policy. But still, the appointment of ambassadors was delayed. On 21 November 1949, it was announced that Mr. Ivan

Nikolaevich Bakunin, who was the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan from 1943 to 1947, would be the ambassador of the USSR to Pakistan. He arrived in Karachi on 15 March 1950 (Khan, 1961). Thus, the Pakistani ambassador was appointed on December 31, 1949, while the Soviet ambassador was appointed on March 22, 1950. Mr. Shoaib Qureshi was the first ambassador to the USSR in 1949. He called on Andre Gromyko, then deputy foreign minister, to tell him that the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had dispatched him so that he could make all arrangements for his visit to Moscow.

Pakistan viewed its relations with the USSR through the prism of its relations with India, as Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru was invited by the US to visit in 1949 (Amin, 2022), after which Liaquat Ali Khan was invited to visit Moscow on June 2, 1949, through the Soviet ambassador to Iran. The Soviet Union thereafter insisted that ambassadors be exchanged prior to Liaquat's visit. Although on June 9, Sir Zafrullah Khan tried to stall the move, Liaquat proceeded regardless. In June 1949, the USSR changed the date of the invitation, from August 20 to August 14. Liaquat could not agree to the date as it happened to be the first Independence Day of Pakistan after the Quaid-i-Azam's demise. Subsequently, an invitation came from the US, and Liaquat proceeded there in May 1950. Liaquat mentioned the Soviet invitation when leaving for the US.

A year later, Liaquat, while addressing a press conference in Karachi, explained the position thus: "I cannot go (to Moscow) until those people who invited me to fix a date and ask me to go on such a date (Dawn, 2017). This visit of Liaquat Ali Khan created mistrust between Pakistan and the Soviet Union (Amin, 2022). Additionally, the USSR remained neutral on the Kashmir issue at that time, and its representative remained absent during the voting when the issue was raised in the United Nations (Mahapatra, 2004).

Pakistan- Soviet Relations 1954-1970

The growing partnership between Pakistan and the US further widened the gap between Pakistan and the Soviet Union (Khalid & Munir, 2023). The strained relationship further deteriorated when Pakistan signed a mutual defense assistance agreement with the United States in May 1954. The same year, Pakistan became a member of SEATO and a year later became a member of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), which was viewed by the Soviet Union as threatening development (Khan, 1961). The purpose of these pacts was to contain the expansion of communist ideology to South Asia (Naqvi & Masood, 2017).

The response of the Soviet Union to these developments came upfront when Nikita N. Khrushchev

(Secretary Communist Party) and Nikolai A. Bulganin (Prime Minister) visited India, Afghanistan, and Burma in 1955 for enhancing strategic ties and cooperation (Belokrenitsky, 2023). The delegation fully endorsed the stance of New Delhi on Kashmir during these visits. By supporting India's stance on Kashmir and offering cooperation to India, the Soviet Union pushed Pakistan to think about ways and measures to balance the equation of power in the region. (Chaudhury, 2020).

The delegation also visited Srinagar to reiterate the pro-India position on Kashmir (Naqvi & Abbas, 2022), followed by their visit to Afghanistan, where they announced their support for the Pashtunistan issue in a bid to pressure Pakistan and also promised a credit of \$100 million to Afghanistan (Sattar, 2019). On February 20, 1957, the USSR used its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to reject a resolution moved by Australia, Cuba, the UK, and the US on the Kashmir dispute (Nair & Sharma, 2022).

Translating these anti-Pakistan moves by the former Soviet Union, it was contemplated in policy circles to mitigate the overtly critical attitude of the USSR by extending an invitation to Moscow to participate in the prestigious ceremony of adopting the 1st Constitution of Pakistan. The invitation was accepted as Deputy Prime Minister Anastas I. Mikoyan visited Pakistan in March 1956 to attend the ceremony, which is considered a sign of modest improvement in bilateral relations between the two states (Belokrenitsky, 2023).

The relations once more deteriorated in May 1960 when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down while flying through the airspace of the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet authorities, this plane was flying at an altitude of seventy thousand feet in the airspace of the Soviet Union, which was equipped with advanced cameras to take pictures of the important installations of the Soviet Union. Further, the Soviet authority alleged that the plane had taken off from Badabir Air base near Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The Badabir Air Base was built in 1959 and was secretly used by the US military (Jafri, 2020).

The US gave an explanation that the U-2 plane was unarmed, piloted by a civilian, and was used for weather-related information, and claimed that it took off from Adana Air Base in Turkey. However, the captured pilot disclosed all information about the plane and its purpose. (Iqbal et al., 2011) The US expected that the plane flying at an altitude of seventy thousand feet would not be detected by the Soviets' radar. As it was shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile, which exposed the US's intention. Further, the Pakistani government was warned by the Soviets not to repeat the same incident again, otherwise it would lead to threatening consequences. (Sattar, 2019). Khrushchev, the Soviet President,

threatened Pakistan with worse consequences if another spy plane flew into the Soviet Union in the future. The President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, was informed about the incident and the warning message while he was on his official visit to England. Backed by the US, Ayub Khan was not intimidated by the threatening message of the Soviet President (Iqbal et al., 2011).

The situation in the region changed dramatically in the 1960s due to several developments; first, the Sino-India border conflict in 1962, and due to the tense relations between the USSR and China, which produced a new strategic environment. The Cuban Missile Crisis further put the US in a situation to support India against China by pushing her to go away from the Soviet bloc, which had annoyed Ayub Khan. He expressed his concerns that the arms could be used against Pakistan. Therefore, he decided to change his foreign policy and tried to bring the US, China, and Pakistan closer in a strategic partnership (After Ayub Khan, Pakistan worked secretly to arrange a meeting of H. Kissinger with China in the 1970s for strategic and economic cooperation. Thus, taking China, Pakistan on its side US was successful in isolating the Soviet Union).

The Air base was handed over to the US 1959 for ten years on agreement. After the expiry of the agreement in 1968, Ayub Khan refused to renew it, which was appreciated by Kosygin.

Due to changing geopolitical and geostrategic developments in the region, the Soviet Union also made an attempt to win Pakistan's interests by offering assistance for oil exploration. Pakistan accepted this offer, and an agreement was signed on 4th of March 1961 under which the Soviet government agreed to provide Pakistan with 120 million rubles payable over a period of twelve years, providing technical assistance and equipment for oil exploration in Pakistan. As a result, a Russian team consisting of six members reached Pakistan in May 1961 for the exploration of oil and natural gas (Iqbal et al., 2011).

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan provided another opportunity for the Soviet Union to mend its relationship with both neighbors, as the US suspended arms delivery to both states. The Soviet leaders tried to normalize tense relations between the two states by offering good offices to settle all outstanding issues, including the Kashmir dispute. Ayub Khan visited Moscow in April 1965, which was his first visit, where he met Brezhnev and Kosygin.

The Soviet Union provided credit for development projects in Pakistan. Pakistan sent a military delegation to Moscow to probe to purchase of military supplies. Ayub Khan visited Moscow again in 1967, and before Kosygin returned the visit in April 1968, Pakistan informed the

United States about non-renewal of the agreement on Badaber Airbase upon its expiry in July 1968 (The Air base was handed over to US in 1959 for ten years on agreement. After the expiry of agreement in 1968, Ayub Khan refused to renew it which was appreciated by Kosygin.). In response, Kosygin promised to build a steel plant (Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation) in Pakistan, which was finally constructed in December 1973. After Ayub Khan, the Soviets continued to cooperate with Pakistan on multiple projects during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government.

Pakistan-Soviet Relations 1970-1980

The relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union took another turn in the 1970s when the US President Richard Nixon decided to formally engage China in a strategic partnership. He asked his Pakistani counterpart to arrange a secret visit of the Secretary of State to China. Pakistan helped Henry Kissinger in his talks in Beijing, which took place in 1971. The opening of China with the US through Pakistan annoyed the Soviet government. As revenge, the Soviet Union supported India against Pakistan in the 1971 war and also cast an adverse vote in the UN Security Council.

The Soviet Union played a considerable role in the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 by supporting India during and after the war. In order to punish Pakistan for bringing China closer to the US, the Soviet Union provided all kinds of support to India. However, the relationship between West Pakistan (after disintegration) and the Soviet Union improved once again during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's era by completing the steel mills project.

Pakistan-Soviet Relations 1980-1999

Soon after the demise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after the military coup of Gen. Zia ul Haq, relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union became worse as the latter invaded Afghanistan in 1979 in a bid to save the communist government. As a result of the communist revolution (Saur Revolution) led by Nur Muhammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was transformed, which had the support of the Soviet Union.

The *Mujahideen* (Islamic militants) led by various Islamic groups were united to oppose the government of Taraki, who was the head of state. Amidst the *Mujahideen* movement, Taraki was assassinated as relations between the two factions upholding communist ideology (Halq and Parcham) deteriorated, and Hafizullah Amin became the Prime Minister. He could not successfully counter the *Mujahideen* and therefore sought the assistance of the Soviet Union. The US and Pakistan supported the *Mujahideen* against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

During 1979-1989, the relationship between the two countries was severely harmed, as Pakistan once again sided with the US. Pakistan was the principal base for the Afghan resistance to Soviet forces. Seen from Moscow, Pakistan was the enemy's backer, resource base, and sanctuary (Khan, 2021). The American Intelligence agency CIA provided assistance to anti-Soviet *Mujahedin* rebels in a program called Operation Cyclone. The US President Jimmy Carter initiated a covert program through the CIA to financially support the Afghan *Mujahedin* in July 1979. Operation Cyclone was the code name for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to arm and finance the *Jihadi* warriors in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Conclusion

The relations between the former Soviet Union and Pakistan are a history full of ups and downs. Being a global power, the Soviet Union tried to create and maintain cordial relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. Since the inception of Pakistan, it was a bipolar world, and both the powers (the Soviet Union and the US) were trying to win Pakistan to their side, as Pakistan is located in a geo-strategically important location. On the political chessboard, the Soviet Union tried to align South Asian countries India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

with communist ideology, while the US tried to win these countries to its side.

The contestation between the two superpowers continued throughout the Cold War era, and many ups and downs happened in their relationships but however, the role of China made a difference. Had China-Soviet Union resolved their border issue amicably, it wouldn't have been possible for the US to win. The role of Pakistan in aligning China with the US after its border tension with the Soviet Union paved the way for the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

It finally happened during the government of Mikhail Gorbachev in November 1986 when he decided to leave Afghanistan. In the Geneva Accords signed on 14th April 1988 by Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and the US, it was agreed that the Soviet Union would withdraw from Afghanistan. In February 1989, the last Soviet soldier crossed the Afghan Soviet, marking the end of one of the bloodiest conflicts ever fought in Afghanistan's history. And that also marked the end of Cold War politics between the two superpowers as the Soviet Union disintegrated. The Central Asia Republics (CARs), gaining independence from the former Soviet Union, established a cordial relationship with Pakistan.

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